Prof. Sreekala M. Nair
Abstract
Acharya Śaṅkarā is undoubtedly one of the tall figures in Indian Philosophical arena and it wouldn’t be an overstatement if we depict him as a bright star in the galaxy of world philosophers as well. The all-encompassing vision he promulgated carried the subtlest logical acumen, the deepest religious fervor and also the finest literary qualities, all the three faculties blended so finely with each other, each helping to enhance the efficacy of the other. This interdependence is best visible in the relation between the bhāṣyas and the prakaranagraṇthas; while bhāṣyas function as the basic ground upon which major theses are presented and logically argued out, in the latter he takes up the task of providing supportive arguments over and above what has been explicated in the bhāṣyas, to establish his chosen theory, namely non-dualism. The third category in Śaṅkarā literature comprises the sṭutis and stotras, where he explores the possibilities of language to expound the ineffable by articulating on the saguṇabrahman, the qualified aspect of Brahman, an ontological category he accommodated within his theory to facilitate those who resort to the bi-ways to self – realization. Often scholars who take up an objective study of the philosopher view that either Śaṅkarā is yielding himself to a plain contradiction by engaging in saguṇopāsanā or we will have to deprive him of the authorship of these devotional hymns. The present paper argues that the genius of Śaṅkarā was exploring the possibilities of language to fathom the ineffable through poetics that in no way demean his other use of language as empowered by logic. This way, discarding both the options mentioned ahead, we arrive at a position wherein the authorship of these sṭutis are retained with Śaṅkarā, and at the same time he could get away with the charge of self – contradiction.
Keywords: saguṇopāsanā, bhakṭi, jñāna, advaita, mokṣa, mumukṣu
Some Introductory Remarks
It wouldn’t be an overstatement if we say that Śaṅkarā is one philosopher who has determined the course of Philosophy in India in the classical period. The greatness of this thinker lies in this that one can agree or disagree with him, but cannot ignore him or step aside him and his positions. The tall proclamations he had made were marked as a milestones in Indian philosophy, so much so that the history of Indian Philosophy itself has been bifurcated into two: the pre Śaṅkarā and the post Śaṅkarā periods. He is also remembered in the history of Indian Philosophy for having initiated the interpretative or commentarial tradition that worked so well with Vedantic thought, renewing it in interim periods as befitting the historical context in which it is studied, yet retaining the crux of it intact. In Śaṅkarā we find mutually contradicting personal traits finely interwoven without demeaning the other. In the words of R. Balasubramanian, a veteran Advaitin of contemporary times, “He is at once a hard core traditionalist and an amazing down – to – earth realist, a great mystic and a radical, a fascinating idealist and a constructive religious reformer, an uncompromising intellectual and an ardent devotee.” Even as he came up with innovative ideas with his Advaitic philosophy, he claimed no originality and chose to present himself as a mere spokesman of Upanisadic thought. His commitment to the tradition is remarkable, and is well appreciated down the years. He would leave out no occasion to reiterate the significance of the interrelation between what I have termed as the T – trio, the teacher, text and the tradition. Even as we grant that the basic ideas in Advaita are not Śaṅkarā’s inventions, his originality lies in analysing and interpreting the Prasthanatraya, so as to suite well with the vision of Advaita Vedanata, thus initiating the commentarial tradition, which later on became a format for all those who intended to advocate new philosophical thinking within Vedanta tradition.
Historians are bewildered with the amount of literature attributed to Śaṅkarā: they not only abound in size but also in variety. Over and above the bhāṣyas on the Prasthanatraya, Śaṅkarā has been credited with a number of Prakaraṇa granthas and a good number of Sṭutis and Sṭotras as well. Thus, Śaṅkarā’s literature can be divided into three categories: bhāṣyas, prakaraṇa granthas and sṭuti literature. One will have to subscribe to the belief that Adi Śaṅkarā is the author of all these three types of literature only by adhering to the faith in the tradition, not on the basis of any analysis of common linguistic style or basic ontological positions. The sṭuti – sṭotra literature of Śaṅkarā, presently a collection of over hundred works on varied topics, starting from vedantic wisdom to Māthrupaṅc̣akam, expounding the glory of mother, gives a straight picture of the saint poet, and his wholesome personality. I would like to classify these sṭotras and sṭutis again into three categories, those that reveal philosophical insights like Manīshapaṅċakam, vakyavrtti, advaitatānubhūti, yatipaṅc̣akam, māyapaṅc̣akam, praśnottari as belonging to the category of Vedantic hymns and those which address feminine deities like, laliṭa paṅc̣aratnam, meenakshi paṅc̣akam, devibhujaṅgam, saundarya lahari, śārada bhujaṅgam, māthrupaṅc̣akam in the second category and the rest of the sṭutis addressing Gods like Vishnu, Shiva, Ganesha, Subrahmanya, Hanuman, and Dakshinamurthy as belonging to the third category. While in the first category of n Vedantic hymns the purpose seems to be to reassert the Vedantic principles in a lucid narration, discarding the argumentative and logical rigour inherent in it, and placing the hard core principles of Advaita in poetic form to make it more acceptable to the common man. The argumentative and interpretative method adopted in bhāṣyas and prakaraṇa granṭas, he realized, wouldn’t help to popularize the doctrine among the common man. The attempt seems to be to explore the possibilities of language to expound the Advaita doctrine, as someone who has sensed the nerve of Indian cultural tradition Śaṅkarā might have been well aware of the Kāvyabodha, the linguistic fervour installed in every Indian, and could have consciously employed it to realize his project. These philosophical lyrics aim to easily convey the sum and substance of the doctrine of Advaita and its basic metaphysical positions.
As we know the doctrine of Advaita points to the subjectivity of consciousness and the objectivity of the rest of the phenomenal objects. For Advaita, the knower signifies a complex entity comprising of the seer and the seen (the dṛḳ and dṛṣya). Also note that an inquiry presupposes an object of inquiry. Tradition points out that the subject, who undertakes the inquiry is the jīva, which is a complex entity. Technically jīva refers to the phenomenal being, human endowed with the power of reasoning. To characterize the being in the world, Sankara uses the qualification of jñāna – karma – adhikāra, i.e., eligibility for knowledge and action. If the jīva is the inquiring subject, the entire world conditioned by space, time, and causality is termed as the object of inquiry. Thus, jīva – in – the world, which bears an organic relation with the world, is a pointer to a higher reality, which supports and sustains it. This is the philosophical significance of this very entity, which is indeed a subject – object complex. This abstract and purely conceptual thesis is put forth in simple poetic language in works like Bhajagovindam, where the argumentative and logical components of the theory has been replaced with mundane life situations that intimately connect the doctrine with the daily life of a common man.
The second category, namely sṭutis and sṭotras that address the female deities in fact, brings him an aura of a tantric philosopher. Scholars stand divided on locating tantric traits in Sankara: while some argue that the genius of Śaṅkarā could amalgamate the apparently contradictory views of tantra and advaita, the other group insists that the bhāṣyakāra we are familiar with, endowed with great logical acumen, seem totally absconding in these sṭutis and sṭotras, and hence these must have been written by some later poets and would have used his name for acceptability. Indian scholastic community, as well known, was one group disinclined to document history, and that shouldn’t in any way cause a depreciation to the tradition, for Aristotle has famously told us that tragedy is superior to history. What is or has happened seems of less value when compared to what has been said (Iṭihāsa) and conceptualized by people. Falling within the tradition well, I am also less inclined to probe into a fact finding exercise whether Śaṅkarā indeed write them or it is only a mere belief. For good or bad beliefs seem to carry more weight than factual assertions in our tradition.
Śaṅkarā as a Devotional Poet: Synchronizing Bhakṭi with Jñāna
One of the fundamental positions of Advaita that distinguishes it from the later evolutes of Vedanta, like Viśiṣtadvaita and Dvaita is that bhakti has been credited with only an instrumental value for salvation unlike Jnana which has been identified as the single source of release (Jñānadeva ṭu kaivalyah). How can one coordinate the prevalent and standing position of Advaita with these sṭotras and sṭutis that form a major chunk of Sankaraite literature, is a question that troubled scholars while addressing the personal traits of the Philosopher. Contemporary thinkers on Advaita like TMP Mahadevan, R. Balasubramanian, Veezhinathan and others have argued that there is nothing controversial in attributing these Sthotrakavyas to Śaṅkarā. If you look at the tradition there are many scholars like, Mandana misra, Vyasatirtha II, Madhusudana Saraswati, to name a few from the long list of versatile geniuses India has produced, who have explicitly entertained apparently contradictory positions. Madhusuḍana Saraswati, a later exponent of Advaita, openly admits the role of bhakti for liberation in his work Bhagavata bhakti rasāyana, a work that gives a detailed exposition of bhakti, its status, and the nature of what he calls bhakti vṛtti, and the elevation of bhakti as a rasa. With regard to Madhusudana we also should keep in mind the historical context in which he was prompted to acknowledge bhakti. During that period Dvaitins and Visistadvaitins like Vyasa tirtha II have scored high and went a long way ahead in the establishment of their schools by promoting bhakti, something which appeals to the minds of a common man. He quickly realized that in order to defend Advaita and save it from the onslaughts of rival schools due acknowledgment and promotion of bhagavata cult was essential, which he found more conducive and realistic than mere intellectual prophecy. Historically too it was a period of transition, where Hinduism was targeted by the Muslim invaders, which called for an increased commitment to religion.
It is history that Śaṅkarā took upon himself the task of reestablishing Hinduism, and bring peace among mutually quarreling groups of Saivism, Vaishnavism, Saktism, ganapathyas, sauras and Kaumaras. The prevailing belief is that Śaṅkarā has composed these sthotras to preserve these different routes of bhakti on one hand and also to establish that as an Advaitin he sees oneness in all these different forms. Though in ordinary parlance, a scholar immersed in theoretical exegesis wouldn’t normally dive into such entrepreneurships, given the divergent potencies of Śaṅkarā, it is quite legitimate to believe that he did indulge in such societal functions as well. Once again let me disassociate myself with the empirical historians, and return to the prime philosophical question, namely, how can these sṭotrakāvyas be integrated with the rest of the literature of Śaṅkarā, in other words, what is the philosophical import of these sṭotrakāvyas?
Two Levels of Language in Advaita
It is popular that at the ontological level Advaita makes a distinction between absolute and relative points of view, and this distinction is echoed in all spheres including language. One can distinguish two levels of language in Advaita philosophy, one which relates to the empirical world and the other which relates to the trans – empirical one. In the second level, the language directly refers to the absolute (Nirguṇa Brahman), through a negation of all the distinctions of names, forms etc., indicated by such terms as not gross, not colored etc. Language is also used to describe the accidental properties superimposed on God, to qualify the Saguṇa Brahman, the representation of the Absolute in avidya. These two functions of language permits Advaita to speak of two types of definitions or lakshanas to the Absolute, svarūpa lakṣaṇa and tatāstha lakṣaṇa; Svarūpa lakṣaṇa is said to give the essential properties of Brahman, while tatāstha laksaṇa enumerates the accidental properties of Brahman. “…it may be said that the svarūpa lakṣaṇa points to the what of Brahman while tatāstha lakṣaṇa posits the that of Brahman. While the former indicates the essential nature, the latter refers to its accidental nature.” Śaṅkarā was pretty well aware that the very attempt to subscribe attributes to the absolute would result in subjecting it to categories and the causal scheme, and the Absolute in turn would cease to be so. Even as Sankara well recognized the use of akhanḍārtha vākyas in the Sruti, like the mahavakyas and statements like satyam jñānam anaṭam Brahama, sentences that refer to the absolute nature of brahman without qualifying it with particular attributes, he did not shy away from conditional attribution of accidental qualities to the saguana brahman, asserting that they will be sublated when the real nature of Brahman would shine forth. Even as Śaṅkarā realized that such a description of the absolute will always be open to challenges, he emphasized the methodological usage of this first level of language, for Advaita is just not a doctrine, but a method, travelling by which one could attain release from the worldly bondage. This pragmatic orientation is evident when he takes on a route to accommodate a qualified absolute within the system. For, a beginner will find it easy to understand the nature of Brahman when it is defined as the cause and the support of the world, and the superimposition of accidental qualities on the absolute would help the masses to progress from the known to the unknown.
However, a question remains, can the absolute be signified directly at all? History of Philosophy is replete with caution notes on the inability of language to explain the nature of the absolute, to refer to a few, in the Taittariya it is said, “words turn back” (Taittiriya, 2.9), Taoism too issues a similar warning note, “The Tao that can be spoken of is not the real Tao.” But this does not imply that there is wordless meaning. Speaking about the unspeakable is again through words. The purpose of religious discourse is to name and / or suggest the ineffable, and certainly it would be a mistake to reckon those names as those that exhaust the Being. However, it would be equally wrong to deprive someone using this potency of language to figure out the nature of the absolute. For the ultimate function of language is to perceive reality as seemingly delimited by language, with this difference, as pointed out by Kaviraj, that for the ignorant language is the reality appearing as language, and for the enlightened language is the reality appearing as the reality. Arguing in this fashion Śaṅkarā seems to be aware that the sṭutis and sṭotras that he has composed have the dual function of concealing as well as revealing the real. This takes us to further probe into the mysteries of language and its unique role in relating the being to the Absolute.
The Mystery of Language
One of the basic presuppositions of Phenomenology is that the characteristic philosophical activity involved in understanding any object is the parallel occurrence of self-knowledge, which in fact is the prime goal of any noetic endeavor. J.J. Arapura, a contemporary Indian phenomenologist identifies consciousness as the single habitat of all mysteries. Language too inhabits in consciousness like other mysteries in the worl , but unlike the rest consciousness is intimately related to language, in a sense uniquely that consciousness indeed becomes language. It means that just as language reveals consciousness, consciousness in turn hides the essence of language. Together they form a single mystery. Often metaphysicians have labored to depict this intimate relation between consciousness and language. An interesting characteristic of ancient Indian thought on language is that, it understands language both in its phenomenal and transcendental aspects. Note that in Indian thought the attempt to understand a given phenomenon and contemplating it as a mystery are not mutually exclusive. In other words, it is possible to attempt analyzing language or reality even while maintaining that it is mysterious. Language is the means by which we can plunge into the depth of our own consciousness, and the declared mission of language is to lead us to Being. This may be called the primary religious function of language, but this should not be understood as something that stand apart from the gran phenomenological undertaking of enlightening reality with the help of language. In brief, while employed in religious discourses language hides in itself, but in philosophical explorations it brings light upon thought.
Evidently this insight on the inter relation between parallel structures of language, self and the world is unique to Advaita ontology. Śaṅkarā while playing language at two levels has been tapping India’s inherent philosophical resources on language and its distinct relation with the absolute, permitting it to throw light on the nature of consciousness (a purely philosophical exercise) on one hand, and also conceive it as embodied (as in religious discourse like sthutis and stotras). The prominent intuitions available in Kashmir Saivism and in Bhartrhari that language and consciousness are identical has its source in the exigencies of Indian religious mysticism handed down to us through the tradition, and precisely for this reason language along with consciousness remains as a mystery.
Mystic Use of Language
Mysticism is one area in philosophy that still retains its link with common man on one hand and the practitioners of religion on the other. There are different ways of approach to the mystic experiences and one will have to be at least aware that we can locate infinite shades of it down the tradition. A mystic would either realize the Divine Presence as ‘that’ (tat), as a Living Light permeating all and subsisting beyond all, or as ‘Thee’ and ‘Me’, both inseparable from each other, or it may be realized as ‘Me’ alone. The Supreme Experience is certainly one and the same and yet there is a characteristic quiddity or distinctness (viśeṣa) in each individual, retaining the individual traits intact. While orthodox Advaitins, Trika of the Kashmir school or Mahāyāna Buddhism lay emphasis on the One, conceived positively or negatively, as if it were an undifferentiated whole (akhaṅḍa) even in the face of this unity, there is according to some schools, an inherent state of what looks like differentiation which is, however, not differentiation (bheda) in the true sense of the term but only a logical quiddity or particularity (viśeṣa). Even Śaṅkarā is said to have maintained this position when he said: Satyapi bhedāpagame nātha tavaivābaṛh na mamā inastvam. This implies that even after the establishment of unity (bhedāpagame) there may continue a relationship within this unity, between ‘Thee’ and ‘Me’. One of the later exponents of Advaita, Jñāneśvara, in his Advaitānubhava, emphasizes the need to reiterate the difference. We find the same view being clearly enunciated in Tripurā-Rahasya (Jñānakhaṅḍa). There is no doubt that even in the latter there is a ‘Beyond’, about which nothing can be said or thought. This appears to be the parama-pada of the Gīta , and may be equated with the Parama Siva or Para Samvit of the Saiva and Sakta Tantras respectively.
Who is a mystic poet, how can we identify him from the ordinary users of language? “A mystic is not a devotee in the conventional sense, though he may have the most fervent ardor of devotion. He is neither an ascetic, though in the earlier stages he may be found using methods of self-mortification. He may be all these or may be none. A mystic need not always be a visionary, though he may have visions from time to time. In all the well-known instances we come across certain attributes which may be maximally or minimally present in a true mystic or may even be totally absent, simply because these do not constitute his essential nature.” However, commonalities abound with regard to the nature of mystic experience: for as we move closer to the mystics diversities begin to melt away and their common commitment to One Undifferentiated Whole reveals itself. The agreement among mystics, however, imply a sense of vagueness, which is inherent in the concept of mysticism. Generally a mystic would have a state of consciousness in which the physical being and all other worldly ties cease to have any validity at all. The self-luminous unity between both the seeker and the sought ties them together, and yet each retains its distinct entity. It is a state in which man and God unite themselves in a close embrace and realize their oneness, showing thus, that one is verily inseparable from the other. This indefinable element in mysticism involves a plunge into the profound depths of Being and Consciousness, leading to a clear intuition of Unity and Love, a state which continues even when the mental life and the sense-life are resumed. This experience would linger on even when the senses continue to function, maintaining contact with the so-called external world; but the inner consciousness refuses to take notice of it and persists in the exclusive enjoyment of the bliss on its own light. More or less in the same way, the mystic seems to move in this world of ours and yet he lives in Reality — in a world of his own. Absolute peace and tranquility reign supreme in him. His heart thrills in the delectable experience of self-awareness. It is a state in which the Supreme Union splits itself up into a blessed companionship in which the sense of otherness disappears, and the sense of integrity persists, allowing for the free play of a responsive personality vibrating with every shade of feeling.
The awakening of the soul involves as its concomitant a tendency in the soul to turn inward, first from the object to the light which shines upon it, then from the light to the subject, the source of illumination, thirdly from the subject to the Transcendental Consciousness and Power, and finally from this, back to the Central Being which stands behind all manifestations. The above state leads on to the higher state of absolute resignation to the Divine Will. In other words, the human will at this point unconditionally surrenders to the Divine Will, or in a sense becomes one with it. The consciousness of this state involves a blessed union of parā jñāna and parā bhakṭi, or cit and ānanda, which is universally and eternally the twofold heritage of every true mystic. Neither the senses nor the reason of man can aspire to reach this ineffable condition which Divine Grace alone can promise and fulfil.
From what has been said above it is clear that mystic consciousness cannot employ the same language that has an inbuilt logical structure to communicate the nature of the absolute as experienced by him. Sri Aurobindo claims that the mystic seems to follow a different kind of logic which he names as the logic of the infinite. A mystic seems to stand at the cross roads of phenomenal and trans – phenomenal linguistic divide. While expounding philosophical truths Śaṅkarā has adhered to that level of language in which logic plays the prime position, and in sthotrakāvyas the rhetoric of language comes to play a major role. Note that Western analysts would defy the very possibility of using language bereft of a logical structure for philosophical purpose, lest they become mere speculation. However, the Indian philosophical tradition sanctions such deviations and permits language to play a different role altogether in revealing reality. It is interesting to note that Heidegger favoring such use of language points out that this approach of language to consciousness is an authentic approach of transcendence. The seeds of this unity between two levels of language is visible in Chandogyopanisad wherein Aum is depicted as that which unites the phenomenal and the transcendental. As Arapura extolls “… in aum that which is sundered in phenomenal language is reunited: the division between assertion on the one hand and invocation, chant, prayer etc. on the other is overcome by the chanting of Aum. It restores the unity of language by recognizing it for what it is.” Aristotle, along with Aurobindo views that the rhetoric is of higher linguistic realm when compared to factual assertions. With the help of the theory of catharsis, which may either mean purgation (a pathological effect on the soul quite like medicine on the body) or purifying the emotions, Aristotle demonstrates how tragedy is superior over reality. Tragedy is more real than history because it lifts itself above the particular historical fact for extracting the universal meaning. In this sense, the Absolute / God is not beyond or behind language, on the contrary, language is the sole instrument of both the ignorant and the liberated.
A phenomenological exposition of bhakti also would reveal that at the experiential level a bhakta essentially relates himself with the world with a similar sense of detachment as a mumukshu would. The transcendental unity experienced by the liberated in the phenomenological level, aparokṣānubhuti, as it is technically called, is not essentially different from the experience of a bhakta. An externalist perception would render a feeling that they are two distinct and mutually exclusive methods with bhaktas positing another ontological domain, of a personal God, who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world, a moral governor and striking identity with Him technically would still retain him at the level of avidya, while for jivanmukta the cause of duality, namely avidya is also erased. But a phenomenological exposition of these two states cannot be qualitatively different, with both having attained the transcendental unity with the absolute.
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Select Bibliography
R. Balasubramanian, Advaita Vedanta, PHISC volume XVI, New Delhi, 2002.
R. Balasubramanian, The Self as the Seer and the Seen, SSUS Publications, Kalady, 2008.
John Grimes, An Advaita Vedanta Perspective on Language, Sri sadguru publications, Indian Books center, Delhi, 1991.
J.G Arappura, Hermeneutical Essays on Vedantic Topics, Motilal Banrsidas, Delhi, 1986.
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