Dr.S.Usha

Abstract

Dravya or substance is a basic, fundamental and foundational entity that constitutes reality. Hence it is essential to acquire a good understanding of this concept. But it is not an easy task as different schools of Indian philosophy conceive the various aspects of dravya in different ways. Among several such views, holding dravya in general as enduring (sthira) or momentary (kṣaṇika) is one.

Criticisms were leveled by Viśiṣṭādvaitin-s too, to establish sthiratva of substances against the arguments of the Buddhists to establish kṣaṇikatva. The views of Veṅkaṭanātha regarding this, as in his work Nyāyasiddhāñjanam are presented in this paper.

Key words: Dravya, kṣaṇika, sthira, anumāna, yukti

Introduction

Dravya or substances are basic, fundamental and foundational entities that constitute reality. Hence it is essential to acquire a good understanding of this concept. But it is not an easy task as different schools of Indian philosophy conceive the various aspects of dravya in different ways. Among several such views, holding dravya in general as enduring or momentary is one. Buddhists uphold momentariness of substances. This view was rejected by all the vedāntin-s. The criticisms leveled by Veṅkaṭanātha against the Buddhist view are given below, as culled from his work Nyāyasiddhāñjanam[1] are presented below.

Substances are enduring and are not momentary, since there is no proof for their momentariness. Veṅkaṭanātha asks, whether momentariness is proved by perception or inference? He states that perception cannot prove the momentariness of objects, as it proves the contrary. That is, recognitions like “so’yam ghatah” (this is that pot), etc., prove the enduring nature of substances.

Now, the Buddhists may contend as follows the said recognition cannot prove the objects to be enduring, as the said recognitions are illusory. Their illusoriness is proved by the inference.

प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रमः संस्काराधीनज्ञानत्वात् शुक्तौ इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानवत्।

pratyabhijñā bhramaḥ, saṁskārādhīnajñānatvāt, śuktau idaṁ rajatamiti jñānavat|

(Recognition is false, for it is a knowledge depending upon latent impressions, like he knowledge of silver in a shell).

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this thus: the said inference cannot prove the illusoriness of recognitions, as there is the defect of vyabhicāra in its hetu. That is, the hetu – saṁskārādhīna jñānatva – is present in memory and in perceptual cognitions like surabhi candanam (the fragrant sandal, etc.,) which are valid. Further, pratyabhijñā is not caused due to any defective sense-organ (duṣṭa-kāraṇa-ajanya). Only those which are duṣṭa-kāraṇa-ajanya are illusory. Since pratyabhijñā is not so, it cannot be illusory. So there is the defect of bādha too. Further, it cannot be illusory also, because there is no subsequent knowledge which sublates the pratyabhijñā (bādhaka-pratyaya-abhāva)[2] .

Now the Buddhists may contend that though there is no perceptual cognition which could contradict pratyabhijñā, yet, there are logical arguments (yukti-s) which can contradict it. They are as follows.

• A seed when kept in a store-room does not give rise to a sprout.  But when it is sown in a field, it gives rise to a sprout. So, it is evident from this that the seed has both – the capacity to produce a sprout (sāmarthya) and also its contrary (asāmarthya). But since these two are contrary to each other, they cannot co-exist in a single seed. Hence, there is a logical necessity to accept the difference between the seed which has the sāmarthya and the one which lacks it. When it is so, the pratyabhijñā which comprehends the identity of these seeds gets contradicted.
• If it is accepted, that the seed is possessed of sāmarthya, then, even the one at the store-room must produce it. But it is not found to be so. Hence, the seed in the store –room must be accepted as different from the one in the field. That is, the seed in the store-room gets destroyed and produces a like-one and this process goes on and on. Thus, all entities exist only for a moment and get destroyed, producing like-ones. Since the entities exist only for a moment they themselves are referred to as moments (kṣaṇa-s) and the immediately preceding moment becomes the cause of the succeeding moment. Thus, there is only a series of moments. When it is so, the pratyabhijñā comprehending the oneness of the seed is contradicted. Hence, as it is only illusory, it cannot prove the enduring nature of entities.

Veṅkaṭanātha refutes these arguments as follows: a seed is accepted to possess only the sāmarthya to produce the sprout. The asāmarthya is not accepted in it at all. Therefore, there is no question of the co-existence of contrary features in it. Further it is the nature of the seed to produce the sprout only when the auxiliary causes like water, clay, etc., are present. So the sāmarthya of the bīja means its capacity to produce sprout, only in the presence of auxiliary causes (sahākari-sannidhau-kurvatsvabhavatva). Similarly, this capacity can also be negatively expressed as its nature of not producing the sprout in the absence of the auxiliary causes (sahakāryabhāva-prayukta-karyābhāvatva). So the so called asāmarthya cannot exist, in it. Therefore, there is no possibility for either the co-existence of contrary features or for admitting the momentariness of objects.

Now, the Buddhists might raise the following question; if there is sāmarthya always in the seed, then how can the seed be possessed of the capacity to produce the sprout, when it is in the field and be possessed of the contrary feature, when it is in the store-room?

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this thus: undoubtedly the seed has only sāmarthya in it. However, the capacity to produce a sprout in it, is due to the presence of auxiliary causes and the contrary is due to the absence of them. Thus, as the two contrary features are due to the adjuncts, they can be present in the same seed, but at different times. There is no defect involved in this, at all.

Now the Buddhists might object as to how the two contrary features of proximity of auxiliaries (sahakāri-sannidhi) and their absence (sahakāri-asannidhi) can co-exist in a single seed, even according to the siddhāntin.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this thus: when the sāmagri-s which are conducive to the proximity of the auxiliary causes are present, there will be the sahakāri-sannidhi and in the absence of those sāmagri-s, there will be the sahakāri-asannidhi. Thus the sannidhi and asannidhi are possible at different times, due to the presence and absence of the samagri-s which are produced at different times. These sāmagri-s too belong to different times depending upon their sāmagri-s. This series of sāmagri-s is beginningless (anādi). So there is no possibility for the defect of anavasthā. Thus, sannidhi and asannidhi of the sahakāri-s which have the respective sāmagri-s as their upādhi-s can be present in the same seed at different times.

Now, the Buddhists might raise the following questions: how can there be the co-existence of the two contrary features of sāmagri-sambandha and sāmagri-asambandha, in the same entity?

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by stating that this is unavoidable. As the sāmagri is produced at different times, there is sāmagri-sambandha and sāmagri-asambandha at different times.

Now, it can be contended that if contrary features can be present in an entity at different times, then even gotva and aśvatva must be accepted to be present in an entity at different times. But this is not possible, because perception does not approve it. In the case of sāmagri-sambandha and sāmagri asambandha, however, there is the approval of perception. Hence there is no defect at all.

Further the Buddhisits too, are under obligation to accept the sāmagri-sambandha at a particular time. It is thus: the Buddhists, apart from maintaining the difference between the seed in the store-room and the one in the field, accept commonness between them. That is, say, both are kālama seeds (a particular variety of rice). So there is commonness (sājatya) between the seeds. This seed being momentary is also called a kṣaṇa or a moment (kṣaṇyate-himsayate iti ksanaḥ). This kṣaṇa gives rise to another and so on and a series of like- kṣaṇa -s are produced. Among these seeds (i.e., kṣaṇa -s) belonging to a particular variety, only a particular seed give rise to a seed capable of producing sprout (samartha- bīja) and the rest do not. When it is so, if it is doubted as to how a particular seed alone can produce the samartha- bīja and not the rest, then the Buddhists must answer it only by accepting the sāmagri-viśeṣa-sambandha at a particular time. That is, their answer should then be that, that seed which has the sāmagri-viśeṣa-sambandha at a particular time alone can produce a samartha- bīja. Therefore they cannot object the view of the siddhāntin.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that they need not resort to the sāmagri-samandha at a particular time, but can account for the production of a samartha- bīja, by admitting svabhāva-vāda. That is, only that bīja-kṣaṇa, which immediately precedes the samartha- bīja, has the svabhāva to produce it and not the rest.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies this by stating that, in that case, the siddhantin too, can account for the sāmagri-sambandha at a particular time, by accepting the svabhāva-vāda itself. That is, it is its svabhāva that the sāmagri-sambandha occurs only at a particular time.

Now, the Buddhists may contend, in that case, just as svabhāva-vāda is accepted by the siddhāntin, so kṣaṇika-vāda too, can be accepted by him. But, it is not possible because, there will be two defects if the kṣaṇika-vāda is accepted. They are:

• In the Buddhists view, there is the production and destruction of entities at every moment. In this manner, innumerable moments are to be accepted. But it is not found. Hence, there will be the great defect of accepting innumerable moments, which are unseen (anupalambhamāna-anata- bīja -kalpanam).
• A svabhāva-visesa must be inferred as existing in a particular bīja-kṣaṇa, by which it produces the succeeding kṣaṇa -s. In this manner, innumerable svabhāva-visesa-s must be inferred in innumerable ksana-s. Therefore there is the defect of prolixity (gaurava). But in accepting the sthiratva of the entities, there would be no defect of prolixity. Hence it is better to accept the defect-less view of sthiratva.

Now the Buddhists might contend as follows. It has been stated by the siddhāntin that, only when there is the sahakāri-sannidhi, a bīja can give rise to sprout and not in its absence. From, this it would be clear that they accept sahakāri-kāraṇa as a cause for the production of a sprout. But in the Buddhistic view, sahaāari-kāraṇa is not accepted at all, as a kāraṇa. When sahakāri is not at all a cause, what is the need to accept it? Further if it be a cause, then it must produce effects forever. But it is not found to be so. This itself proves the akāranatva of the sahakāri. Further, it is the nature of the cause to produce the effect, in itself. For example, the upādāna produces the effect in itself. But it is not so in the sahakāri. Therefore sahakāri cannot be the cause.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies this as follows: causality is decided by anvaya-sahacāra and vyatireka-sahacāra. Anvaya-sahacāra is of the form yat sattve yat sattvam and vyatireka-sahacāra is of the form – yadabhāve yadabhāvah.

Now, sahakāri is proved as a cause, as it is only in its presence (say, water etc.,) the effect (say, sprout), is produced and in its absence, there can be no effect. So it is but proper to accept sahakāri, as a cause. If causality is denied to it, in spite of its having the anvaya-sahacāra and vyatireka-sahacāra, then even upādāna cannot be the cause. It is because anavaya-sahacāra and vyatireka-sahacāra prove the causality of both upādāna and sahakāri. Further the Buddhistic view – अधिपतिसहकार्यालम्बन-समनन्तरप्रत्ययाश्चत्वारोऽपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतवः।

(adhipati-sahakāryālambana-samanantarapratyayāścatvāraḥ jñānotpatti-hetavaḥ|) [3]too, cannot be accounted for. Therefore, just as upādāna is accepted as a cause, so also sahakāri must be accepted as a cause.[4]

Further the Buddhists maintain that the kāraṇa and the akāraṇa, and the sahakāri-sannidhi and sahakāri-asannidhi which belong to different times, differentiate the objects. They being contrary features cannot co-exist in one and the same object. Their contradiction cannot be resolved even by difference in time. Hence objects must be accepted as being differentiated by these contrary features.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies this as follows: if the said contention is accepted, then even the kāraṇa and the akāraṇa, and the sahakāri-sannidhi and the sahakāri-asannidhi, which are present in different places, must be accepted as differentiating objects, on the said consideration. That is, a particular seed itself must be accepted as many, as it produces sprout only at a particular place, and at another it does not, and only at a particular place it gets associated with the sahakāri and at another it does not. In that case, as even a momentary seed becomes many, there would be the unwelcome position, even for the Buddhists, to accept countless differences. Therefore nothing can be proved as a single entity, and only the sūnya-vāda may have to be accepted by all. This however is undesirable even for those Buddhists who maintain the momentariness of objects. Hence the said contention is unsound.

Now the Buddhists might contend as follows: In order to avoid the said position, it is accepted that a seed produces sprout only in that place in which it exists and not in the rest.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies that it is not proper to state so. It is because there is the co-existence of two contrary features of – being present (in a place) and not being present (in another place), in a single seed. These contrary features naturally differentiate the object. Therefore, to avoid this unwelcome position, it must be admitted that the contradiction between the two features in a single object, is resolved by deśa-bheda.  Similarly, even kāla-bheda must be accepted as resolving the contradiction. Consequently, the momentariness of objects stands refuted.

Now the Buddhists seek to establish momentariness in another way. It is as follows: those who admit the enduring nature of substances state that every object exist both in the past and the present times. Since they exist in both the divisions of time, they are to be accepted as enduring. But this is not proper as, an object cannot be related to two different times, due to their mutual opposition. Therefore, only momentariness has to be accepted.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this as follows the siddhāntin-s do accept the association of two different times, the past and future, in an object. These past and future times are not with regard to that specific object, but with regard to the other objects. So these two times are only the svakāla-s of the specific objects. Hence, there is no defect involved at all, in an object being related to the pūrva and aprakāla, which form the svakāla of it.

The idea behind this is as follows: The time at which there is the prior non-existence of an object, is its pūrvakāla and the time in which there is the posterior non-existence of an object is its aprakāla. Now, this time, which becomes the pūrvakāla and aprakāla of some objects, can be the svakāla of other objects, if they exist, at that time. So, the siddhāntin-s do not state that an object is associated with the time, which is the substratum, of its prior and posterior non-existence, but only state that, the object is associated with the time which is the substratum of the prior or posterior non-existence of other objects. Here the following illustration is to be kept in mind. A particular place, which is the pūrvadeśa as well as the aparadeśa, with regard to two different atoms, can well be the svadeśa of yet another atom. There is no contradiction involved in it at all. Similarly the pūrvakāla and aprakāla of different entities can be the svakāla of a particular entity. If this is not accepted then the object itself must be accepted to be differentiated due to the contrary features. In that case, no single entity can be proved and as stated before only śūnya-vāda will have to be accepted by all.

Now the Buddhists state as follows: it is not objected that the association with the times conditioned by the prior and posterior non-existence of objects involves contradiction. But the objection is this: among those who advocate sthiratva, some accept the concept of time and some do not. In the case of the former, they state that a single object gets associated with pūrvakāla and aprakāla, and the latter state that the adjuncts of those two times get associated with that object. But both cannot hold well, as the two times or the adjuncts that cause them are mutually opposed to each other like light and darkness. Hence they cannot be associated to a single object. If they are not opposed to each other, then they must be associated to the object simultaneously.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by stating that only if the pūrva-aprakāla-sambandha or the upādhi-sambandha is simultaneously present in an object, there will be contradiction. But, if they are associated to the object at different times, then there is no contradiction. If this is not accepted or if it is maintained that an object can never be associated with two different times, then pratyabhijñā cannot arise at all. It is because even the Buddhists, who maintain pratyabhijñā to be invalid, accept the association of pūrvakāla and aprakāla in it. Therefore to account for pratyabhijñā, the association of the two different times must be accepted in a single entity.

Now the Buddhists might contend as follows the relation of time with the objects is only tādātmya. When it is so, there can be no possibility for the association of two different times in one object. Otherwise, the two times must be mutually identical. (paraspara-tādātmya). This is because of the rule – तदभिन्नाभिन्नस्य तदभिन्नत्वनियमः। (tadabhinnābhinnasya tadābhinnatva-niyamaḥ). Hence applying this maxim, the pūrvakāla which is non-different from the object must be identical with aprakāla too, as aprakāla too, is identical with the object. But there can be no such identity between the different times.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by stating that tādātmya is not the relation that relates time and object. If tādātmya be the relation, then, all the objects which were in the past and which are to be produced must have association with the same time as these must be the cognition – ‘all objects which were and are to be produced are present in this particular time’. But the association of all objects in a particular time is impossible. Therefore, instead of tādātmya, the svarūpa-sambandha of the form – kālikaviśeṣaṇatā alone, is to be accepted as relating the objects and time. Thus, even without accepting the identity between two times, the associations of two different times in an object is possible without involving any contradiction. If identity is insisted upon then, rūpa, rasa etc., which are present in a single object, cannot be accounted for. It is because they are not identical, in spite of being different and are related to a single object[5].

Now the Buddhists can object by stating that there can never be the association of many in one. But this is not possible because, even the Buddhists who admit attribute-less and momentary atoms accept that several atoms get associated and form an aggregate. In this case, a very close conjunction (nairantarya) of several atoms in one atom must be accepted.

Now another section of Buddhists seek of establish momentariness as follows: Perception proves that objects like pot, etc., are existent (ghaṭādayo varthamānaḥ|). This shows that pot, etc., are not avartamāna. Only the two – the past and the future objects are accepted to be avartamāna. From the said perceptual cognition of the pot as ‘ghaṭaḥ varthamānaḥ’ it is clear that the pot is neither related to the past nor to future, but only to the present time. This proves pot, etc., to be momentary.

But, Veṅkaṭanātha states that this view is already refuted as it has been proved that an object can be related to two different times. Further, by the cognition ‘ghaṭaḥ varthamānaḥ’ the absence of the relation with past and future times is neither comprehended, nor implied by anyāthānupapatti. ‘This cognition only proves that pot etc., are not avartamāna at that time[6]. If there be the prior non-existence or the posterior non-existence of an object, then it can be accepted as avartamāna. But as the object itself exists at that time, the avartamānatva of it alone is negated by the vartamānatva-pratīti. It does not prevent the association of two different times in an object. Hence, the sthiratva of objects cannot be refuted.

The perceptual cognition comprehends an object, which has the sense-contact, as associated with that particular time. The association of it with any other time is not comprehended by it. Hence there is no pramāṇa to prove the sthiratva of objects.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies this by stating that the recognition ‘this verily is that’ (tadeva idam) which comprehends an object as related to two different times and which is un-contradicted is the proof for the sthiratva of objects.

Now the Buddhists might object that ‘recognition’ is illusory and hence it cannot prove the sthiratva of objects. They prove the illusoriness of recognition by the following inference.

प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रान्तिः प्रत्यभिज्ञात्वात् दीपप्रत्यभिज्ञावत्।(Pratyabhijñā bhrāntiḥ, pratyabhijñātvāt, dīpa-pratyabhijñāvat)(Recognition is illusory, as it is recognition, like the recognition of lamp).

With regard to the flame of a lamp, there arises the recognition – ‘seyam dīpajvālā’ (this flame of the lamp, is the same as that). But this recognition is contradicted by the inference – दीपज्वाला भिन्ना तैलवर्त्त्याख्यसामग्रीभेदात्।(Dīpajvālā bhinna tailavartyākhya-sāmagrībhedāt)

(The flames of the lamp are different, as their causal materials like wick, oil, etc., are different). Thus the recognition comprehending the oneness of the flame is illusory. On this analogy, all the recognitions become illusory, as they are recognitions. Hence recognition cannot be cited as a proof for the sthiratva of the objects.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by stating that the inference of the Buddhists which proves the illusoriness of recognition is defective. There is the defect of sopādhikatva in it. Kāraṇadoṣa and bādhakapratyaya are the upādhi-s. That knowledge, which is based on some defect or that which is contradicted alone, is illusory. In the case of the dīpapratyabhijñā, there is the defect of similarity (sādṛśya). Hence it is defective. But in the case of the recognition of the pot etc., there is no such defect or contradiction. Therefore they are not illusory and are the pramāṇa-s that prove the sthiratva of objects.

Now the Buddhists might contend that the recognition of pot, etc., though, are not based on any defect are yet contradicted by the said inference, which proves the illusoriness of recognition. Hence they being illusions cannot be pramāṇa-s.

“But it has already been shown”, states Veṅkaṭanātha, “that the inference is defective”. Hence it cannot contradict the recognition. Nevertheless, admitting that the inference contradicts the recognition, he replies as follows: if recognition is admitted to be illusory merely because of it being contradicted by the said inference, then the Mādhyamika view alone will have to be accepted by all. That is, the Mādhyamika-s without bothering about its validity, seek to prove the illusoriness of all objects, through the inference.

सर्वोऽपि प्रत्ययो भ्रान्तिः प्रत्ययत्वात् शुक्ति-रजतादि-प्रत्ययवत्। (Sarvo’pi pratyayo bhrāntiḥ pratyayatvāt sukti-rajatādi pratyayavat). (All cognitions are illusory, as they are cognitions, like the cognition of a shell-silver)

Likewise, the particular section of Buddhists who are the pūrvapakṣin-s too, not caring for the validity of their inference admit that it contradicts the recognition and thereby proves its invalidity. Therefore, it is almost similar to accepting the Mādhyamika view. Further even an illusory recognition and remembrance cannot be accounted for, in the view of those who admit the momentariness of objects. This is because recognition and remembrance require an agent who is sthira (enduring). But in kṣaṇika-vāda, even the self is momentary. Therefore neither recognition (which is illusory), nor remembrance can satisfactorily be explained.

Further, in the kṣaṇika-vāda, anumāna would be totally impossible. This is because there can be no remembrance of the vyāpti, as smṛti in general, is impossible. The result would be that anumāna would be impossible, which would mean that momentariness cannot be proved by inference.

In fact, even accepting that inference is possible, momentariness can still not be proved by it. It is because the inference through which the Buddhists seek to prove momentariness itself is flawed. Their inference is as follows:

यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्, यथा घटः सन्तश्चामीभावाः।(Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ santaśca amī bhāvah)[7] (That which is existent, is momentary, like a pot, and all the entities are existent).

In effect, the above inference is obviously defective as follows: it may be asked as to whether the entire world is intended to be conveyed by the word – bhāva. If yes, then there will be no difference of the pakṣa, in the hetu and the dṛṣṭānta. If there is no pakṣabheda in the dṛṣṭānta, then, it would mean that the sādhya is proved in the dṛṣṭānta, and hence there will be the defect of siddhasādhana. If there is no pakṣabheda in the hetu, then, as the hetu does not exist in the pakṣa through the hetutāvacchedaka-sambandha, there will be the defect of bhagāsiddhi. That is, when there is non-difference between the pakṣa and the hetu, there can be no ādhara-ādheya-bhāva between the two.[8]

To overcome this defect, if bhāva is taken to mean everything else other than pot, then pot cannot serve as the dṛṣṭānta. This is because, it is not accepted as momentary by the siddhāntin-s. And it has already been shown that the alleged contradiction involved in the co-existence of the contrary features of sāmarthya and asāmarthya, cannot show a pot to be momentary. This again is because the contradiction has been already resolved. Hence pot which is not proved to be momentary cannot be the dṛṣṭānta.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that the flame of a lamp can serve as the illustration. But, this too is improper, as even that is accepted to exist for about some three or four kṣaṇa-s.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that kṣaṇopādhi which is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s can serve as the example. That is, that upādhi which limits a small duration of time, namely, a kṣaṇa in the mahākāla, is accepted as kṣaṇopadhi by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s. This kṣaṇopadhi is not sthira (enduring), but is kṣaṇika. If it were sthira, then it cannot limit a kṣaṇa. Hence this kṣaṇikopādhi can serve as the illustration.

But this contention is not correct. It is because the origination of an object, as limited by the destruction of another or the destruction of an object as limited by the origination of some other object alone, is accepted as a kṣaṇopadhi by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s. It is thus: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s accepts a sequence in which the destruction of an object occurs. The sequence is – क्रिया – क्रियातो विभागः – विभागात् पुर्वसंयोगनाशः – पूर्वसंयोगनाशात् उत्तरसंयोगः – ततः कर्मनाशः। (Kriyā, kriyāto vibhāgaḥ, vibhāgāt pūrvasamyoganāsaḥ, pūrvasamyoga-nāsāt uttarasamogaḥ, tataḥ karma-nāsāḥ).

In this sequence, first karma is produced. This moment is the karmotpatti-kṣaṇa. Then, the karma remains in the second moment and gets destroyed in the third. In the second moment, vibhāga-prāgabhāva is destroyed, so that in the third moment, vibhāga can be produced. Now, the karmotpatti- kṣaṇa is the last moment or avasāna- kṣaṇa for vibhāga-prāgahāva. Hence it can be said that the karma is de-limited by vibhāga-prāgahāva, or that the end of vibhāga is characterized or de-limited by the karma. Now the former is technically called vibhāga-prāgabhāvāvacchinna-karma and the latter, karmāvaccinna- vibhāga-avasāna. This vibhāga-prāgabhāva-avacchinna-karma is accepted as the upādhi limiting that particular kṣaṇa. Therefore, ekavastvarāvavacchinna-avasānaka-vastvantaram or ekavastu-avasāna-avacchinna-ārambhaka-vastvantaram is the kṣaṇopādhi. Hence, since both the vastu-s involved are sthira, kṣaṇikopādhi cannot be the illustration.

Now the Buddhists might contend that, there is no evidence (pramāṇa) for proving the parasparāvaccheda between two vastu-s. That is, two things de-limiting each other. Veṅkaṭanātha replies this by stating that as they become the objects of viśiṣṭa-buddhi (complex-cognition) simultaneously, there can be parasparāvaccheda. This is similar to two scales limiting a small place. That is, two scales which are kept in opposite directions and which are conjoined at a particular point by their parts are mutually conjoined. Thus, just as it is possible in the case of space, it is also possible in the case of time.

Thus Buddhists cannot prove momentariness by citing anvayavyāpti, as it cannot be substantiated through an illustration.

Now, the vyatireka-vyāpti of the form – यदक्षणिकं तदसत् यथा शशविषाणम्। yadakṣaṇikam tadasat, yatha śaśaviṣāṇam (that which is not momentary is non-existent as a hare’s horn), might be stated as proving momentariness.

Veṅkaṭanātha rejects this by raising the question as to what is intended by akṣaṇikatva. If kṣaṇikatvābhāva is intended, then the vyāpti cannot hold good. It is because, the pratiyogi of kṣaṇikatvābhāva, namely, kṣaṇikatva itself is unproved. Therefore, without this pratiyogi-jnāna there can be no abhāva- jnāna. Consequently, there can be no vyatireka-vyāpti at all. To avoid this, it can be said that cirakālā-sthāyitva or remaining for some extended time is intended by kṣaṇikatva. But this too is not proper, as it is not present in the hare’s horn which is cited as the illustration.

To overcome this, śaśasṛṅgābhāva might be stated as the illustration. But it is not proper, as it is an existent entity (sat). That is, śaśasṛṅgābhāva exists for ever. Thus, as it has kālasambandha, it becomes pramāṇasiddha. Hence it becomes sat. Being sat, it cannot become the illustration of the vyatireka-vyāpti involving asattva.

Now the Buddhists might object that kālasambandhitva is not sattva but only bhāvatva can be so. Hence the non-existence of hare’s horn can be the illustration.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by pointing out that the asattva of the form of bhāvetaratva (being different from bhāva-a positive entity), is not present in the absence of hare’s horn. That is, according to those who maintain non-existence as a positive entity (bhāvāntaro abhāvaḥ), there can be no bhāvetaratva in the non-existence of hare’s horn, as that too will be of the form of some positive entity.

Further, in the view of those who maintain abhāva as distinct from bhāva, kālasambandhitva alone is unanimously accepted as sattva. Differing from this, if bhāvatva is said to be sattva, by the Buddhists, then, even abhāvatva can be stated to be so, by somebody else. Hence it is not proper to establish the siddhānta in the said manner.

The Buddhists might now object that if abhāvatva is stated as sattva, then even pot, etc., which are positive entities becomes asat. Hence the perception of them cannot be accounted for. Therefore bhāvatva must be stated as sattva.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies that the said defect remains even if bhāvatva is maintained as sattva. That is, ghatābhāva, etc., must be asat, being abhāva. In that case, there can be no perception of them. But they are perceived. This perception can be accounted for only if they have got kālasambandha. Hence that alone must be accepted as sattva.

Thus the objection and the reply are common when either bhāvatva or abhāvatva is accepted to be sattva. Therefore kālasambandha alone is sattva. Since it is present in the non-existence of hare’s horn, it is sat. Consequently it cannot be the illustration of the vyatireka-vyāpti. So this vyāpti too cannot prove momentariness.

Then, a section of Buddhists contend as follows: it is not proper to prove momentariness by sattva. It is because there is the defect of bādha in the hetu – sattva. That is, Buddha has instructed that there is one nitya-tattva. In this nityatattva there is sattva but not kṣaṇikatva. Hence there are the defects of āgama-bādha and vyabhicāra in the hetu (sattva). Hence momentariness of everything else apart from the said nitya-tattva is to be proved by the hetu – dhruvabhāvitva (dhruva-bhāvi is something whose happening cannot be prevented).

That is, that which is dhruva-bhavi, is not dependent upon a cause – यद् ध्रुवभावि न तद्धेतु-सापेक्षम्। (yat dhruvabhāvi na taddhetusāpeksam). If hetu-nirapeksatva is not accepted, then it would be opposed to dhruva-bhāvitva. Therefore, as the destruction of all the originated objects is dhruva-bhāvi, it does not depend upon any hetu. And since it is not dependent upon any hetu an object is destroyed as soon as it gets originated. Thus, momentariness of objects is proved by dhruva-bhāvitva through ahetukatva.

Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes this view by raising the question as to what is intended by ध्रुवभावित्वम् (dhruva-bhāvitva). It can mean only one among the following. They are:

• तद्-समकाल-भावित्वम् – Tad-samakāla-bhāvitvam
• तद्-अनन्तर-भावित्वम् – Tad-anantara-bhāvitvam
• तन्मात्र-जन्यत्वम् – Tanmātra-janyatvam
• तदेकसामग्री-जन्यत्वम् – Tad-ekasāmagrī-janyatvam and
• अहेतुकत्वम् – Ahetukatvam

Now, dhruvabhavitva cannot mean either Tad-samakāla-bhāvitva or Tad-anantara- kāla bhāvitva, as there will be the defect of asiddhi. It thus: the destruction of an originated object, which is stated to be dhruvabhāvi, does not exist at the time at which the effect exists or at the time following the production of the effect. Therefore, if dhruvabhāvi is taken to mean the two said senses, then there will be the defect of asiddhi.

It cannot also mean either Tanmātra-janyatva or Tad-ekasāmagrī-janyatva, as there will be the defects of vyāghāta and virodha. It is thus: if the destruction of effects which is stated to be dhruvabhāvi, be caused by the effect alone (tanmātrajanya) or be caused by the same auxiliaries which produce the effect (tadekasāmagrījanya), then it becomes sahetuka. Hence, if dhruvabhāvitva which means sahetukatva be stated as the hetu, which proves the sādhya – ahetukatva, then there will be the defects of vyāghāta and virodha.

Similarly if ahetukatva is intended by dhruvabhāvitva, then there will be the defect of sādhyāviśeṣa. This is because ahetukatva itself becomes both the hetu and the sādhya. In that case, even the hetu (which is not different from the sādhya), becomes doubtful like the sādhya. Thus, dhruva-bhāvitva cannot mean any of the said five senses[9].

Now, the Buddhists might contend that dhruvabhāvitva means eṣyatva-niyama or the rule that something will invariably occur. But, Veṅkaṭanātha points out that this too is improper, as there is the defect of vyabhicāra[10]. It is thus: the Buddhists who uphold momentariness of objects admit that there is a series of momentary objects. This series can either be a series of like-objects (sadṛśa-santāna), or a series of unlike-objects (visadṛśa-santana). When there is a series of momentary pots, then there is the sadṛśa-santāna involving apratisankhyā-nirodha. That is, there is the non-intentional or natural destruction of the preceding momentary pots in the series.

Similarly, when a pot is broken by a stick, then there is a series of pot-shreds, which are also momentary. This series which got initiated by a pot has pot-shreds which are dissimilar to it. Therefore this is a visadṛśa-santāna. This dissimilar series involves pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha[11]. That is there is the destruction of the pot due to the will to destroy it. The Buddhists accept that when a pot is broken with a stick, both the initial momentary pot-shred in the dissimilar series and the pratisaṅkhyā -nirodha occur simultaneously. In this, pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, there is the eṣyatva-niyama which is the hetu, but there is no ahetukatva, which is the sādhya. Hence there is the defect of vyabhicāra.

Thus dhruva-bhāvitva taken in any sense remains defective.

Further if ahetukatva is accepted merely because of eṣyatva-niyama, then all the objects of the world, which are supposed to be momentary, must come into being in the first moment itself and get destroyed in the very second moment. But such a position is not found in experience. Therefore, dhruva-bhāvitva cannot prove ahetukatva and consequently kṣaṇikatva cannot be proved.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that there is need for instructing momentariness, for the purpose of preventing attachment to worldly existence. But Veṅkaṭanātha points out that the Buddhists who consider themselves to be dhārmika-s will incur the great sin due to uttering falsehood. A person of sharp intellect who listens to the instruction of momentariness will easily understand its apramaikata and so the attachment to the world in his case will not be prevented. Further, this attachment can be prevented even by instructing the anityatva of samsāra. If not, only sūnya or void is to be instructed for the purpose of developing detachment. But it is not acceptable even to the Vaibhāṣika-s. Therefore momentariness need not be instructed for the said purpose.

Then, Veṅkaṭanātha proceeds to give the counter-inferences for refuting momentariness and establishing the enduring nature of objects. They are as follows:

1. विगीता प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्वविषये प्रमा अबाधित-बुद्धित्वात् स्वलक्षणबुद्धिवत्। (Vigītā pratyabhijñā, svaviṣaye pramā, abādhitabuddhitvāt svalaksaṇa-buddhivāt) (Recognition, which is under discussion, is valid in regard to its object, as it is an un-contradicted knowledge, like the knowledge of the svalaksaṇa -s). [In the Buddhist terminology, svalaksaṇa -s means rūpa, rasa, gandha and sparśa. The knowledge of these is accepted to be un-contradicted and hence valid even by the Buddhists. The Vedāntin-s too accept the knowledge of the four, though not termed svalaksaṇa-s, as valid. Similar to this, recognition too must be valid, being un-contradicted. The inference of the Buddhists, प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रमः प्रत्यभिज्ञात्वात् दीपप्रत्यभिज्ञावत्। (pratyabhijñā, bhramaḥ, pratyabhijñātvat, dīpapratyabhijñāvat) (recognition is invalid, being recognition, like the recognition of the flame of the lamp), is contradicted by the said inference].
2. घटादयः अक्षणिकाः सत्त्वात् संप्रतिपन्न नित्यवत्। (Ghaṭādayaḥ akṣaṇikāḥ sattvāt, sampratipanna-nityavat) (Pot etc. are not momentary, being existent, like the eternal object accepted by both). [The Buddhists accept a nitya-tattva instructed by Buddha. The Vedāntin-s too accept Brahman and other objects as nitya. These are accepted to be nitya due to sattva (i.e., since they are existent). Similarly, pot etc., too are not momentary being existent. The inference of the Buddhists – क्षणिकं सत्त्वात् घटवत्। (ksanikam sattvat ghaṭāvat) is contradicted by the said inference].
3. घटादयः अक्षणिकाः प्रतीतत्वात् शशशृङ्गादिवत्। (Ghaṭādayaḥ akṣaṇikāḥ pratītatvāt, śaśaśṛṅg-ādivat) (Pot etc. are not momentary, as they are objects of knowledge, like the hare’s horn). [The hare’s horn is cognized by the word – śaśaśṛṅga. It is also not momentary as it is tuccha. Likewise, pot etc., too being cognized cannot be momentary. This inference too contradicts the inference of the Buddhists – क्षणिकं सत्त्वात् घटवत्।(kṣaṇikam sattvāt, ghaṭavat)].
4. प्रध्वंसः सहेतुकः पूर्वावधिमत्त्वात् पटवत्।(Pradhvaṁsaḥ sahetukaḥ pūrva-avadhimatvāt, paṭavat). (Destruction is possessed of cause, as it has a beginning like a cloth). [This inference contradicts the inference of the Buddhists – प्रध्वंसः अहेतुकः ध्रुवभावित्वात्। (Pradhvaṁsaḥ ahetukaḥ dhruva-bhavitvāt)].

Conclusion

Thus, the enduring nature of substances is proved, by refuting momentariness upheld by the Mādhyamikabauddhas.

____

References

1. Nyayasiddhanjana of Vedantadesika with Nyaya-siddhanjana-tika and Ratna-petika, ed., Uttamur Veeraraghavacharya, Ubhayavedanta-grantmala, T.Nagar, Madras – 17, 1978
2. Nyayasiddhanjana of Vedantadesika, with Nyaya-siddhanjana-tika, ed. Kapisthalam Desikacarya, SrivaisnavaSiddhanta Pracara Sabha Ltd., Madras, 1934
3. Tattva-muktakalapa and Sarvarthasiddhi and two commentaries, ed. Uttamur Veeraraghavacharya, Ubhayavedantagrantamala, Madras 1973

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