{"id":195,"date":"2025-08-04T13:56:15","date_gmt":"2025-08-04T13:56:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/?p=195"},"modified":"2026-03-19T02:04:17","modified_gmt":"2026-03-19T02:04:17","slug":"some-anti-metaphysical-tendencies-in-indian-philosophy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/2025\/08\/04\/some-anti-metaphysical-tendencies-in-indian-philosophy\/","title":{"rendered":"Some Anti-Metaphysical Tendencies in Indian Philosophy"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n

Pradeep P. Gokhal<\/strong>e<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Indian philosophy is generally studied as a collection of schools or systems. Each system is said to contain a position about ultimate reality, which can be called its metaphysics, a theory of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>s which can be called its epistemology, and an approach to the goals of life (puru\u1e63\u0101rtha<\/em>s) which can be called its axiology. There were philosophers in India who were opposed to construction of any metaphysics or any system of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>s. They did it either in the framework of a philosophical system or independently of any system. Such positions which present either metaphysical skepticism or epistemological skepticism are generally neglected or even condemned in Indian philosophical discussions.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

This paper deals with such a comparatively neglected area of Indian philosophy. It tries to make a critical but selective survey of anti-metaphysical tendencies in Indian philosophy.\u00a0 I have called them \u2018tendencies\u2019 because they are not always found in the form of full-fletched and systematic approaches.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Here a question can be raised about the very term metaphysics. It can be asked as to which approach can be called metaphysical and in what sense of the term \u2018metaphysics\u2019 can it be so called.\u00a0 In the first section therefore, I have dealt with the variety of ways in which one can come across metaphysics and also the corresponding anti-metaphysics.\u00a0 In the second section I have dealt with a few skeptical approaches which are opposed to common sense.\u00a0 In the third section I have discussed the approaches of C\u0101rv\u0101ka and the Buddha which are allegedly opposed to transcendent metaphysics.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

(I) Varieties of Metaphysics<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Metaphysics is not one concept but there are different concepts of metaphysics.\u00a0 A very broad and general concept of metaphysics would be that metaphysics is a study of the transcendent, a study of something which goes beyond what is given.\u00a0 But the question is: What is given? The answer to this question can differ from philosopher to philosopher and accordingly the nature of metaphysics for a philosopher can also differ. If \u201cthe given\u201d is too minimalistic, for example, only the sense datum of the present moment, then even a common-sense world view or even a scientific world view will be regarded as metaphysical.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

However, the upholders of common-sense view may not agree that their view is metaphysical. For example, phenomenalists may claim that realism of material objects is a metaphysical view. But the realists may not accept the charge that they are metaphysicians.\u00a0 They may believe that material objects are directly given in our experience.\u00a0 Materialists too may not accept that they are metaphysicians.\u00a0 They may believe that their view being obviously true or indubitable is scientific.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

If on the other hand common sense view or scientific world view is regarded as \u2018given\u2019, then the view such as theism or idealism would be regarded as metaphysical. In fact, such views may be called metaphysical by all.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 It may be interesting to see how \u2018metaphysical thinking\u2019 is possible in a variety of ways.\u00a0 Let us start with the idea of what is immediately given.\u00a0 Suppose we say that some sensible object or a feeling is given to me here and now.\u00a0 Immediately there are three ways of going beyond what is immediately given.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

(1)\u00a0 One may either deny the existence of it and say that this is just a false appearance and reality is different.\u00a0 This is how a form of metaphysical idealism becomes available to us.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

(2)\u00a0\u00a0 One may say instead, this immediate phenomenon is real, no doubt, but maybe other things are also real.\u00a0 A leap is involved in this kind of claim and for justifying such a claim, different types of rational exercises may be conducted.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

(3)\u00a0 But there is also a third possibility.\u00a0 Someone may claim that the immediately given phenomenon is the only reality and nothing else exists.\u00a0 This is also a metaphysical position insofar as here one is making a negative ontological claim regarding what is beyond the immediately given.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0The three kinds of metaphysics emerging from the three modes of thinking can be called eliminative, additive and restrictive metaphysics respectively.\u00a0 In all these varieties one is making assertive or negative existential claims. Hence, they are different from cognitive skepticism in which we suspend such claims.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Now let us consider in more detail the second variety, i.e., the additive metaphysics which accepts \u2018something more\u2019 in addition to what is immediately given.\u00a0 Here we can get a series of metaphysical approaches in increasing degree of heaviness (gaurava<\/em>) or crowdedness.\u00a0 How can one go on constructing a more and more crowded metaphysics?\u00a0 One normal way is: by accepting additional sources of knowledge than direct experience.\u00a0 For instance \u2013<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \r\n
  1. Over and above direct experience one may accept memory as a source of knowledge so that one accepts not only immediately given phenomena, but also other phenomena which have been previously experienced.\u00a0<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
  2. We may claim to know continuity or identity between past and present phenomena on the basis of \u2018recognition\u2019 (pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em>) as a source of knowledge.\u00a0<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
  3. One may think that the phenomena that appear are just the apparent features of something substantial which has many other features.\u00a0\u00a0 One may do this on the basis of a certain kind ofinference (anum\u0101na<\/em>).<\/em><\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
  4. One may think that the phenomenon given to me or the \u2018thing\u2019 apprehended in it by me is just an instance of a class of similar phenomena or things. In fact we can know the whole class through an instance. Here generalization is used as a method.\u00a0 S\u0101m\u0101nyalak\u1e63a\u1e47\u0101 praty\u0101satti<\/em> of Ny\u0101ya can be a variety of this.\u00a0<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
  5. One may further think that these phenomena cause other phenomena and are themselves caused by others.\u00a0 This involves a causal reasoning, which is a variety of the knowledge of universal laws \u2013 a form of the knowledge of vy\u0101pti.<\/em><\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
  6. There are certain abstract notions like space, time, number and relation, which are accepted because it is in terms of them that we can explain our sensory and linguistic experience.\u00a0 The mode of reasoning through which such abstract notions are postulated may be construed in different ways.\u00a0 It could be construed as transcendental reasoning or speculative reasoning.\u00a0 In Indian epistemological terms it may be construed as kevalavyatireki anum\u0101na<\/em> (according to Nyaya) or arth\u0101patti <\/em>(according to P\u016brvam\u012bm\u0101\u1e43s\u0101) or s\u0101m\u0101nyatod\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6da anum\u0101na.<\/em>(according to Ny\u0101ya or S\u0101\u1e45khya)\u00a0<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 All the above additions to \u2018what is immediately given\u2019, form a part of our common sense view of the world and in their sophisticated, examined and revised form they constitute the scientific view of the world.\u00a0 Nevertheless, they do contain metaphysical elements insofar as they cross the boundaries of what is immediately given \u2018here and now\u2019.\u00a0 However, I am not suggesting here that whosoever possesses or develops such common sense or scientific metaphysical beliefs necessarily arrives at them by using various forms of reasoning I have suggested.\u00a0 Though the beliefs of the common-sense metaphysics are not given to us in immediate experience, they are culturally given to us through communicative and social practices.\u00a0 We simply imbibe them.\u00a0\u00a0 The question of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>s or ratiocinative grounds arises in the case of their justification.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Now, on the background of such a mundane (commonsensical or scientific) metaphysics, metaphysical thinking can lead us to still \u2018higher\u2019 levels.\u00a0 Just as the immediate experience of phenomenon can be a point of departure for metaphysical constructions, a mundane metaphysics can be a point of departure for further metaphysical constructions.\u00a0\u00a0 For instance, one can take an eliminative approach by saying that the world view given by common sense or even by science is ultimately not real, the true nature of the reality is different.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Or, one can say that our world view need not be limited to the sphere of common sense or even to the scientific world view, certain additions can be made which make our word view more complex and expansive.\u00a0 Or someone may develop a restrictive approach by saying that common sense view or scientific view of the world is all that we should have and to transcend the limits of it amounts to stepping into nonsense.\u00a0 In this way the same three ways: eliminative, additive and restrictive could be open at this stage as well.\u00a0\u00a0 The first two ways out of them amount to developing a kind of transcendent metaphysics whereas the third, i.e. the restrictive approach is opposed to a transcendent metaphysics.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 One thing may be noted here.\u00a0 We have seen how different forms of reasoning \u2013 pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> \u2013 are used for arriving at and justifying common sense view of the world.\u00a0 All these pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> may not be needed for developing transcendent metaphysics.\u00a0 However, the most important pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> which are generally used at this level seem to be the following:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \r\n

    (1) Analogical reasoning or s\u0101m\u0101nyatod\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6da anum\u0101na.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    (2) Verbal testimony or \u0101gama pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> \/ \u015babda pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    (3) Transcendental reasoning which in Indian context assumes the form of Kevalavyatireki<\/em> anum\u0101na <\/em>or arth\u0101patti.<\/em>\u00a0<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 In this way two broad groups of metaphysical approaches become available to us.\u00a0 One: the mundane metaphysics, i.e. the metaphysics of common sense and science and two: the transcendent metaphysics \u2013 i.e., what is popularly so called.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Now, if metaphysics can be conceived broadly at two levels, anti-metaphysical tendencies too can be conceived at two levels.\u00a0 The philosophers who are opposed even to common sense metaphysics are skeptics.\u00a0 In Indian context we can consider three major philosophers in this context: Jayar\u0101\u015bibha\u1e6d\u1e6da, N\u0101g\u0101rjuna and \u015ar\u012bhar\u1e63a.\u00a0 They seem to be opposed to common sense metaphysics.\u00a0\u00a0 But are they also opposed to transcendent metaphysics?\u00a0 They have to be opposed to additive type of transcendent metaphysics, but they need not necessarily be opposed to eliminative metaphysics.\u00a0 We will consider this issue in the next section of this paper.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 At the second level of anti-metaphysical tendencies, we can consider C\u0101rv\u0101kas and early Buddhists, who are allegedly opposed to transcendent metaphysics.\u00a0 Two questions seem to be interesting at this level.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    (a)\u00a0 Does C\u0101rv\u0101ka epistemology consistently negate transcendent metaphysics?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    (b)\u00a0 Can the Buddha\u2019s silence on the unanswerable questions (avy\u0101k\u1e5bta<\/em>–pra\u015bna<\/em>) be interpreted as his theoretical opposition to metaphysics?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    We will deal with these questions in the third section of this paper.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    (II) Anti-metaphysical Implications of Indian Skepticism<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    In India there were cognitive sceptics who doubted the authenticity of all pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> including pratyak\u1e63a<\/em> and also the existence of all prameyas<\/em>.\u00a0 Three well-known philosophers have done this exercise.\u00a0 They are N\u0101g\u0101rjuna, Jayar\u0101\u015bibha\u1e6d\u1e6da and \u015ar\u012bhar\u1e63a.\u00a0 In normal course cognitive skepticism of the above sort can be expected to be radically opposed to any kind of metaphysics.\u00a0 But the facts are otherwise.\u00a0 Though N\u0101g\u0101rjuna and \u015ar\u012bhar\u1e63a object to the authenticity of all pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> and existence of all prameyas<\/em>, they also seem to develop metaphysical approaches.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    The case of \u015ar\u012bhar\u1e63a is clear.\u00a0 He denies pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> as well as prameya<\/em>s, but also asserts that the reality of Atman\/Brahman<\/em> beyond the duality of pram\u0101\u1e47a <\/em>and prameya<\/em> remains undeniable. N\u0101g\u0101rjuna\u2019s case is complex.\u00a0 N\u0101g\u0101rjuna in Vigrahavy\u0101vartan\u012b<\/em> criticizes the concepts of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> as well as prameya<\/em>.\u00a0 In Madhyamaka\u015b\u0101stra<\/em> and elsewhere he vehemently criticizes the metaphysics of essentialism (svabh\u0101vav\u0101da<\/em>) and propagates non-essentiality (ni\u1e25svabh\u0101vat\u0101<\/em>) or emptiness (\u015b\u016bnyat\u0101<\/em>) of all things.\u00a0 Now, is the assertion of \u015b\u016bnyat\u0101<\/em> an expression of his anti-metaphysical tendency or that of the metaphysics of \u015b\u016bnyata<\/em>?\u00a0\u00a0 What does expressing a metaphysical position amount to?\u00a0 One can say that it amounts to accepting or committing oneself to the being of something which is beyond what is immediately given.\u00a0 \u015a\u016bnyata<\/em> of all things is certainly not something that is immediately given and still N\u0101g\u0101rjuna is committing himself to it as the true nature of reality.\u00a0 On the other hand one can quote N\u0101g\u0101rjuna\u2019s well-known claim that he is not making any claim, i.e. pratijna<\/em> and hence one cannot find fault with him (\u2018N\u0101sti ca mama pratij\u00f1\u0101 tasm\u0101n naiv\u0101sti me do\u1e63a\u1e25\u2019<\/em>, VV 29). Similarly, one can refer to N\u0101g\u0101rjuna\u2019s statement in Madhyamaka\u015b\u0101stra<\/em> that the Buddha states that \u015b\u016bnyat\u0101<\/em> is the elimination of all views; but those who hold sunyata<\/em> itself as a view are incorrigible.\u00a0 (\u2018Ye\u1e63\u0101\u1e43 tu \u015b\u016bnyat\u0101 d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6dis t\u0101n as\u0101dhy\u0101n babh\u0101\u1e63ire<\/em>\u2019, MS 13.8).<\/em>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 This argument of N\u0101g\u0101rjuna is like the one from Liar\u2019s paradox.\u00a0 One possible answer is that, that all views are \u015b\u016bnya<\/em> is not itself a view but a meta-view.\u00a0 N\u0101g\u0101rjuna would not be satisfied by this answer because he would regard both, \u2018view\u2019\u00a0\u00a0 as well as \u2018meta-view\u2019, essentialist in nature and therefore \u015b\u016bnya<\/em>.\u00a0 But now the question is:\u00a0 What about praj\u00f1\u0101<\/em> – insight or wisdom regarding \u015b\u016bnyata<\/em>?\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 N\u0101g\u0101rjuna\u2019s approach seems to be that it is not a view (d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6di)<\/em>, because a view by its very nature assumes the form of a statement which asserts something to be the essence (svabh\u0101va<\/em>) of something.\u00a0 Praj\u00f1\u0101 <\/em>on the other hand is not expressible in language.\u00a0 The so-called expression of praj\u00f1\u0101<\/em> which is aimed at generating a similar insight in the listener (N\u0101g\u0101rjuna says: \u201cpraj\u00f1aptyartha\u1e43 tu kathyate\u201d<\/em> MS 22.11) may \u2018point at\u2019 the ineffable reality, i.e., \u015b\u016bnyat\u0101<\/em>, but it cannot adequately describe it.\u00a0 (The position may be compared to early Wittgenstein\u2019s position that metaphysical statements show something without saying it.)\u00a0 The most interesting part of N\u0101g\u0101rjuna\u2019s argument (unlike Wittgenstein) is to show how language fails to describe the true nature of things.\u00a0 This position, however, does not amount to the denial of metaphysics.\u00a0 It only implies that though one can have an insight into metaphysical reality, one cannot express it in language.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 What about Jayar\u0101\u015bi, whose philosophical affiliation is essentially different from that of N\u0101g\u0101rjuna and \u015ar\u012bhar\u1e63a?\u00a0 Can we say that he being a Lok\u0101yata sceptic was free from metaphysical commitment?\u00a0 I think, it is possible to accept this as a broad claim insofar as Jayar\u0101\u015bi in his Tattvopaplavasi\u1e43ha<\/em> interprets even B\u1e5bhaspati\u2019s aphorisms as questioning the existence of the four gross elements as tattva<\/em>s.<\/em>\u00a0 Jayar\u0101\u015bi consistently refutes all pramanas <\/em>and prameyas <\/em>and regards this position as the true Lokayata position[1]<\/a>.\u00a0 Unlike N\u0101g\u0101rjuna and \u015ar\u012bhar\u1e63a he does not accept any transcendent ultimate reality also.\u00a0 Still, he can be accused of allowing the common-sense world view by back door.\u00a0 For at the end of his treatise he says:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u201cHence having all essential principles (tattvas<\/em>) been refuted, all the common practices (vyavah\u0101r\u0101\u1e25<\/em>), which are worth entertaining without reflecting upon (avic\u0101ritarama\u1e47\u012by\u0101\u1e25<\/em>), are acceptable.\u201d [2]<\/a>Here the adjective avic\u0101ritarama\u1e47\u012bya<\/em> is important. Jayar\u0101\u015bi\u2019s idea seems to be this.\u00a0 There are common practices involving a common world view which the ignorant and the learned have to accept alike (\u2018Lokavyavah\u0101ram prati sad\u1e5b\u015bau b\u0101lapa\u1e47\u1e0ditau<\/em>\u2019, <\/em>TUS p. 1, Line 7) If we investigate into them, try to explain and justify them or refute them theoretically, then we will be frustrated, because after all no pram\u0101\u1e47as <\/em>and no prameyas<\/em>\u00a0 can be established.\u00a0 In this sense philosophy is a self-defeating exercise.\u00a0 But practically such practices and such a world view are inevitable.\u00a0 Here the expression \u2018sarve vyavah\u0101r\u0101h gha\u1e6dante\u2019[3]<\/strong><\/a> <\/em>only means that they are acceptable practically and \u2018avic\u0101ritarama\u1e47\u012by\u0101\u1e25\u2019<\/em> means \u2018to be entertained superficially, without going deeper\u2019.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    Here Jayar\u0101\u015bi\u2019s acceptance of common sense can be compared with G.E. Moore\u2019s defense of common sense. Jayar\u0101\u015bi is recommending practical acceptance of common sense but he is not giving any theoretical justification of it, because his cognitive skepticism prevents him from doing that. G.E. Moore, on the other hand, while emphasizing acceptability of common sense is pointing out that non-acceptance of common sense beliefs would lead to pragmatic contradictions.\u00a0\u00a0 He is making pragmatic necessity a ground for their theoretical acceptability.\u00a0 He is claiming that it is not only the case that common sense beliefs are acceptable but we know them to be true, though we may or may not be able to give correct analysis of them (Moore 1959: 53).<\/sub><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Hence though Jayar\u0101\u015bi allowed common sense metaphysical beliefs to enter into one\u2019s life as a practical inevitability, he disallowed any knowledge-claims in their favour.\u00a0 By and large this can be appreciated as a form of consistent anti-metaphysical tendency.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    (III)\u00a0 C\u0101rv\u0101ka and the Buddha vis-\u00e0-vis transcendent metaphysics<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    Now we come to those anti-metaphysical tendencies which accept the metaphysics of common sense or that of science but are critical about transcendent metaphysical beliefs.\u00a0 Two such tendencies are identifiable in Indian context.\u00a0 One is that of C\u0101rv\u0101ka-dar\u015bana and the other is that of early Buddhism.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    (IIIa ) C\u0101rv\u0101ka<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    C\u0101rv\u0101kas (- here I am excluding the sceptic C\u0101rv\u0101kas such as Jayarasibhatta-) represent an admixture of anti-metaphysical epistemology and materialistic metaphysics.\u00a0 C\u0101rv\u0101kas developed their epistemology mainly in order to combat otherworldly metaphysics of Brahmanical and \u015arama\u1e47a schools.\u00a0 Side by side they also presented their materialistic metaphysics.\u00a0 This has led to a paradoxical situation in their epistemology.\u00a0 Let me explain.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    C\u0101rv\u0101ka epistemology is available to us at least in two forms.\u00a0 One form is extreme empiricism and the other is what can be called mitigated empiricism.\u00a0 According to the former, pratyak\u1e63a <\/em>alone is pram\u0101\u1e47a <\/em>and according to the latter pratyak\u1e63a <\/em>along with anum\u0101na<\/em> of a certain kind is pram\u0101\u1e47a.<\/em>\u00a0 But what kind of anumana <\/em>is pramana<\/em>?\u00a0\u00a0 One answer is: utpanna-prat\u012bti anum\u0101na[4]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>, which is the inference, the object of which has been experienced before.\u00a0 Here C\u0101rv\u0101kas are opposed to the other kind of anum\u0101na<\/em>, viz. utp\u0101dyaprat\u012bti anum\u0101na<\/em>, which is the inference, the object of which has not been experienced by pratyak\u1e63a <\/em>(literally, the object of which is to be experienced).\u00a0 It is the kind of inference specially used in the case of transcendent objects such as God.\u00a0 Utp\u0101dyaprat\u012bti\u00a0 anum\u0101na<\/em>\u00a0 which is rejected by C\u0101rv\u0101kas is nothing but analogical inference, i.e. samanyatodrsta anumana \u00a0<\/em>which Naiyayikas-Vaisesikas and Samkhyas use for establishing transcendent entities.\u00a0 Hence these C\u0101rv\u0101kas through pratyaksa<\/em> and utpanna-pratiti anumana<\/em> as the only two pramanas<\/em> develop, like A.J. Ayer, a positivistic epistemology, which results into refutation of transcendent metaphysics.\u00a0 But unlike A.J. Ayer, these C\u0101rv\u0101kas present metaphysics of common sense with materialistic explanation of consciousness and also a theory of values.\u00a0 They argue that consciousness arises from the four gross elements viz. earth, water, fire and air, when they get organized in a particular way, like the power of intoxication generated in the molasses and other things combined and processed in a certain way. This is a kind of inference. But what kind of inference is this?\u00a0 Here the object of inference, viz. the rise of consciousness from material elements, is not a matter of our prior experience like fire generating smoke is, or intoxicatingpower arising from molasses and other things is.\u00a0 In this inference d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101nta <\/em>operates as an analogy and not as an instantiation of the object of inference.\u00a0 When, on the other hand, we prove fire on the mountain, fire in the kitchen serves as an instance of fire in general. Hence the C\u0101rv\u0101kas\u2019 materialist explanation of consciousness takes recourse to analogical reasoning, which they themselves reject while refuting the arguments for God.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 If such a move of C\u0101rv\u0101kas is justified, then their approach will be on par with the approach of other advocates of transcendent metaphysics \u2013 such as idealists and dualists.\u00a0 This is a paradoxical situation.\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Here Purandara\u2019s classification of anumana<\/em> seems to suggest a way out.\u00a0 Purandara, a C\u0101rv\u0101ka thinker referred to in Tattvasa\u1e45grahapa\u00f1jik\u0101<\/em> of Kamala\u015b\u012bla, comes out with another classification of anumana<\/em>, the one between lokaprasiddha anum\u0101na<\/em> and lok\u0101t\u012bta anumana<\/em>.[5]<\/u><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 According to Purandara, C\u0101rv\u0101kas accept the former and deny the latter.\u00a0 Here \u2018lokaprasiddha anum\u0101na\u2019<\/em> can be taken to mean an inference, the object of which is acceptable (prasiddha<\/em>) as belonging to this empirical world (loka<\/em>) whereas lok\u0101t\u012bta anum\u0101na<\/em> is the one, the object of which is supposed to be beyond the empirical world.\u00a0 The rise of consciousness from physical elements is the phenomenon acceptable within the limits of this world, the soul or God transcending the empirical existence is not so acceptable.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    C\u0101rv\u0101kas are suggesting here that even an analogical reasoning can be accepted if it is of lokaprasiddha <\/em>type and not if it is of lok\u0101t\u012bta<\/em> type.\u00a0 Hence C\u0101rv\u0101kas seem to believe that by using this technique we can not only prove materialism but also many objects of common-sense view of the world in general.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    This proposal of C\u0101rv\u0101kas, however, may not be satisfactory as a purely epistemological proposal, because C\u0101rv\u0101kas here, one could say, are prejudging the issue as to what should count and what should not count as a part of this world and accordingly designing the nature of the methodological tool with which they try to establish it.\u00a0 Of course, it is quite possible that such a prejudgment of the issue is not the peculiarity of the C\u0101rv\u0101kas.\u00a0 It is quite likely that many systems of Indian philosophy first determine their ontology or axiology and then erect the structure of pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> appropriate for its justification.\u00a0 However, the paradoxical situation continues.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 I suggest that two-fold response is possible from the side of C\u0101rv\u0101kas to this paradox supposed to be committed by them. The metaphysics which transcends common sense, as we have seen, could be of two kinds: (1) eliminative metaphysics which condemns common sense as mithy\u0101<\/em> or illusory and (2) additive metaphysics which adds the doctrines such as those of soul, God and other worlds to the commonsense view of the world.\u00a0 In the former case C\u0101rv\u0101kas may point out that eliminative metaphysics involves pragmatic contradictions.\u00a0 In the latter case they would point out, by using the principle of parsimony, which is again a pragmatic principle, that such extra\u2013commonsensical beliefs are not necessary for understanding and living the life in this world successfully.\u00a0 Hence justification of common sense metaphysics and denial of theistic, idealistic or dualistic kind of transcendent metaphysics may be done on the basis of certain pragmatic considerations and not merely on the basis of\u00a0 the mitigated empiricism.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    ( IIIb) Early Buddhism<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    Now let us turn to another school which is many times described as anti-metaphysical.\u00a0 It is early Buddhism or what is more radically termed as original Buddhism or the original teaching of the Buddha.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    A few observations can be made at the very outset.\u00a0 Unlike the metaphysics of C\u0101rv\u0101kas who advocated materialism in the frame of common-sense world view, the Buddha\u2019s metaphysical inclinations are more towards phenomenalism which denies material as well as spiritual substances and more towards giving primacy to change than to permanence or continuity.\u00a0 Similarly, since the Buddha was concerned with finding out the laws of human and physical nature (though only those laws which were most relevant to the problem of human suffering) his metaphysics leans more towards scientific world view than towards the common-sense world view.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 On this background it is sometimes pointed out that the Buddha was primarily and solely concerned with the empirical\u2013practical problem of suffering and not with the trans-empirical metaphysical issues, since they are irrelevant to this problem.\u00a0 Here the reference is generally made to the so-called unanswerable\u00a0 questions (avy\u0101k\u1e5bta\u2013pra\u015bnas<\/em>) on which the Buddha observed silence.\u00a0 The questions included the following:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 ( 1 ) Is the world ( loka<\/em>) eternal or non-eternal?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 ( 2 ) Is the world infinite or finite?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 ( 3 ) Does the Tath\u0101gata <\/em>exist after death?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 ( 4 ) Is the self (j\u012bva<\/em>) same as body or different from body?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The list of these questions is further augmented by conjunctively affirming and denying some of the internal options and is made into the list of 12 or 14 questions.\u00a0 The questions (1) and (2) above which look similar are distinguished by suggesting that question-1 refers to beginning-less-ness or otherwise of the world whereas question-2 refers to endlessness or otherwise i.e. questions (1) and (2) refer to p\u016brv\u0101nta<\/em> and apar\u0101nta <\/em>respectively.\u00a0 Here it is to be noted that questions (1) and (2) do not pertain to this or that phenomenon in the world but to the world as a whole.\u00a0 This is important because the Buddha did make statements about phenomena in the world by saying that they arise from causes and whatever so arises also comes to an end.\u00a0 The world as a whole can be conceived as the totality of the series of causally connected phenomena and now the question is whether this totality has a beginning and an end.\u00a0 Similarly, it is generally agreed that the Buddha accepted the doctrine of rebirth and the wheel of becoming caused by misconception (avidy\u0101<\/em>) and craving (t\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e47\u0101<\/em>) but the question was whether the person free from these causes of suffering will also have rebirth.\u00a0 Similarly, it was clear that the Buddha did not accept noumenal self, i.e., \u0101tman<\/em>, but the question was whether the phenomenal self, which he accepted was inseparable or separate from body.\u00a0 The Buddha\u2019s silence on these questions has been interpreted in various ways.\u00a0 Here I am considering only one interpretation according to which the Buddha\u2019s attitude is likened with that of a logical positivist, who regards metaphysical statements to be cognitively meaningless or nonsensical.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Here, I want to suggest that though the Buddha\u2019s approach prima facie resembles such a positivistic approach, it is different from that in many respects.\u00a0 Logical positivists were philosophers of science, not philosophers of life.\u00a0 They treated not only metaphysical but also ethical statements to be cognitively meaningless.\u00a0 The Buddha was primarily and essentially a philosopher of life who treats ethical statements to be cognitively meaningful.\u00a0 The Buddha was very much in favour of scientific temperament which he employed mainly in the field of moral psychology unlike logical positivists for whom physical sciences were the sciences in the primary (and ultimate) sense of the term.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Now what about their attitude to transcendent metaphysics?\u00a0 When one concentrates on the unanswerable questions (avy\u0101k\u1e5bta-pra\u015bna<\/em>s)\u00a0\u00a0 <\/em>and the way the Buddha explained his silence over them, we come across two kinds of explanations the Buddha himself gives.\u00a0 One in terms of the relevance of the questions to the basic problem of life and the other in terms of the question whether the question itself is true or false.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 In the suttas <\/em>like C\u016blamalu\u1e45kyasutta[6]<\/strong><\/a><\/em> and Potthapadasutta[7]<\/strong><\/a><\/em> the Buddha says that these questions and the possible affirmative or negative answers to them are irrelevant to the fundamental problem of life.\u00a0 They are like the questions regarding the physical details of a poisoned arrow and the social details of the person who threw it, when someone is actually wounded with it. In other words this explanation questions the pragmatic propriety of the question. The second explanation is found in Aggivacchagottasutta[8]<\/strong><\/a> <\/em>which particularly refers to the question regarding the existence of Tath\u0101gata after death.\u00a0 The Buddha claims there that the question is a false question, i.e. the question based on a false presupposition.\u00a0 It is like the question regarding an extinguished fire whether it went in eastern direction or western direction etc.\u00a0 Here one can ask, is the question really a false question?\u00a0 The question regarding extinct fire (whether it went in the eastern direction or western direction etc.) is a wrong question based on a false presupposition that fire, when it becomes extinct, \u2018goes somewhere\u2019.\u00a0 No such false presupposition is logically involved in the question about Tath\u0101gata<\/em>.\u00a0 (The M\u0101dhyamika interpretation apart, because N\u0101g\u0101rjuna in the chapter \u2018Nirv\u0101\u1e47apar\u012bk\u1e63\u0101\u2019 of Madhyamaka\u015b\u0101stra<\/em> said that it is incorrect even to presuppose that Tath\u0101gata<\/em> existed during his life. (MS 25.18)) The Buddha also said that if he would say that Tath\u0101gata<\/em> exists after death then it would lead to eternalism (i.e. belief that Tath\u0101gata<\/em> is the eternal \u0101tman<\/em>) and if he would say that Tath\u0101gata <\/em>does not exist after death, it would lead to annihilationism.[9]<\/a> In fact annihilationism in the early Buddhist tradition refers to the materialist view (say, that of Ajitakesakambal\u012b) that there is no fruit of action and hence no rebirth.\u00a0 Since Tathagata<\/em> is free from the bondage of action, the question of annihilationism does not arise in his case.\u00a0 Perhaps the Buddha was reading the question about the posterior existence of Tath\u0101gata<\/em> as the question regarding the existence of the soul of Tath\u0101gata <\/em>after death.\u00a0 If, the question is read as this, then it can be considered as a false question, the false presupposition there being \u2018Tath\u0101gata<\/em>\u2019s soul existed when he was alive.\u2019\u00a0 But suppose, one is not having this presupposition and asking the same question, will the question be false?\u00a0\u00a0 I think, not.\u00a0 Perhaps the Buddha is reading the question the way he does to avoid the disrespect people would have shown to the doctrine of nirv\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> if the Buddha would have plainly accepted that a liberated person does not exist after death any more.\u00a0 Again, this was a pragmatic consideration of another kind on the part of the Buddha.\u00a0 The point I am trying to make is that though the Buddha\u2019s methodological approach was influenced by scientific rationality, his opposition to transcendent metaphysical beliefs was not solely based on that, it was also based on pragmatic considerations.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 On the other hand, it cannot be said that the Buddha was always averse to any kind of transcendent metaphysics.\u00a0 Two limitations may be cited here. (1) As a part of his total world view the Buddha also developed the theory of karma which had its implications to the transcendent metaphysics of past and future birth. (2) One can also attribute to him the metaphysical doctrine of nibb\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> (i.e., nirv\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> in Sanskrit). The Buddha\u2019s nibb\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> cannot be identified with \u0100tman-Brahman<\/em> identity because according to the Buddha\u2019s doctrine of triple character (trilak\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>), the characteristic of anatt\u0101 <\/em>(non-substantiality) wasapplied not only to conditioned objects, but to the unconditioned ones such as nibb\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> as well. Nibb\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>, however, remains a mystery because it was also described by the Buddha as amata\u1e43<\/em> pada\u1e43<\/em>\u00a0 (immortal state)\u00a0 and parama\u1e43 sukha\u1e43<\/em> (ultimate bliss).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Let me summarize this section. (1)\u00a0 The Buddha was developing a metaphysics close to a scientific world view with the focus on phenomenalism and flux and the laws governing human nature. (2) His so-called scientific metaphysics was subservient to his moral psychology and (3) His opposition to transcendent metaphysics was mitigated and was governed largely by pragmatic considerations regarding the problem of suffering.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    Some observations at the end:<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 An interesting observation common to different anti-metaphysical views which emerges from the above discussion is that anti-metaphysicians in India had to take recourse to pragmatic considerations in some way or the other.\u00a0 A sceptic like Jayar\u0101\u015bi denies all rational metaphysics, but he is ready to accept common sense beliefs at pragmatic level \u2013 because that was inevitable in some way.\u00a0 The materialist C\u0101rv\u0101ka can deny so-called transcendent metaphysics either on the ground that the latter (- if it is eliminative \u2013) involves pragmatic contradictions or because (- if it is additive -) it is pragmatically superfluous.\u00a0 The Buddha refuses to answer some metaphysical issues for the reason that the issues are pragmatically irrelevant, i.e., irrelevant to the universal practical problem of suffering.\u00a0 One may conclude that pragmatic considerations are inevitable in this way or the other for any kind of anti-metaphysical approach.\u00a0 But why should this conclusion be restricted to anti-metaphysics?\u00a0 Pragmatic considerations are probably inevitable for anti-metaphysicians as well as metaphysicians.\u00a0 No one can escape from them.\u00a0 To quote Jayar\u0101\u015bi: \u201cLokavyavah\u0101ram\u00a0 prati\u00a0 sad\u1e5b\u015bau\u00a0 b\u0101lapa\u1e47\u1e0ditau\u201d <\/em>(The ignorant as well as the learned are alike with respect to the worldly practices.).<\/em>\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    \u00a0[Acknowledgement: This is a revised version of the article presented in the national conference on \u201cCurrent Debates in Metaphysics\u201d organized by IIT, Mumbai on February 16-18, 2007]<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

    Bibliography with Abbreviations<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      \r\n
    1. Franco, Eli, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief (A Study of Jayarasi\u2019s Scepticism),<\/em> Motilal banarsidass, Delhi (Second Ed., 1994),<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    2. Gokhale, Pradeep, \u201cThe\u00a0 Carvaka Theory of Pramanas : A Restatement\u201d, Philosophy East and West<\/em>, Vol. 43, No. 4, October, 1993, University of Hawaii Press.<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    3. Gokhale, pradeep P.: \u201cNagarjuna\u2019s Scepticism vis-\u00e0-vis those of Jayarasi and Sriharsa\u201d.\u00a0 Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner) Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, Jan-April, 1999.\u00a0\u00a0<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    4. Humphreys, Christmas, ed. 1987. The Wisdom of Buddhism. New Delhi: Promilla and Company Publishers.<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    5. Moore, G.E., \u201c A Defense of Common sense \u201c as included in Philosophical Papers,<\/em> George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,\u00a0 London (1959),<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    6. MS: Madhyamaka\u015b\u0101stra\u00a0\u00a0 of N\u0101g\u0101rjuna<\/em>, edited by Vaidya P.L. The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga (1960) )<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    7. TUS: Tattvopaplavasimha of Sri Jayarasi bhatta<\/em>, edited by Sanghavi, P.S. and Parikh R.C. Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi (1987)<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    8. VV: Vigrahavy\u0101vartani<\/em>,\u00a0 ( Included as Appendix 5 in Vaidya P.L. (Ed.), Madhyamaka\u015b\u0101stra\u00a0\u00a0 of N\u0101g\u0101rjuna<\/em>, The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga (1960) )<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
    9. Warren, Henry Clarke. 1953. Buddhism in Translations. Passages Selected from the Buddhist Sacred Books and Translated from the Original Pali Into English. Cambridge: Harward University Press.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      _____<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      Pradeep P. Gokhale<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      Retd. Professor,<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      Department of Philosophy, Savitribai Phule Pune University.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n

      \r\n\r\n\r\n
      \r\n

      [1]<\/a> TUS P.1, lines 10-14. For translation and interpretation see Franco (1994: 5, 69) Also see my paper Gokhale (1999)<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [2]<\/a> \u201ctad evam upaplute\u1e63v eva sarvatattve\u1e63u avic\u0101ritarama\u1e47\u012by\u0101\u1e25 sarve vyavah\u0101r\u0101 gha\u1e6dante<\/em>\u201d, TUS p. 125, Lines 11-12<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [3]<\/a> Ibid\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [4]<\/a> Jayantabha\u1e6d\u1e6da in Ny\u0101yama\u00f1jar\u012b<\/em> introduces this classification while explaining the position of more educated (Su\u015bik\u1e63itatara) C\u0101rv\u0101kas. For my explanation of the classification see Gokhale (1993)\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [5]<\/a> See Gokhale (1993).\u00a0 Purandara in the statement quoted in Tattvasa\u1e43grahapa\u00f1jik\u0101 <\/em>describes the second type of inference as \u2018the one which is stated by transgressing the worldly way\u2019.\u00a0 I have called it lok\u0101t\u012bta<\/em> for the sake of brevity.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [6]<\/a> See Warren (1953):\u201cQuestions which tend not to edification\u201d, pp. 117-22.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [7]<\/a> Humphreys (1987) pp.53-54.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [8]<\/a> Warren, (1953) pp. 123-128.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      [9]<\/a> Humphreys (!987) pp. 54-55.<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

      Download PDF<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Pradeep P. Gokhale \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Indian philosophy is generally studied as a collection of schools or systems. Each system is said to contain a position about ultimate reality, which can be called…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-195","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-parispanda-2025"],"gutentor_comment":4,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/195","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=195"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/195\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":813,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/195\/revisions\/813"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=195"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=195"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=195"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}