{"id":314,"date":"2025-08-06T01:38:22","date_gmt":"2025-08-06T01:38:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/?p=314"},"modified":"2026-03-19T01:54:20","modified_gmt":"2026-03-19T01:54:20","slug":"a","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/2025\/08\/06\/a\/","title":{"rendered":"A \u015aa\u1e45karan Engagement with David Chalmers on Reality and Consciousness"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n

Anand Jayaprakash Vaidya<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

1.<\/strong> Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

In his (2022) Reality+<\/em>, David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is genuine reality. In his (2014) \u201cPanpsychism and Panprotopsychism\u201d he argues for taking panpsychism and panprotopsychism about consciousness seriously in the philosophy of mind. In this piece I offer a comparative engagement of Chalmers\u2019 views based on the work of \u015aa\u1e45kara, the foremost proponent of the AdvaitaVed\u0101nta school of Indian philosophy. In 2<\/strong>, I present Chalmers\u2019s and \u015aa\u1e45kara\u2019s distinct accounts of reality and compare them. In 3<\/strong>, I present Chalmers\u2019 and \u015aa\u1e45kara\u2019s account of consciousness and compare them. In 4<\/strong>, I argue for more cross-traditional engagement with Chalmers\u2019s philosophy through other traditions of Indian philosophy, such as Ny\u0101ya and Vi\u015bi\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101dvaitaVed\u0101nta.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

2.Reality<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

In his (2022) Reality+<\/em>,\u00a0 Chalmers argues that virtual reality is genuine reality. Chalmers offers five definitions of \u2018reality\u2019 and shows that virtual worlds satisfy some of these definitions in the same sense that any non-virtual real entity does.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Chalmers defines \u201cvirtual realism\u201das the view that virtual entities are indeed real, functional, and even central to life, and \u201csimulation realism\u201d as the view that if we are in a simulation, the objects around us are real and not an illusion. Simulation realism holds that even if we have lived our whole life in a simulation everything around us in our simulation is real. He says the following about the Reality+ <\/em>view.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

[R]eality contains many realities, and those realities are real. Or more mundanely: the cosmos (everything that exists) contains many worlds (physical and virtual spaces), and the objects in those worlds are real. (Chalmers 2022: 108)<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Let C be any ordinary object you take to be real, such as a cup.\u00a0 Let V be any virtual object you take to be non-real, such as a character in a video game. Chalmers goes through and shows that just as C exists, has causal powers, is mind-independent, non-illusory, and genuine, so is V. V exits in the video game, it has causal powers that players of the game interact with, it doesn\u2019t depend on the mind of the player but on the video game, it isn\u2019t an illusion, and it is genuine (not a counterfeit). So, if C is real for those reasons, so is V. The argument is basically:\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\r\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 If C or V are real in either S1<\/sub>, S2<\/sub>, S3<\/sub>, S4<\/sub>, S5<\/sub>, then they are genuinely real.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 S1<\/sub>: reality as existence.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 S2<\/sub>: reality as causal power.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 S3<\/sub>: reality as mind-independence.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

5.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 S4<\/sub>: reality as non-illusoriness.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

6.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 S5<\/sub>: reality as genuineness.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

7.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 X and Y satisfy some of S1<\/sub> to S5<\/sub><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

8.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 So, X and Y are both real.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Chalmers argues that virtual objects are real at least in four out of the five senses. That is enough on his account to say that they are genuinely real. Let\u2019s compare this view of reality to that of \u015aa\u1e45kara\u2019s.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

For \u015aa\u1e45kara, reality is related to dependence and persistence\u2014something which persists is more real than something that changes or is transient. Consider the commonly used example of a clay pot in Indian philosophy. According Dalal (2021) the clay that is the substantial cause of a pot or a plate is more real than the pot or the plate because it remains continuous over time while the shape changes. As a consequence, we have a graded view of reality under which temporal continuity is how the grade is determined. It turns out that for \u015aa\u1e45kara, the relation between the clay and the pot is the same as that between pure consciousness and objects: pure consciousness remains through the many forms it takes on.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

According to \u015aa\u1e45kara then, the real is that which is permanent in time or that which doesn\u2019t change its nature. This leads to S6<\/sub>: reality as permanence in time.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Now consider the following argument.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\r\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 C and V are both real only if they are real in sense S6.<\/sub><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 S6<\/sub>: reality as permanence in time.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 C and V are not permanent in time.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 So, C and V are non-real.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

In Vaidya (2020, 2022) I advocated the view that \u015aa\u1e45kara is best read as an illusionist about everything other than pure consciousness, because pure consciousness remains throughout while everything else changes at some point in time. Indeed, his opponents often labeled him a m\u0101y\u0101vadin, <\/em>a person that holds the world is an illusion.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

However, Dalal (2021) notes that \u015aa\u1e45kara is focused on the idea that the world is dependent on and an effect of brahman (pure consciousness). \u015aa\u1e45kara distinguishes between two levels of reality\u2014the conventional intersubjective empirical reality (vy\u0101vah\u0101rikasatt\u0101<\/em>) and the ultimate reality (p\u0101ram\u0101rthikasatt\u0101<\/em>). In contrast to the illusionist reading of \u015aa\u1e45kara, there is an alternative, advocated by Timalsina (2008) and implicit in Dalal (2021) where \u015aa\u1e45kara endorses a graded conception of reality, where what is permanent in time is fundamental and real from all perspectives, but what is transient is less real. Although conventional reality is less real from the perspective of ultimate reality, from within conventional reality, conventional reality is real. For the purposes of a more fruitful engagement with Chalmers work, I will take the graded conception of reality as being \u015aa\u1e45kara\u2019s view.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

On the graded conception of reality view, C and V are not illusions or fictions that don\u2019t exist. Rather, they are just less real than what is most real: pure consciousness. C and V have causal powers. They are \u201cgenuine\u201d from the level in which they reside as transient objects. They are not \u201cgenuine\u201d from the level of pure consciousness which is fundamental because permanent in time. C and V real, but less so.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Given that \u015aa\u1e45kara thinks that ordinary reality is less real than pure consciousness, nothing stands in the way of his embrace of virtual reality as \u201cgenuine\u201d reality. Given both virtual and \u201cgenuine\u201d are less real than pure consciousness, they are equally real, in the graded sense of reality. Thus, in the work of \u015aa\u1e45kara one finds an ally to the reality plus program with a caveat. While virtual reality is as real as \u201cgenuine\u201d reality, they are both less real than pure consciousness.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

3.Consciousness<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

In his (2014) \u201cPanpsychism and Panprotopsychism\u201d, Chalmers offers a Hegelian styled argument for panpsychism. By \u201cHegelian\u201d he means that the argument has the form of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. A technique common to the work of Hegel (he does not endorse the Hegelian position on consciousness, which is closer to \u015aa\u1e45kara\u2019s own position). A major background assumption in the work is that the starting point that either materialism or dualism is true. Materialism holds that physical truths suffice for all the truths. Dualism denies materialism, holding that some truths are not physical truths.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Thesis<\/strong>: Dualismvia the conceivability argument<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Where P<\/em> is the conjunction of all microphysical truths, and Q<\/em> is an arbitrary phenomenal truth, such as \u201cI am conscious.\u201d The thesis and antithesis arguments are as follows.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\r\n

1.P<\/em>&\u00acQ<\/em> is conceivable.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

2. If P<\/em>&\u00acQ<\/em> is conceivable, P<\/em>&\u00acQ<\/em> is metaphysically possible.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

3. If P<\/em>&\u00acQ<\/em> is metaphysically possible, then materialism is false.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

4.So, materialism is false.<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Because we have the ability to conceive of all the physical truths without phenomenal truths, materialism is false. Chalmers enhances the argument by showing that zombies<\/em>, physical duplicates of humans that lack phenomenal consciousness, are conceivable\u2014a version of the argument where P<\/em>&\u00acQ<\/em> is used to describe a zombie. However, consider the antithesis for dualism.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Antithesis<\/strong>: Materialism via the causal argument<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\r\n

1. Phenomenal properties are causally relevant to physical events.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

2.Every caused physical event has a full causal explanation in physical terms.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

3.If every caused physical event has a full causal explanation inphysical terms, every property causally relevant to the physical is itself grounded in physical properties.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

4.If phenomenal properties are grounded in physical properties, materialism is true.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

5.So, materialism is true.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Ever since the time of Elizabeth of Bohemia\u2019s critique of Descartes\u2019 dualism about mind and body, it has been known that mental causation is a problem for dualism. How can the mind cause the body to do anything if it is the case that mind and body are totally distinct substances? How can thinking about what to do tomorrow cause someone to do anything if the thinking is made out of a substance that by definition cannot interact with matter because it is not extended in space like matter? The back and forth between dualism and materialism leads to the synthesis panpsychism<\/em>.Chalmers says.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

I think constitutive Russellian panpsychism is perhaps the most important form of panpsychism, precisely because it is this form that promises to avoid the problems of [materialism] and dualism and to serve as a Hegelian synthesis. In particular, one can argue this view avoids both the conceivability argument against physicalism and the causal argument against dualism. (Chalmers 2014: 255).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Let\u2019s break this view down piece by piece. First, let\u2019s distinguish between macroexperience and microexperience. Macroexperience<\/em> is the kind of experience humans have, macrophenomenal <\/em>properties, which characterize the what it is like aspect of experience are instantiated in macroexperience. Microexperience<\/em> is the kind of experience had by microphysical entities. And microphenomenal<\/em> properties are instantiated in microexperience by microphysical entities. Panpsychism<\/em> is the thesis that microphysical entities are conscious. Constitutivism<\/em>aboutpanpsychismis the thesis that macroexperience is wholly or partially grounded in microexperienceRussellian panpsychism<\/em> is the thesis that some quiddities are microphenomenal properties. Quiddities<\/em> are the fundamental categorical properties that play the fundamental roles specified by physics. Constitutive Russellian Panpsychism<\/em> holds that there are quiddities that play the mass role and charge role, for example, and at least some of these quiddities are phenomenal. . In his Analysis of Mind <\/em>(1927) Bertrand Russell argued that it cannot be all about structure and dispositions all the way down. While there are models in physics that make sense of the idea that there all and only dispositions, Russell felt that this view was empty. In his articulation and examination of constitutive Russellian panpsychism Chalmers argues that it is not a form of dualism or materialism.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Chalmers argues that panpsychism is not a form of dualism. He does so by distinguish between narrow physical properties and broad physical properties. Narrow physical properties are microphysical role properties and structural properties. Broad physical properties are physical properties and structural properties along with any other non-structural property necessary for the instantiation of the physical property. Quiddities are not narrow physical properties. But they are broad physical properties, since they are necessary for the instantiation of the microphysical role property by a physical property along with the structure. Thus, it is not a form of dualism.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Chalmers also argues that panpsychism is not a form of materialism because there is a sense in which panpsychism is only a form of \u201cbroad\u201d physicalism. While \u201cnarrow\u201d physicalism entails broad physicalism, broad physicalism does not entail narrow physicalism. Thus, it is not a form of materialism.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Constitutive Russellian panpsychism emerges as a distinctive view from a Hegelian dialectic between dualism and materialism where they are seen to be the two alternatives driving toward a synthesis. After exploring other views such as panprotopsychism, Russellian monism, and panqualityism, Chalmers concludes by saying:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

I think that the Hegelian argument gives good reason to take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising solution to the mind-body problem. So, the combination problem deserves serious and sustained attention. (Chalmers 2014: 274)<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Here’s the combination problem as Chalmers sees it:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

The problem can be stated as follows: how do microexperiences combine to yield macroexperiences? It is at least very hard to see how a number of separate experiences had by separate entities could combine to yield a distinct experience had by a composite entity. (Chalmers 2014: 266)<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Philip Goff (2017) and Itay Shani (2015) argue that one solution to the combination problem is to simply drop the atomistic metaphysics of panpsychism which favors small atomic like entities being prior to wholes that they compose. If we reverse the order of explanation by adopting priority monism\u2014the view that wholes are prior to their parts, we get\u2014constitutive cosmopsychism\u2014the view that all facts are grounded in\/realized by\/constituted of conscious involving facts at the cosmic level. However, the constitutive cosmopsychism of Goff and Shani faces a corresponding decombination problem.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

In Vaidya (2022) I offer an account of the decombination problem as breaking down into two questions. How is it logically or metaphysically possible for there to be a cosmic conscious subject where every individual finite mind that is conscious is coherently a part of it? That is: how is it possible for a cosmic consciousness to coherently coexist with and explain individual conscious minds while preserving the reality of individual minds, their subjectivity, their consciousness, and the contents of their consciousness? And: how are individual conscious centers of experience delimited from a cosmic consciousness? That is, given that it is possible for a cosmic consciousness to explain the consciousness of every finite conscious mind, how are those individual minds generated from cosmic consciousness?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\u015aa\u1e45kara\u2019sAdvaitaVed\u0101nta, for \u201cAdvaita\u201d means non-dual. The thesis that \u0101tman<\/em> is brahman<\/em> (non-duality) is the claim that the true self<\/em> is pure consciousness<\/em>. The non-duality, however, is not about the opposition between dualism and materialism as theses about the relation between the mind and the body, but about the individual self (\u0101tman<\/em>) and pure consciousness (brahman<\/em>). Thus, according to \u015aa\u1e45kara the following holds:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n