

Means of Ascertaining Vyapti According to Navya Nyaya

Raghunath Ghosh

I

In the history of Indian Philosophy, the Carvakas believe that inference cannot be taken as a source of valid cognition (*Prama*) because the knowledge of *Vyapti*, the uncommon cause (*karana*) of inference, cannot be known by any means and hence prediction about future is not justifiable. To them if someone gets fire from the knowledge of smoke, it is merely accidental which is technically called *yadrcchiki*, which is exemplified by the phrase *manimantrausadhivat*. Just as an individual being gets his desired object after holding some jewel or after chanting some *mantra* or applying some medicine, a man can get fire from the knowledge of smoke, which has no causal basis. *Vyapti* cannot be ascertained through perception in which internal sense-organ acts as an instrument. As internal sense-organ depends on external sense-organ in knowing an external object, it cannot produce the perceptual knowledge of an object independently. The internal sense-organ has got capacity to reveal the mental situations which are going on within, but not to reveal other objects that are capable of being perceived through external sense-organs. Inference cannot provide the cognition of *vyapti* on account of the fact that the knowledge of *vyapti* is the precondition for applying an inference. If the

knowledge of *vyapti* depends on an inference, the inference itself also will depend on the knowledge of *vyapti*. Thus, the knowledge of *vyapti* or inference will never be attained due to the defect of *Infinite Regress (anavastha)*. Verbal testimony fails to ascertain *vyapti*, because the import (*samketa*) existing in a term known from the meaning of a particular word is understood through the auditory perception of the words. The knowledge of the import regarding a particular meaning of a particular word is attained from the conventional usage (*vrddhavyavahara*), which is a form of inference. Hence the above-mentioned defect i.e., *infinite regress* will again occur here. According to some, *vyapti* is a relation free from extraneous adjunct (*upadhi*) (*nirupadhiko sambandho vyaptih*). If it is accepted, the knowledge of the absence of extraneous adjunct is highly essential. If it is known by inference, there would occur the defect called *infinite regress (anavastha)*. If something has an equal pervasion with the probandum not being pervader of the probans, it is called *upadhi (sadhanavyapakatve sati sadhyasamavyaptih)*. The cognition of *upadhi* is not at all possible as it will involve the defect of mutual dependence (*anyonyasraya*). Without the cognition of *vyapti* the equal pervasion with the probandum (*sadhyasamavyapti*) cannot be properly understood. The terms like 'vyapya' and 'vyapakatva' are relative in the sense without the proper idea of *vyapti* these terms are unintelligible and hence without the proper knowledge of *vyapti* the knowledge of *upadhi* is not possible. For this reason, the defect of *anyonyasraya* occurs. Depending on the foregoing arguments it is concluded that the knowledge of *vyapti* cannot be attained through perception etc leading to the impossibility of inference as a source of valid cognition (*pramana*).

II

In connection with the refutation of the view of the Carvakas regarding the impossibility of the ascertainment of *Vyapti (Vyaptigraha)*, the Buddhists have come forward and are of the opinion that *Vyapti* can easily be ascertained with the help of identity (*tadatmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*). To them *vyapti* remains between an object and the particular nature remaining in it. In the inference- 'It is a tree, as it has got the property remaining in *Simsapa*' (*ayam vrksah simsapatvat*) *simsapa* is an object in which there is the invariable relation of treeness. If the causal relation remains in two objects, the *vyapti* in the form of *tadutpatti* remains between them. In the inferential form- 'The mountain has got fire, as it has got smoke' (*parvato vahniman dhumat*) there is the relation of cause and effect between smoke and fire, which is *vyapti*. The inseparable relation

in the form of *vyapti* is called *avinabhava*. The term ‘*vina*’ means the locus of the absolute negation of a *sadhya* (*sadhyatyantabhavavan*). The meaning of the negative particle ‘*nan*’ (*nanartha*) is connected with an absence (*abhava*). Hence the meaning of the term ‘*avinabhava*’ would be the locusness of the absence of the superstratumness determined by the locus of the absence of the probandum (*sadhyabhavavadvrttya-bhavavattvam*).

Criticizing the Carvakas the Buddhists argue whether they forward any argument in support of their statement or not. If not, they cannot justify their standpoint and their position becomes baseless (*asiraska*). A proposition, which is alone i.e., not guarded by any ground, cannot establish the content of the proposition (*‘Ekakini pratijna hi pratijnatam na sadhayet’—Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Bauddhadarsana*). If the answer in the positive, they may be charged for making a self-contradictory statement (*svavyaghata*) like ‘*mama mata vandhya*’ (i.e., My mother is barren) etc. Moreover, to distinguish between *Pramana* and *Pramanabhasa* (pseudo-*pramana*), to know others judgments as contradictory, to know the absence of something, to know the intention of others etc they virtually take recourse to inferential cognition (*‘Pramanastadabhasavyvasthanam, paragatavipra-tipattih vacanalingeneti’* etc—*Sarvadasanasamgraha, Bauddhadarsana*).

Udayana has raised some problems against the view of the Carvakas. First, what is the meaning of the term *sambhavana*? The probability is nothing but a kind of doubt (*‘sambhavana hi sandehah’*), which does not exist in an object already seen. The object is ascertained as soon as it is seen. Hence there is no scope of doubt. It cannot also exist in an object not seen earlier at all. For the non-cognition of an object points to its absence. (*‘Sambhavana hi sandehah, sa ca drstau nasti tasya niscayat adrstau ca nasti anupalabddhau tadabhavasya nirnayat’—Nyayakusumanjali, 3/6*).

Secondly, if the sense organs like eye etc were excluded from the causes of perception on account of the fact that they are not perceptible in nature, perception would not be accepted as a source of knowledge.

(*'Hetau pratyksakarane caksuradau vadhite sati pratyaksamapi pramanam na syat'-Ibid*). If it is not accepted that they are existent even though they are not seen, it goes against the basic presupposition of the Carvakas. (*'Anupalabdihikale 'pi tasya sattve tu vyabhicarat nanupalabdhirabhavadharane hetuh'-Ibid*).

Lastly, if there is fear or doubt, there is inference. If there is the doubt of deviation between two objects existing in different time and place, the knowledge of different time and place is established through inference.

(*'Taddesatalkalayorvyabhicarabhavaniscayat kalantaradesantarasthayorvyabhicarasamka syat kalantaradesantarasthajnananacanumanadeveti siddhamanumanam'-Ibid*).

III

To Visvanatha the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining *Vyapti*. (*'vyabhicaravirahasahakrtam saharadarsanam vyaptigraha-kam'-Tattvacintamani, Vyaptigrahopaya-portion*). As the knowledge of deviation counters the knowledge of *Vyapti*, the absence of it should be considered as the cause of ascertaining *Vyapti* (*'vyabhicaragrahasya vyaptigrahe pratibandhakatva-bhavah karanam'-Siddhantamuktavali on verse no.137*)

The repeated observations of the co-existence between *hetu* and *sadhya* cannot be regarded as the cause of *Vyapti*. For, *Vyapti* may sometimes be ascertained by a single observation of the co-existence of a *hetu* and a *sadhya* in a particular locus if the knowledge of deviation does not arise (*'bhuyodarsanam tu karanam vyabhicarasphurtau sakrddarsane 'pi kvacidvya-ptigrahat'-Siddhantamuktavali on verse137*) as we find in the case –‘It has this-colour, as it has this-taste (*etadrupavan etadrasat*). In

this case the knowledge of *Vyapti* is in the form-‘this-taste is pervaded by this-colour’ (*etadrasah etadrupavyapyah*) of which ‘this-taste’ is a qualificand and ‘the pervasion determined by this-colour’ is a qualifier. From the single observation of the coexistence of the two in the above-mentioned inference the knowledge of *Vyapti* is ascertained. As it is ascertained from the single observation of the existence of the two when there is the absence of the knowledge of deviation (*vyabhicara*), the repeated observation cannot be the violation of the rule-‘the method of agreement in absence’ (*vyatirekavyabhicara*).

What is to be understood by the absence of the knowledge of deviation (*vyabhicarajnanaviraha*)? It is an absence whose counter-positiveness is limited by the property of being knowledge existing either in the definite knowledge of deviation or in the knowledge of deviation in the form of doubt. The knowledge of deviation may be attained sometimes definitely but sometimes not. If in a case of inferential procedure *vyapti* or invariable relation, not being known definitely, gives rise to the slightest doubt about it, it should be described as the knowledge of deviation. Hence ‘the cognition of the absence of deviation’ (*vyabhicarajnanaviraha*) requires certain knowledge of *vyapti*, which is free from doubt. The cognition in which the probans is known as qualificand (*visesya*) and the co-existence of the probans with the probandum in the same substratum as qualifier (*prakara*) is to be known by the term-‘*sahacaragraha*’ (the knowledge of coexistence) (*sahacaragrahasca hetuvisesyakasamanadhikaranya-prakarakam jnanam*). It can be explained with the help of the following instance. In the cognition-‘Smoke is coexistent with fire in the same locus’ (*dhumah vahnisamanadhikaranah*) the ‘smoke’ (*dhumah*) is the qualificand (*visesya*) and ‘the coexistence of the smoke with the fire in the same substratum’ (*vahnisamanadhikarana*) is the qualifier (*prakara*). By the term ‘*sahacaragraha*’ such an apprehension should be taken into account. Both the knowledge of existence of the probans and the probandum in a particular locus and the absence of the knowledge of deviation

are the causes of ascertaining *vyapti* (*tadubhayamapi vyaptiniscaye karanam*). Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (*prayojaka*) in ascertaining *Vyapti* by removing the doubt of deviation. (*'Vyabhicarasamkavidhunadanadvara bhuyo-darsanamupayujyate'* *Siddhantamuktavali* on verse 137. Also *Gadadhari on Tattvacintama*, p.645)

There are two kinds of knowledge- the definite knowledge and the knowledge in the form of doubt. The doubt of deviation may arise in some cases from the doubt of extraneous adjunct and sometimes from the knowledge of some common attributes like co-existence etc along with the absence of the knowledge of the specific characteristic features of them. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by *Tarka* or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called *svatahsiddhah*. (*'jnanam niscayah samka ca. Sa kvacidupadhisandehat, kvacid visesadarsanasahitasadharana-dharmadarsanat, Tadvirahasca kvacid vipaksavadhakatarkat, kvacit svatahsiddhah eva'* *Tattvacintamani, Vyaptigrahopaya-portion 'svatahsiddhah iti tarkam vina anyena prayuktah'*-*Mathuri on T.C.*, *'svatahsiddhah=svasamagrivirahaprayojyah'*-*Nrsinghaprakasika on T.S.*). If doubt is not dispelled through repeated observation of the co-existence between *hetu* and *sadhya*, the method of *tarka* is to be resorted to (*yatra tu bhuyodarsanadapi samka napaiti tatra vipaksabadha-katarko 'peksitah*). *Tarka* is the end of doubt (*tarkah samkavadhih*), as it is dispelled through the application of this method. *Tarka* is a kind of hypothetical reasoning (*aropa*). It is an imposition of the pervader through the imposition of the pervaded (*vyapyaropena vyapakaropah*). It is of two types-determining the definite nature of an object (*visayaparispdhaka*) and removing the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicara-samkanivartaka*). The former is in the form: 'If it does not possess fire, it would not possess smoke' (*yadyam vahniman na syat tada dhumavan na syat*). It determines the certainty of the existence of fire in a particular locus. In this context through the absence of the *apadya* or the consequence (i.e., by the absence of the negation of smoke) the certainty of the existence of the absence of

the *apadaka* (the absence of the negation of fire) is ascertained. Through the knowledge of the existence of smoke the existence of fire is ascertained. In this way the doubt as to the existence of fire on the mountain in this context may be removed by applying this type of *tarka*. The observation of the co-existence is to be taken as the cause of ascertaining causal relation (*karyakaranabhava*) between smoke and fire ('*yadyam vahnimana na syat tada dhumavan na syat, karanam vina karyanutpadat*' *Siddhantamuktavali* on verse no 137.) The latter type of *tarka* is in the following form: 'If smoke be deviated from fire, it will not be caused by fire' (*dhumoyadi vahnivyabhicari syattarhi vahnijanyo na syat*). If the first part is true, the second part would also be true. But it is experienced that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke, which is not caused by fire. From the falsity of the second half the falsity of the first half is determined. *Tarka*, being a mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence it is otherwise called *apatti* i.e., imposition of the undesired through which a desired standpoint is established. It is a kind of indirect method through which the truth is ascertained. If the negation of p is proved as absurd, it would automatically follow that p is true. *Tarka* cannot be applied to all cases where doubt stands on the way of our knowledge. If there does not arise any doubt due to some contradiction (*vyaghata*), inference can be drawn without the application of *tarka*.

The doubt of deviation (*vyabhicarasamka*) does not arise in the *vyapti* existing inside *tarka*, because it would lead to the involvement of contradiction in respect of one's own activity (*svakriyavyaghata*) and hence there does not arise any necessity of another *tarka*. It is a fact that an individual is allowed to doubt so long as there does not arise any contradiction in respect of one's own practical activity. He is not allowed to entertain doubt about *vyapti*-relation existing between smoke and fire, because he seeks fire to get smoke without any hesitation in the empirical level. Had he possessed a slightest doubt as to it, he would not have sought fire for smoking. The existence of doubt in this context will contradict

one's own activity. Thus habitually a man takes food to satisfy his hunger and takes the help of language to make others understand his desire etc (*yadi hi karanam vina karyam syat tada dhumartham vanhestreptyartham bhojanasya va niyamata upadanam tavaiva na syaditi- Siddhantamuk-tavali* on verse no. 137). If there is a case where an effect is produced without any cause, the effect would be doubted as having any cause or un-caused (*ahetuka*). If this doubt persists, it would surely lead to contradic-tion in respect of one's own action (*svakriyavyaghata*). In fact such doubt, if nourished, surely leads to contradiction, which is undesirable. Hence it is better not to entertain doubt (*yadi hi kvacit karanam vina karyam bhavisyati tadahetuka eva bhavisyatiti tatrapyasamka bhavet tada sa svakriyavyaghata-dapasaraniya-* Ibid). One's own activities indicate the absence of doubt in them. For, the activities are regarded as impediment to a doubt. In spite of this if someone goes on doubting without caring to the fact of self-contradiction, it would be taken as a pathological one. Hence the phenomenon of doubting would be taken as an object of doubt.

Visvanatha admits *samanyalaksana* as a *pratyasatti* in ascertain-ing *Vyapti* between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him the su-per-normal connection through universal (*samanyalaksana pratyasatti*) has got a prominent role in ascertaining *vyapti*. When it is asserted that all men are mortal, it means that the character of being mortal is true not of this or that man only but all men existing in past, present and future. Such cognition of morality is not possible by ordinary contact of sense organ with the object on account of the fact that all men are cannot be physically present before my sense organ. Hence a super-normal connection with the aid of universal has been admitted by the Naiyayikas. When a human being is perceived as such, the universal 'humanity' in him is also per-ceived simultaneously. The normal perception of humanity is the medium through which all human beings or the class of human beings is perceived.

With the aid of such supernormal connection through universal the invariable relation (*vyaptisambandha*) can be established between two

objects. Such relation existing between all cases of smoke and fire cannot be known through the normal way of seeing. The cognition of the coexistence between a particular smoke and a particular fire leads to the perception of their corresponding universals i.e., smokeness and fireness. With the help of these an invariable relation between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general existing in three times can be established. In this context the universal 'smokeness' serves as a *pratyasatti* through which we get all the cases of smoke. Generally doubt arises concerning all cases of smoke and fire existing in different place and time that are beyond the range of our sense organs. Any type of doubt presupposes the knowledge of its object. Hence an object must be known previously to justify doubt and the previous perceptual knowledge of all cases of smoke is highly essential. This is possible through universal (smokeness). This is another way of justifying *samanyalaksana*, which ultimately assists in ascertaining *Vyapti* in the way mentioned above. ('*Vyaptigrahasca samanyalaksanapratyasattya sakala-dhumadivisyaka*' *Tattvacintamani*, '*Prasiddha-dhume vahnisambandhavagamat kalantariyadesantariya-dhumasya manabhavenajnanat. Samanyena tu sakaladhumaopasthitau dhumantare visesadarsane samsayo yujyate*' *Ibid*).

In this case the term '*laksana*' means *svarupa* or nature. The connection in which universal becomes the nature is called *samanyalaksana* (*samanyam laksanam yasya ityarthah*). The definition, if taken into account, everybody would have acquired the knowledge of all cases of smoke through the connection of smokeness, which is eternal and remains in all smokes through the relation of inherence. But in actual life such cognition is not possible. Hence a different type of definition is proposed. By the term '*samanyalaksanasannikarsa*' we mean the universal, which has become a qualifier in the knowledge of which the object connected with sense organ is a qualificand (*indriyasambaddhavisayaka*). In the case of a particular manifestation of smoke the 'smoke' has become a qualificand connected with sense organ. In such 'smoke' the property or universal

‘smokeness’ inheres as a qualifier (*prakaribhuta*). All the cases of smoke existing in past, present and future can be perceived through super normal connection through smokeness existing in a particular smoke (*‘tatra dhumatvena sannikarsena dhuma ityevam rupam sakaladhumavisayakam jnanam jayate’ Siddhantamuktavali on verse no.45*).

In the case of inferential cognition the knowledge of all cases of smoke is essential. In the smoke, which is perceived, there is certainty about its relation with invariable concomitance with fire. Without the acceptance of such *sannikarsa* the doubt regarding the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, which is beyond the reach of the sense organ, cannot be explained. When a particular smoke, fire and their coexistence are known, the universals like smokeness and fireness are known simultaneously. Through these universals all individuals become objects of our knowledge. In such cases universal becomes a supernormal relation or *pratyasatti*.

IV

First, Visvanatha thinks that even from a single observation of the co-existence of *Hetu* and *Sadhya* the *Vyapti* between them can be ascertained if there is the absence of the knowledge of deviation, e.g., *Etadrupavan etadrasat*. It is not clear to us how *Vyapti*-relation between them is known from a single occurrence, as the knowledge of relation presupposes the repeated observation of them. Secondly, in order to know whether there is any case of deviation or not it needs more than one case to observe so far as our common sense goes. Hence the question of repeated observations remains as relevant in this context. Lastly, the meaning of *svatahsiddhah* i.e., substantiation of *vyapti* without taking recourse to *Tarka* is not, I think, sufficient. There may be some cases where the doubt of deviation may be removed through the repeated observations (*bhuyodarsana*). The meaning of the term *svatahsiddha* is not confined with that which is caused by something other than *Tarka*, but it may be extended to that which is not even caused by *bhuyodarsana* (*Tarkena bhuyodarsanena ca vina anyena prayuktah*).

The Navya Nyaya thinkers may offer a solution. Someone knows the *Vyapti*-relation between ‘colour’ and ‘taste’ of a particular type of

object after observing their co-existence in different place and time. What is applicable to all individuals is applicable to a particular (*vyakti*). On the strength of this factor one could understand both *sahacara* and *vyabhic-arabhava*. The phenomenon of *bhuyodarsana* has got a prominent role in determining the co-existence between a *Sadhya* and a *Hetu* (*sahacara*) and the absence of the knowledge of deviation (*vyabhicarabhava*). In order to ascertain the said co-existence and the absence of the knowledge of deviation it needs more than one case. Otherwise, how can the co-existence of them be confirmed? If repeated observations (*bhuyodarsana*) is taken as a sole cause of ascertaining *Vyapti*, it would lead to a problem as to the exclusively affirmative (*kevalanvayi*) inferences like-‘This is nameable, as it is knowable’ (*idam vacyam jneyatvat*). The invariable relation between ‘nameability’ (*vacyatva*) and ‘knowability’ (*jneyatva*) can be known through their occurrence in a single case only. But this is also not problematic on account of the fact that this relation is known in a single instance, because we are confirmed that whatever is existent is expressible and nameable. Hence from the fact of an object’s nameability its knowability can be known from a single occurrence of them due to gathering confidence from the previous instances. Hence the importance of repeated observations of the co-existence of *hetu* and *sadhya* cannot be ruled out. From the single occurrence of a particular *hetu* and a particular *sadhya* we can have the cognition of *vyapti* if there exists a universal rule of the co-existence between two general things, which is established through repeated observation.

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