

Dravya: Enduring or Momentary

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Introduction

Dravya or substances are basic, fundamental and foundational entities that constitute reality. Hence it is essential to acquire a good understanding of this concept. But it is not an easy task as different schools of Indian philosophy conceive the various aspects of *dravya* in different ways, for instance, there are divergent ways in holding *dravya*, either as enduring or momentary. While Naiyyayikas subscribe to enduring substances, the Buddhists uphold momentariness of substances. The latter view, that substances are momentary, was rejected by all the *vedāntin*-s, even when they retain disagreements with the Nyaya materialist approach. In this paper an attempt has been made to examine the criticisms leveled by *Veṅkaṭanātha* against the Buddhist view, as culled from his work *Nyāyasiddhāñjanam*.¹

Placing his thesis that substances are enduring and are not momentary, *Veṅkaṭanātha* argues that we have no proof to substantiate their momentariness. *Veṅkaṭanātha* asks, whether momentariness is proved by perception or inference? He states that perception cannot prove the momentariness of objects, as it proves the contrary. That is, recognitions like “*so'yam ghatah*” (this is that pot), etc., prove the enduring nature of substances. Now, the Buddhists may contend that

the said recognition cannot prove the enduring nature of objects, as the said recognitions are illusory. Their illusoriness is proved by the inference, as it has been observed by them that recognition is false, for it is a knowledge depending upon latent impressions, like the knowledge of silver in a shell. (*pratyabhijñā bhramah, saṃskārādhīna jñānatvāt, śuktau idam rajatamiti jñānavat*). (ref.) *Veṅkaṭanātha's* response to this is follows: the said inference cannot prove the illusoriness of recognitions, as there is the defect of *vyabhicāra* in its *hetu*. That is, the *hetu* – *saṃskārādhīna jñānatva* is present in memory and in perceptual cognitions like *surabhi candanam* (the fragrant sandal, etc.,) which are valid. Further, *pratyabhijñā* is not caused due to any defective sense-organ (*duṣṭa-kāraṇa-janya*). Only those which are *duṣṭa-kāraṇa-janya* are illusory. Since *pratyabhijñā* is not so, it cannot be illusory. So there is no defect of *bādha* too. Further, it cannot be illusory because there is no subsequent knowledge which sublates the *pratyabhijñā* (*bādhaka-pratyaya-abhāva*).²

Now the Buddhists may repudiate this pointing out that though there is no perceptual cognition which could contradict *pratyabhijñā*, yet, there are logical arguments (*yukti-s*) which can contradict it. They are as follows: A seed when kept in a store-room does not give rise to a sprout. But when it is sown in a field, it gives rise to a sprout. It is evident from this that the seed has both the capacity (*sāmarthya*) to produce a sprout and also its contrary (*asāmarthya*). But since these two are contrary to each other, they cannot co-exist in a single seed. Hence, there is a logical necessity to accept the difference between the seed which has the *sāmarthya* and the one which lacks it. If we were to identify the two types of seeds, the one which bears the *sāmarthya*, and the other *asāmarthya* with *pratyabhijñā*, we go wrong. If it is accepted that the seed is possessed of *sāmarthya* to produce, then, even the one at the store-room must produce it, which is not the case. Hence, the seed in the store –room must be accepted as different from the one in the field. That is, the seed in the store-room gets destroyed and produces a like-one and this process goes on and on. Thus, all entities exist only for a moment and get destroyed, producing the like-ones. Since the entities exist only for a moment, they themselves are referred to as moments (*kṣaṇa-s*) and the immediately preceding moment becomes the cause of the succeeding moment. Thus, there is only a series of moments. If this is accepted, the *pratyabhijñā* comprehending the oneness of the seed is contradicted, it is only illusory and cannot prove the enduring nature of entities.

2 *Ratnapetīkā Com. on Nyāyasiddhāntjanam* pp. 16 -17

Veṅkaṭanātha refutes these arguments as follows: a seed is accepted to possess only the *sāmarthya* to produce the sprout, the *asāmarthya* is not its natural disposition. Therefore, there is no question of the co-existence of contrary features in it. Further it is the nature of the seed to produce the sprout only when the auxiliary causes like water, clay, etc., are present. So the *sāmarthya* of the *bīja* means its capacity to produce sprout in the presence of auxiliary causes (*sahākāri-sannidhau-kurvatsvabhavatva*). Similarly, this capacity can also be negatively expressed as its nature of not producing the sprout in the absence of the auxiliary causes (*sahakāryabhāva-prayukta-karyābhāvatva*). Hence it is wrong to claim that the *asāmarthya* exists in it. Therefore, there is no possibility for either the co-existence of contrary features or for admitting the momentariness of objects.

Now, the Buddhists might raise the following question; if there is *sāmarthya* always in the seed, then how can the seed be possessed of the capacity to produce the sprout, when it is in the field and be possessed of the contrary feature, when it is in the store-room? *Veṅkaṭanātha* answers to this in the following manner: undoubtedly the seed has only *sāmarthya* in it. However, the capacity to produce a sprout in it is due to the presence of auxiliary causes and the contrary is due to the absence of them. Thus, as the two contrary features are due to the adjuncts, they can be present in the same seed, but at different times. There is no defect involved in this, at all. Now the Buddhists might object as to how the two contrary features of proximity of auxiliaries (*sahākāri-sannidhi*) and their absence (*sahākāri-asannidhi*) can co-exist in a single seed, even according to the *siddhāntin*. *Veṅkaṭanātha* answers: when the *sāmagri*-s which are conducive to the proximity of the auxiliary causes are present, there will be the *sahākāri-sannidhi* and in the absence of those *sāmagri*-s, there will be the *sahākāri-asannidhi*. Thus, the *sannidhi* and *asannidhi* are possible at different times, due to the presence and absence of the *sāmagri*-s which are produced at different times. This series of *sāmagri*-s is beginningless (*anādi*), and hence there is no possibility for the defect of *anavasthā*. Thus, *sannidhi* and *asannidhi* of the *sahākāri*-s, which have the respective *sāmagri*-s as their *upādhi*-s can be present in the same seed at different times.

Now, the Buddhists might raise the following questions: how can there be the co-existence of the two contrary features of *sāmagri-sambandha* and *sāmagri-asambandha*, in the same entity? *Veṅkaṭanātha* answers this by stating that this is unavoidable. As the *sāmagri* is produced at different times there could

be *sāmagri-sambandha* and *sāmagri-asambandha* at different times. But this is objectionable, says the Buddhist: if contrary features can be present in an entity at different times, then even *gotva* and *aśvatva* must be accepted to be present in an entity at different times. Veṅkaṭanātha, however, denounces this, because perception does not approve this. But in the case of *sāmagri-sambandha* and *sāmagri asambandha*, however, there is the approval of perception. Hence there is no defect at all. Further the Buddhists too are under obligation to accept the *sāmagri-sambandha* at some point: the Buddhists, apart from maintaining the difference between the seed in the store-room and the one in the field, accept a commonness that prevails between them, for instance, both are *kālama* seeds (a particular variety of rice) and so on. So there is commonness (*sājatya*) between the seeds. This seed being momentary is also called a *kṣaṇa* or a moment (*kṣaṇyate-himsayate iti kṣanaḥ*). This *kṣaṇa* gives rise to another and so on and a series of like - *kṣaṇa*-s are produced. Among these momentary seeds (i.e., *kṣaṇa* -s) belonging to a particular variety, only a particular seed gives rise to a seed capable of producing sprout (*samartha- bīja*) and the rest do not. When it is so, the fact that a particular seed alone can produce the *samartha- bīja* and not the rest can be accommodated even by the Buddhists only by accepting the *sāmagri-viśeṣa-sambandha* at a particular time. That is, their answer should then be that, that seed which has the *sāmagri-viśeṣa-sambandha* at a particular time alone can produce a *samartha- bīja*, an answer that attest to the position of the *siddhāntin*.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that they need not resort to the *sāmagri-sambandha* at a particular time, but can account for the production of a *samartha- bīja* by admitting *svabhāva-vāda*. They maintain that *bīja-kṣaṇa*, which immediately precedes the *samartha- bīja*, has the *svabhāva* to produce it and not the rest. Veṅkaṭanātha replies to this by stating that the *siddhāntin* has no difficulty in conceding to this too, can account for the *sāmagri-sambandha* at a particular time by accepting the *svabhāva-vāda* itself. That is, it is its *svabhāva* that the *sāmagri-sambandha* occurs only at a particular time.

This response would in fact make the Buddhists jubilant, they may contend that, in that case, just as *svabhāva-vāda* is accepted by the *siddhāntin*, so *kṣaṇika-vāda* too can be accepted by them. But Vedantins scrupulously reject the proposal: it is not possible to embrace *kṣaṇika-vāda* because, they get to commit two defects by accepting it, viz., 1) In the Buddhists view, there is the production and destruction

of entities at every moment, which in turn demand that we accept the existence of innumerable moments, something which we don't find in reality. Hence, there will be the great defect of accepting innumerable moments, which are unseen (*anupalambhamāna-anata-bīja-kalpanam*). 2) A *svabhāva-visesa* must be inferred as existing in a particular *bīja-kṣaṇa*, by which it produces the succeeding *kṣaṇa*-s. In this manner, innumerable *svabhāva-visesa*-s must be inferred in innumerable *ksana*-s. Therefore, there is the defect of prolixity (*gaurava*). But in accepting the *sthīratva* of the entities, there would be no defect of prolixity. Hence it is better to accept the defect-less view of *sthīratva*.

Now the Buddhists might contend as follows: It has been stated by the *siddhāntin* that, only when there is the *sahakāri-sannidhi*, a *bīja* can give rise to sprout and not in its absence. From, this it would be clear that they accept *sahakāri-kāraṇa* as a cause for the production of a sprout. But in the Buddhist view, *sahāāri-kāraṇa* is not accepted at all, as a *kāraṇa*. When *sahakāri* is not at all a cause, what is the need to accept it? Further if it be a cause, then it must produce effects forever. But it is not found to be so. This itself proves the *akāraṇatva* of the *sahakāri*. Further, it is the nature of the cause to produce the effect, in itself. For example, the *upādāna* produces the effect in itself. But it is not so in the *sahakāri*. Therefore *sahakāri* cannot be the cause. *Veṅkaṭanātha* replies to this as follows: causality is decided by *anvaya-sahacāra* and *vyatireka-sahacāra*. *Anvaya-sahacāra* is of the form *yat sattve yat sattvam* and *vyatireka-sahacāra* is of the form – *yadabhāve yadabhāvah*. Now, *sahakāri* is proved as a cause, as it is only in its presence (say, water etc.,) the effect (say, sprout), is produced and in its absence, there can be no effect. So it is but proper to accept *sahakāri*, as a cause. If causality is denied to it, in spite of its having the *anvaya-sahacāra* and *vyatireka-sahacāra*, then even *upādāna* cannot be the cause. It is because *anavaya-sahacāra* and *vyatireka-sahacāra* prove the causality of both *upādāna* and *sahakāri*.

Further the Buddhist view:

अधिपति सहकार्यालम्बन समनन्तरप्रत्ययाश्चत्वारोऽपि ज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतवः। अधिपति (*adhipati-sahakāryālambana-samanantarapratyayāścātvarāḥ jñānotpatti-hetavaḥ*)³ too, cannot be accounted for. Therefore, just as *upādāna* is accepted as a cause, so also *sahakāri* must be accepted as a cause.⁴

3 Quoted in *Nyāya-siddhāntajana-ṭikā* p. 20 & *Ratnapetīkā* Com. on *Nyāyasiddhāntjanam* p. 20

4 *Ratnapetīkā* Com. on *Nyāyasiddhāntjanam* p. 21

Further the Buddhists maintain that the *kāraṇa* and the *akāraṇa*, and the *sahakāri-sannidhi* and *sahakāri-asannidhi* which belong to different times, differentiate the objects. They being contrary features cannot co-exist in one and the same object. Their contradiction cannot be resolved even by difference in time. Hence objects must be accepted as being differentiated by these contrary features.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies this as follows: if the said contention is accepted, then even the *kāraṇa* and the *akāraṇa*, and the *sahakāri-sannidhi* and the *sahakāri-asannidhi*, which are present in different places, must be accepted as differentiating objects, on the said consideration. That is, a particular seed itself must be accepted as many, as it produces sprout only at a particular place, and at another it does not, and only at a particular place it gets associated with the *sahakāri* and at another it does not. In that case, as even a momentary seed becomes many, there would be the unwelcome position, even for the Buddhists, to accept countless differences. Therefore nothing can be proved as a single entity, and only the *sūnya-vāda* may have to be accepted by all. This however is undesirable even for those Buddhists who maintain the momentariness of objects. Hence the said contention is unsound.

Now the Buddhists might contend as follows: In order to avoid the said position, it is accepted that a seed produces sprout only in that place in which it exists and not in the rest.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies that it is not proper to state so. It is because there is the co-existence of two contrary features of - being present (in a place) and not being present (in another place), in a single seed. These contrary features naturally differentiate the object. Therefore, to avoid this unwelcome position, it must be admitted that the contradiction between the two features in a single object, is resolved by *deśa-bheda*. Similarly, even *kāla-bheda* must be accepted as resolving the contradiction. Consequently, the momentariness of objects stands refuted.

Now the Buddhists seek to establish momentariness in another way. It is as follows: those who admit the enduring nature of substances state that every object exist both in the past and the present times. Since they exist in both the divisions of time, they are to be accepted as enduring. But this is not proper as, an object cannot be related to two different times, due to their mutual opposition. Therefore, only momentariness has to be accepted.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this as follows the *siddhāntin-s* do accept the association of two different times, the past and future, in an object. These past

and future times are not with regard to that specific object, but with regard to the other objects. So these two times are only the *svakāla*-s of the specific objects. Hence, there is no defect involved at all, in an object being related to the *pūrva* and *aparakāla*, which form the *svakāla* of it.

The idea behind this is as follows: The time at which there is the prior non-existence of an object, is its *pūrvakāla* and the time in which there is the posterior non-existence of an object is its *aparakāla*. Now, this time, which becomes the *pūrvakāla* and *aparakāla* of some objects, can be the *svakāla* of other objects, if they exist, at that time. So, the *siddhāntin*-s do not state that an object is associated with the time, which is the substratum, of its prior and posterior non-existence, but only state that, the object is associated with the time which is the substratum of the prior or posterior non-existence of other objects. Here the following illustration is to be kept in mind. A particular place, which is the *pūrvadeśa* as well as the *aparadeśa*, with regard to two different atoms, can well be the *svadeśa* of yet another atom. There is no contradiction involved in it at all. Similarly the *pūrvakāla* and *aparakāla* of different entities can be the *svakāla* of a particular entity. If this is not accepted then the object itself must be accepted to be differentiated due to the contrary features. In that case, no single entity can be proved and as stated before only *śūnya-vāda* will have to be accepted by all.

Now the Buddhists state as follows: it is not objected that the association with the times conditioned by the prior and posterior non-existence of objects involves contradiction. But the objection is this: among those who advocate *sthīratva*, some accept the concept of time and some do not. In the case of the former, they state that a single object gets associated with *pūrvakāla* and *aparakāla*, and the latter state that the adjuncts of those two times get associated with that object. But both cannot hold well, as the two times or the adjuncts that cause them are mutually opposed to each other like light and darkness. Hence they cannot be associated to a single object. If they are not opposed to each other, then they must be associated to the object simultaneously.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by stating that only if the *pūrva-aparakāla-sambandha* or the *upādhi-sambandha* is simultaneously present in an object, there will be contradiction. But, if they are associated to the object at different times, then there is no contradiction. If this is not accepted or if it is maintained that an object can never be associated with two different times, then *pratyabhijñā* cannot arise at all. It is because even the Buddhists, who maintain *pratyabhijñā*

to be invalid, accept the association of *pūrvakāla* and *aparakāla* in it. Therefore to account for *pratyabhijñā*, the association of the two different times must be accepted in a single entity.

Now the Buddhists might contend as follows the relation of time with the objects is only *tādātmya*. When it is so, there can be no possibility for the association of two different times in one object. Otherwise, the two times must be mutually identical. (*paraspara-tādātmya*). This is because of the rule

तदभिन्नाभिन्नस्य तदभिन्नत्वनियमः ।

(*tadabhinnābhinnasya tadābhinnatva-niyamaḥ*).

Hence applying this maxim, the *pūrvakāla* which is non-different from the object must be identical with *aparakāla* too, as *aparakāla* too, is identical with the object. But there can be no such identity between the different times.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by stating that *tādātmya* is not the relation that relates time and object. If *tādātmya* be the relation, then, all the objects which were in the past and which are to be produced must have association with the same time as these must be the cognition – ‘all objects which were and are to be produced are present in this particular time’. But the association of all objects in a particular time is impossible. Therefore, instead of *tādātmya*, the *svarūpa-sambandha* of the form – *kālikaviśeṣanatā* alone, is to be accepted as relating the objects and time. Thus, even without accepting the identity between two times, the associations of two different times in an object is possible without involving any contradiction. If identity is insisted upon then, *rūpa*, *rasa* etc., which are present in a single object, cannot be accounted for. It is because they are not identical, in spite of being different and are related to a single object⁵.

Now the Buddhists can object by stating that there can never be the association of many in one. But this is not possible because, even the Buddhists who admit attribute-less and momentary atoms accept that several atoms get associated and form an aggregate. In this case, a very close conjunction (*nairantarya*) of several atoms in one atom must be accepted.

Now another section of Buddhists seek of establish momentariness as follows: Perception proves that objects like pot, etc., are existent (*ghaṭādayo varthamānaḥ*). This shows that pot, etc., are not *avartamāna*. Only the two – the past and the future objects are accepted to be *avartamāna*. From the said perceptual cognition of the pot as ‘*ghaṭaḥ varthamānaḥ*’ it is clear that the pot is neither

related to the past nor to future, but only to the present time. This proves pot, etc., to be momentary.

But, *Veṅkaṭanātha* states that this view is already refuted as it has been proved that an object can be related to two different times. Further, by the cognition ‘*ghaṭaḥ varthamānaḥ*’ the absence of the relation with past and future times is neither comprehended, nor implied by *anyāthānupapatti*. ‘This cognition only proves that pot etc., are not *avartamāna* at that time⁶. If there be the prior non-existence or the posterior non-existence of an object, then it can be accepted as *avartamāna*. But as the object itself exists at that time, the *avartamānatva* of it alone is negated by the *vartamānatva-pratīti*. It does not prevent the association of two different times in an object. Hence, the *sthiratva* of objects cannot be refuted.

The perceptual cognition comprehends an object, which has the sense-contact, as associated with that particular time. The association of it with any other time is not comprehended by it. Hence there is no *pramāṇa* to prove the *sthiratva* of objects.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies this by stating that the recognition ‘this verily is that’ (*tadeva idam*) which comprehends an object as related to two different times and which is un-contradicted is the proof for the *sthiratva* of objects.

Now the Buddhists might object that ‘recognition’ is illusory and hence it cannot prove the *sthiratva* of objects. They prove the illusoriness of recognition by the following inference.

प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रान्तिः प्रत्यभिज्ञात्वात् दीपप्रत्यभिज्ञावत् ।

(*Pratyabhijñā bhrāntiḥ, pratyabhijñātvāt, dīpa-pratyabhijñāvat*)

(Recognition is illusory, as it is recognition, like the recognition of lamp).

With regard to the flame of a lamp, there arises the recognition – ‘*seyam dīpajvālā*’ (this flame of the lamp, is the same as that). But this recognition is contradicted by the inference –

दीपज्वाला भिन्ना तैलवर्त्याख्यसामग्रीभेदात् ।

(*Dīpajvālā bhinna tailavartyākhyā-sāmagrībedāt*)

(The flames of the lamp are different, as their causal materials like wick, oil, etc., are different).

Thus the recognition comprehending the oneness of the flame is illusory. On this analogy, all the recognitions become illusory, as they are recognitions. Hence recognition cannot be cited as a proof for the *sthiratva* of the objects.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by stating that the inference of the Buddhists which proves the illusoriness of recognition is defective. There is the defect of *sopādhikatva* in it. *Kāraṇadoṣa* and *bādhakapratyaya* are the *upādhi*-s. That knowledge, which is based on some defect or that which is contradicted alone, is illusory. In the case of the *dīpapratyabhijñā*, there is the defect of similarity (*sādrśya*). Hence it is defective. But in the case of the recognition of the pot etc., there is no such defect or contradiction. Therefore they are not illusory and are the *pramāṇa*-s that prove the *sthīratva* of objects.

Now the Buddhists might contend that the recognition of pot, etc., though, are not based on any defect are yet contradicted by the said inference, which proves the illusoriness of recognition. Hence they being illusions cannot be *pramāṇa*-s.

“But it has already been shown”, states *Veṅkaṭanātha*, “that the inference is defective”. Hence it cannot contradict the recognition. Nevertheless, admitting that the inference contradicts the recognition, he replies as follows: if recognition is admitted to be illusory merely because of it being contradicted by the said inference, then the *Mādhyamika* view alone will have to be accepted by all. That is, the *Mādhyamika*-s without bothering about its validity, seek to prove the illusoriness of all objects, through the inference.

सर्वोऽपि प्रत्ययो भ्रान्तिः प्रत्ययत्वात् शुक्ति-रजतादि-प्रत्ययवत् ।

(*Sarvo'pi pratyayo bhrāntiḥ pratyayatvāt sukṭi-rajatādi pratyayavat*).

(All cognitions are illusory, as they are cognitions, like the cognition of a shell-silver)

Likewise, the particular section of Buddhists who are the *pūrvapakṣin*-s too, not caring for the validity of their inference admit that it contradicts the recognition and thereby proves its invalidity. Therefore, it is almost similar to accepting the *Mādhyamika* view. Further even an illusory recognition and remembrance cannot be accounted for, in the view of those who admit the momentariness of objects. This is because recognition and remembrance require an agent who is *sthīra* (enduring). But in *kṣaṇika-vāda*, even the self is momentary. Therefore neither recognition (which is illusory), nor remembrance can satisfactorily be explained.

Further, in the *kṣaṇika-vāda*, *anumāna* would be totally impossible. This is because there can be no remembrance of the *vyāpti*, as *smṛti* in general, is impossible. The result would be that *anumāna* would be impossible, which would mean that momentariness cannot be proved by inference.

In fact, even accepting that inference is possible, momentariness can still not be proved by it. It is because the inference through which the Buddhists seek to prove momentariness itself is flawed. Their inference is as follows:

यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्, यथा घटः सन्तश्चामीभावाः ।

(Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ santaśca amī bhāvah)⁷

(That which is existent, is momentary, like a pot, and all the entities are existent).

In effect, the above inference is obviously defective as follows: it may be asked as to whether the entire world is intended to be conveyed by the word – *bhāva*. If yes, then there will be no difference of the *pakṣa*, in the *hetu* and the *drṣṭānta*. If there is no *pakṣabheda* in the *drṣṭānta*, then, it would mean that the *sādhya* is proved in the *drṣṭānta*, and hence there will be the defect of *siddhasādhana*. If there is no *pakṣabheda* in the *hetu*, then, as the *hetu* does not exist in the *pakṣa* through the *hetutāvacchedaka-sambandha*, there will be the defect of *bhagāsiddhi*. That is, when there is non-difference between the *pakṣa* and the *hetu*, there can be no *ādharma-ādheya-bhāva* between the two.⁸

To overcome this defect, if *bhāva* is taken to mean everything else other than pot, then pot cannot serve as the *drṣṭānta*. This is because, it is not accepted as momentary by the *siddhāntin*-s. And it has already been shown that the alleged contradiction involved in the co-existence of the contrary features of *sāmarthya* and *asāmarthya*, cannot show a pot to be momentary. This again is because the contradiction has been already resolved. Hence pot which is not proved to be momentary cannot be the *drṣṭānta*.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that the flame of a lamp can serve as the illustration. But, this too is improper, as even that is accepted to exist for about some three or four *kṣaṇa*-s.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that *kṣaṇopādhi* which is accepted by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*-s can serve as the example. That is, that *upādhi* which limits a small duration of time, namely, a *kṣaṇa* in the *mahākāla*, is accepted as *kṣaṇopādhi* by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*-s. This *kṣaṇopādhi* is not *sthira* (enduring), but is *kṣaṇika*. If it were *sthira*, then it cannot limit a *kṣaṇa*. Hence this *kṣaṇikopādhi* can serve as the illustration.

7 This belongs to *parārthānumāna* type. The Buddhists accept only the two *avayava*-s of *parārthānumāna* - *drṣṭānta* and *upanaya*.

8 *Ratnapetikā* Com. on *Nyāyasiddhāñjanam* p.27

But this contention is not correct. It is because the origination of an object, as limited by the destruction of another or the destruction of an object as limited by the origination of some other object alone, is accepted as a *kṣaṇopadhi* by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*-s. It is thus: The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*-s accepts a sequence in which the destruction of an object occurs. The sequence is:

क्रिया - क्रियातो विभागः - विभागात् पुर्वसंयोगनाशः - पूर्वसंयोगनाशात् उत्तरसंयोगः - ततः कर्मनाशः ।
(*Kriyā, kriyāto vibhāgaḥ, vibhāgāt pūrvasamyoganāśaḥ, pūrvasamyoga-nāsāt uttarasamogaḥ, tataḥ karma-nāsāḥ*).

In this sequence, first *karma* is produced. This moment is the *karmotpatti-kṣaṇa*. Then, the *karma* remains in the second moment and gets destroyed in the third. In the second moment, *vibhāga-prāgabhāva* is destroyed, so that in the third moment, *vibhāga* can be produced. Now, the *karmotpatti-kṣaṇa* is the last moment or *avasāna-kṣaṇa* for *vibhāga-prāgabhāva*. Hence it can be said that the *karma* is de-limited by *vibhāga-prāgabhāva*, or that the end of *vibhāga* is characterized or de-limited by the *karma*. Now the former is technically called *vibhāga-prāgabhāvāvacchinna-karma* and the latter, *karmāvaccinna-vibhāga-avasāna*. This *vibhāga-prāgabhāva-avacchinna-karma* is accepted as the *upādhi* limiting that particular *kṣaṇa*. Therefore, *ekavastvarāvavacchinna-avasānaka-vastvantaram* or *ekavastu-avasāna-avacchinna-ārambhaka-vastvantaram* is the *kṣaṇopādhi*. Hence, since both the *vastu*-s involved are *sthira*, *kṣaṇikopādhi* cannot be the illustration.

Now the Buddhists might contend that, there is no evidence (*pramāṇa*) for proving the *parasparāvaccheda* between two *vastu*-s. That is, two things de-limiting each other. *Veṅkaṭanātha* replies this by stating that as they become the objects of *viśiṣṭa-buddhi* (complex-cognition) simultaneously, there can be *parasparāvaccheda*. This is similar to two scales limiting a small place. That is, two scales which are kept in opposite directions and which are conjoined at a particular point by their parts are mutually conjoined. Thus, just as it is possible in the case of space, it is also possible in the case of time.

Thus Buddhists cannot prove momentariness by citing *anvayavyāpti*, as it cannot be substantiated through an illustration.

Now, *the vyatireka-vyāpti* of the form:

यदक्षणिकं तदसत् यथा शशविषाणम् ।

yadakṣaṇikam tadasat, yatha śaśaviṣāṇam

(that which is not momentary is non-existent as a hare's horn), might be stated as proving momentariness.

Veṅkaṭanātha rejects this by raising the question as to what is intended by *akṣaṇikatva*. If *kṣaṇikatvābhāva* is intended, then the *vyāpti* cannot hold good. It is because, the *pratiyogi* of *kṣaṇikatvābhāva*, namely, *kṣaṇikatva* itself is unproved. Therefore, without this *pratiyogi-jnāna* there can be no *abhāva-jnāna*. Consequently, there can be no *vyatireka-vyāpti* at all. To avoid this, it can be said that *cirakālā-sthāyitva* or remaining for some extended time is intended by *kṣaṇikatva*. But this too is not proper, as it is not present in the hare's horn which is cited as the illustration.

To overcome this, *śāśasṛṅgābhāva* might be stated as the illustration. But it is not proper, as it is an existent entity (*sat*). That is, *śāśasṛṅgābhāva* exists for ever. Thus, as it has *kālasambandha*, it becomes *pramāṇasiddha*. Hence it becomes *sat*. Being *sat*, it cannot become the illustration of the *vyatireka-vyāpti* involving *asattva*.

Now the Buddhists might object that *kālasambandhitva* is not *sattva* but only *bhāvatva* can be so. Hence the non-existence of hare's horn can be the illustration.

Veṅkaṭanātha answers this by pointing out that the *asattva* of the form of *bhāvetaratva* (being different from *bhāva*-a positive entity), is not present in the absence of hare's horn. That is, according to those who maintain non-existence as a positive entity (*bhāvāntaro abhāvaḥ*), there can be no *bhāvetaratva* in the non-existence of hare's horn, as that too will be of the form of some positive entity.

Further, in the view of those who maintain *abhāva* as distinct from *bhāva*, *kālasambandhitva* alone is unanimously accepted as *sattva*. Differing from this, if *bhāvatva* is said to be *sattva*, by the Buddhists, then, even *abhāvatva* can be stated to be so, by somebody else. Hence it is not proper to establish the *siddhānta* in the said manner.

The Buddhists might now object that if *abhāvatva* is stated as *sattva*, then even pot, etc., which are positive entities becomes *asat*. Hence the perception of them cannot be accounted for. Therefore *bhāvatva* must be stated as *sattva*.

Veṅkaṭanātha replies that the said defect remains even if *bhāvatva* is maintained as *sattva*. That is, *ghatābhāva*, etc., must be *asat*, being *abhāva*. In that case, there can be no perception of them. But they are perceived. This perception can be accounted for only if they have got *kālasambandha*. Hence that alone must be accepted as *sattva*.

Thus the objection and the reply are common when either *bhāvatva* or *abhāvatva* is accepted to be *sattva*. Therefore *kālasambandha* alone is *sattva*.

Since it is present in the non-existence of hare's horn, it is *sat*. Consequently it cannot be the illustration of the *vyatireka-vyāpti*. So this *vyāpti* too cannot prove momentariness.

Then, a section of Buddhists contend as follows: it is not proper to prove momentariness by *sattva*. It is because there is the defect of *bādha* in the *hetu – sattva*. That is, *Buddha* has instructed that there is one *nitya-tattva*. In this *nityatattva* there is *sattva* but not *kṣaṇikatva*. Hence there are the defects of *āgama-bādha* and *vyabhicāra* in the *hetu (sattva)*. Hence momentariness of everything else apart from the said *nitya-tattva* is to be proved by the *hetu – dhruvabhāvitva* (*dhruva-bhāvi* is something whose happening cannot be prevented).

That is, that which is *dhruva-bhavi*, is not dependent upon a cause

यद् ध्रुवभावि न तद्धेतु-सापेक्षम्।

(*yat dhruvabhāvi na taddhetusāpeksam*).

If *hetu-nirapeksatva* is not accepted, then it would be opposed to *dhruva-bhāvitva*. Therefore, as the destruction of all the originated objects is *dhruva-bhāvi*, it does not depend upon any *hetu*. And since it is not dependent upon any *hetu* an object is destroyed as soon as it gets originated. Thus, momentariness of objects is proved by *dhruva-bhāvitva* through *ahetukatva*.

Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes this view by raising the question as to what is intended by *ध्रुवभावित्वम् (dhruva-bhāvitva)*. It can mean only one among the following. They are:

§ तद्-समकाल-भावित्वम् - *Tad-samakāla-bhāvitvam*

§ तद्-अनन्तर-भावित्वम् - *Tad-anantara-bhāvitvam*

§ तन्मात्र-जन्यत्वम् - *Tanmātra-janyatvam*

§ तदेकसामग्री-जन्यत्वम् - *Tad-ekasāmagrī-janyatvam* and

§ अहेतुकत्वम् - *Ahetukatvam*

Now, *dhruvabhavitva* cannot mean either *Tad-samakāla-bhāvitva* or *Tad-anantara-kāla bhāvitva*, as there will be the defect of *asiddhi*. It thus: the destruction of an originated object, which is stated to be *dhruvabhāvi*, does not exist at the time at which the effect exists or at the time following the production of the effect. Therefore, if *dhruvabhāvi* is taken to mean the two said senses, then there will be the defect of *asiddhi*.

It cannot also mean either *Tanmātra-janyatva* or *Tad-ekasāmagrī-janyatva*, as there will be the defects of *vyāghāta* and *virodha*. It is thus: if the destruction

of effects which is stated to be *dhruvabhāvi*, be caused by the effect alone (*tanmātrajanya*) or be caused by the same auxiliaries which produce the effect (*tadekasāmagrījanya*), then it becomes *sahetuka*. Hence, if *dhruvabhāvitva* which means *sahetukatva* be stated as the *hetu*, which proves the *sādhya* – *ahetukatva*, then there will be the defects of *vyāghāta* and *virodha*.

Similarly if *ahetukatva* is intended by *dhruvabhāvitva*, then there will be the defect of *sādhya*. This is because *ahetukatva* itself becomes both the *hetu* and the *sādhya*. In that case, even the *hetu* (which is not different from the *sādhya*), becomes doubtful like the *sādhya*. Thus, *dhruva-bhāvitva* cannot mean any of the said five senses⁹.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that *dhruvabhāvitva* means *eṣyatva-niyama* or the rule that something will invariably occur. But, *Veṅkaṭanātha* points out that this too is improper, as there is the defect of *vyabhicāra*¹⁰. It is thus: the Buddhists who uphold momentariness of objects admit that there is a series of momentary objects. This series can either be a series of like-objects (*sadrśa-santāna*), or a series of unlike-objects (*visadrśa-santana*). When there is a series of momentary pots, then there is the *sadrśa-santāna* involving *apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*. That is, there is the non-intentional or natural destruction of the preceding momentary pots in the series.

Similarly, when a pot is broken by a stick, then there is a series of pot-shreds, which are also momentary. This series which got initiated by a pot has pot-shreds which are dissimilar to it. Therefore this is a *visadrśa-santāna*. This dissimilar series involves *pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*¹¹. That is there is the destruction of the pot due to the will to destroy it. The Buddhists accept that when a pot is broken with a stick, both the initial momentary pot-shred in the dissimilar series and the *pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* occur simultaneously. In this, *pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*, there is the *eṣyatva-niyama* which is the *hetu*, but there is no *ahetukatva*, which is the *sādhya*. Hence there is the defect of *vyabhicāra*.

9 *Nyāya-siddhāntajana-ṭikā* p.20 & *Ratnapetikā* Com. on *Nyāyasiddhāntjanam* p. 32

10 *Tattvamuktākalāpaḥ* 1-28

11 *Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* is explained in two ways. One is that *saṅkhyā* means knowledge, *prati* means *pratikūla* and *nirodha* means destruction. Hence, *pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* means destruction due to non-conducive knowledge or intentional destruction. See *Ratnapetikā*. P.33. But, the Hindi translator explains it in a different way, as the destruction, which is opposed to the previous cognition. That is, it prevents the previous knowledge. For instance, when a pot is destroyed by a stick, then it prevents the knowledge – ‘this is a pot’. See Hindi translation of NS. P.30. Also see *Alabhyalābha*. C. on TMK p.127

Thus *dhruva-bhāvitva* taken in any sense remains defective. Further if *ahetukatva* is accepted merely because of *eṣyatva-niyama*, then all the objects of the world, which are supposed to be momentary, must come into being in the first moment itself and get destroyed in the very second moment. But such a position is not found in experience. Therefore, *dhruva-bhāvitva* cannot prove *ahetukatva* and consequently *kṣaṇikatva* cannot be proved.

Now, the Buddhists might contend that there is need for instructing momentariness, for the purpose of preventing attachment to worldly existence. But *Veṅkaṭanātha* points out that the Buddhists who consider themselves to be *dhārmika*-s will incur the great sin due to uttering falsehood. A person of sharp intellect who listens to the instruction of momentariness will easily understand its *apramāikata* and so the attachment to the world in his case will not be prevented. Further, this attachment can be prevented even by instructing the *anityatva* of *samsāra*. If not, only *sūnya* or void is to be instructed for the purpose of developing detachment. But it is not acceptable even to the *Vaibhāṣika*-s. Therefore momentariness need not be instructed for the said purpose.

Then, *Veṅkaṭanātha* proceeds to give the counter-inferences for refuting momentariness and establishing the enduring nature of objects. They are as follows:

1. विगीता प्रत्यभिज्ञा स्वविषये प्रमा अबाधित-बुद्धित्वात् स्वलक्षण बुद्धिवत् ।
(*Vigītā pratyabhijñā, svaviṣaye pramā, abādhitabuddhitvāt svalakṣaṇa-buddhivāt*)
(Recognition, which is under discussion, is valid in regard to its object, as it is an un-contradicted knowledge, like the knowledge of the *svalakṣaṇa* -s).
[In the Buddhist terminology, *svalakṣaṇa* -s means *rūpa, rasa, gandha and sparśa*. The knowledge of these is accepted to be un-contradicted and hence valid even by the Buddhists. The *Vedāntin*-s too accept the knowledge of the four, though not termed *svalakṣaṇa*-s, as valid. Similar to this, recognition too must be valid, being un-contradicted. The inference of the Buddhists, प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रमः प्रत्यभिज्ञात्वात् दीपप्रत्यभिज्ञावत् । (*pratyabhijñā, bhramah, pratyabhijñātvāt, dipapratyabhijñāvat*) (recognition is invalid, being recognition, like the recognition of the flame of the lamp), is contradicted by the said inference].
2. घटादयः अक्षणिकाः सत्त्वात् संप्रतिपन्न नित्यवत् । (*Ghaṭādayaḥ akṣaṇikāḥ sattvāt, samprati-panna-nityavat*) (Pot etc. are not momentary, being existent, like the eternal object accepted by both).

[The Buddhists accept a *nitya-tattva* instructed by Buddha. The *Vedāntin*-s too accept *Brahman* and other objects as *nitya*. These are accepted to be *nitya* due to *sattva* (i.e., since they are existent). Similarly, pot etc., too are not momentary being existent. The inference of the Buddhists - क्षणिकं सत्त्वात् घटवत्। (ksanikam sattvat ghaṭāvāt) is contradicted by the said inference].

3. घटादयः अक्षणिकाः प्रतीतत्वात् शशशृङ्गादिवत्। (*Ghaṭādayaḥ akṣaṇikāḥ pratītatvāt, śaśaśṛṅg-ādivat*) (Pot etc. are not momentary, as they are objects of knowledge, like the hare's horn).

[The hare's horn is cognized by the word – *śaśaśṛṅga*. It is also not momentary as it is *tuccha*. Likewise, pot etc., too being cognized cannot be momentary. This inference too contradicts the inference of the Buddhists - क्षणिकं सत्त्वात् घटवत्।(kṣaṇikam sattvāt, ghaṭavat)].

4. प्रध्वंसः सहेतुकः पूर्वावधिमत्त्वात् पटवत्। (*Pradhvaṃsaḥ sahetukaḥ pūrva-avadhimatvāt, paṭavat*). (Destruction is possessed of cause, as it has a beginning like a cloth).

[This inference contradicts the inference of the Buddhists - प्रध्वंसः अहेतुकः घ्रुव-भावित्त्वात्। (*Pradhvaṃsaḥ ahetukaḥ dhruva-bhavitvāt*)].

Conclusion

Thus, the enduring nature of substances is proved, by refuting momentariness upheld by the Mādhyamikabuddha-s.

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