{"id":190,"date":"2025-08-04T13:52:24","date_gmt":"2025-08-04T13:52:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/?p=190"},"modified":"2026-03-19T02:01:37","modified_gmt":"2026-03-19T02:01:37","slug":"dravya-enduring-or-momentary","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/2025\/08\/04\/dravya-enduring-or-momentary\/","title":{"rendered":"Dravya \u2013 Enduring or Momentary"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-background has-link-color wp-elements-1d2f1e6f3ed649576eeb0c7fc3dc76db\" style=\"color: #00246b; background-color: #cadcfc;\"><strong>Dr.S.Usha<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><strong>Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Dravya<\/em> or substance is a basic, fundamental and foundational entity that constitutes reality. Hence it is essential to acquire a good understanding of this concept. But it is not an easy task as different schools of Indian philosophy conceive the various aspects of <em>dravya<\/em> in different ways. Among several such views, holding <em>dravya<\/em> in general as enduring (<em>sthira<\/em>) or momentary (<em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ika<\/em>) is one.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Criticisms were leveled by <em>Vi\u015bi\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101dvaitin<\/em>-s too, to establish <em>sthiratva <\/em>of substances against the arguments of the Buddhists to establish <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikatva<\/em>. The views of <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> regarding this, as in his work <em>Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<\/em> are presented in this paper.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><strong>Key words: <\/strong><em>Dravya, k\u1e63a\u1e47ika, sthira, anum\u0101na, yukti<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Dravya<\/em> or substances are basic, fundamental and foundational entities that constitute reality. Hence it is essential to acquire a good understanding of this concept. But it is not an easy task as different schools of Indian philosophy conceive the various aspects of <em>dravya<\/em> in different ways. Among several such views, holding <em>dravya<\/em> in general as enduring or momentary is one. Buddhists uphold momentariness of substances. This view was rejected by all the <em>ved\u0101ntin<\/em>-s. The criticisms leveled by <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> against the Buddhist view are given below, as culled from his work Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<a id=\"_ednref1\" href=\"#_edn1\">[1]<\/a> are presented below.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Substances are enduring and are not momentary, since there is no proof for their momentariness. <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> asks, whether momentariness is proved by perception or inference? He states that perception cannot prove the momentariness of objects, as it proves the contrary. That is, recognitions like \u201c<em>so\u2019yam ghatah<\/em>\u201d (this is that pot), etc., prove the enduring nature of substances.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists may contend as follows the said recognition cannot prove the objects to be enduring, as the said recognitions are illusory. Their illusoriness is proved by the inference.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e \u092d\u094d\u0930\u092e\u0903 \u0938\u0902\u0938\u094d\u0915\u093e\u0930\u093e\u0927\u0940\u0928\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e\u0928\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0936\u0941\u0915\u094d\u0924\u094c \u0907\u0926\u0902 \u0930\u091c\u0924\u092e\u093f\u0924\u093f \u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e\u0928\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101 bhrama\u1e25, sa\u1e41sk\u0101r\u0101dh\u012bnaj\u00f1\u0101natv\u0101t, \u015buktau ida\u1e41 rajatamiti j\u00f1\u0101navat|<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>(Recognition is false, for it is a knowledge depending upon latent impressions, like he knowledge of silver in a shell).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this thus: the said inference cannot prove the illusoriness of recognitions, as there is the defect of <em>vyabhic\u0101ra<\/em> in its <em>hetu<\/em>. That is, the <em>hetu \u2013 sa\u1e41sk\u0101r\u0101dh\u012bna j\u00f1\u0101natva<\/em> \u2013 is present in memory and in perceptual cognitions like <em>surabhi candanam<\/em> (the fragrant sandal, etc.,) which are valid. Further, <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em> is not caused due to any defective sense-organ <em>(du\u1e63\u1e6da-k\u0101ra\u1e47a-ajanya)<\/em>. Only those which are <em>du\u1e63\u1e6da-k\u0101ra\u1e47a-ajanya<\/em> are illusory. Since <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em> is not so, it cannot be illusory. So there is the defect of <em>b\u0101dha<\/em> too. Further, it cannot be illusory also, because there is no subsequent knowledge which sublates the <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101 (b\u0101dhaka-pratyaya-abh\u0101va)<\/em><a id=\"_ednref2\" href=\"#_edn2\">[2]<\/a> .<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists may contend that though there is no perceptual cognition which could contradict <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em>, yet, there are logical arguments (<em>yukti<\/em>-s) which can contradict it. They are as follows.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\r\n<li>A seed when kept in a store-room does not give rise to a sprout.\u00a0 But when it is sown in a field, it gives rise to a sprout. So, it is evident from this that the seed has both \u2013 the capacity to produce a sprout <em>(s\u0101marthya)<\/em> and also its contrary <em>(as\u0101marthya)<\/em>. But since these two are contrary to each other, they cannot co-exist in a single seed. Hence, there is a logical necessity to accept the difference between the seed which has the <em>s\u0101marthya<\/em> and the one which lacks it. When it is so, the <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em> which comprehends the identity of these seeds gets contradicted.<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>If it is accepted, that the seed is possessed of <em>s\u0101marthya<\/em>, then, even the one at the store-room must produce it. But it is not found to be so. Hence, the seed in the store \u2013room must be accepted as different from the one in the field. That is, the seed in the store-room gets destroyed and produces a like-one and this process goes on and on. Thus, all entities exist only for a moment and get destroyed, producing like-ones. Since the entities exist only for a moment they themselves are referred to as moments (<em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>-s) and the immediately preceding moment becomes the cause of the succeeding moment. Thus, there is only a series of moments. When it is so, the <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em> comprehending the oneness of the seed is contradicted. Hence, as it is only illusory, it cannot prove the enduring nature of entities.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> refutes these arguments as follows: a seed is accepted to possess only the <em>s\u0101marthya<\/em> to produce the sprout. The <em>as\u0101marthya<\/em> is not accepted in it at all. Therefore, there is no question of the co-existence of contrary features in it. Further it is the nature of the seed to produce the sprout only when the auxiliary causes like water, clay, etc., are present. So the <em>s\u0101marthya<\/em> of the <em>b\u012bja<\/em> means its capacity to produce sprout, only in the presence of auxiliary causes <em>(sah\u0101kari-sannidhau-kurvatsvabhavatva)<\/em>. Similarly, this capacity can also be negatively expressed as its nature of not producing the sprout in the absence of the auxiliary causes <em>(sahak\u0101ryabh\u0101va-prayukta-kary\u0101bh\u0101vatva)<\/em>. So the so called<em> as\u0101marthya<\/em> cannot exist, in it. Therefore, there is no possibility for either the co-existence of contrary features or for admitting the momentariness of objects.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists might raise the following question; if there is <em>s\u0101marthya<\/em> always in the seed, then how can the seed be possessed of the capacity to produce the sprout, when it is in the field and be possessed of the contrary feature, when it is in the store-room?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this thus: undoubtedly the seed has only <em>s\u0101marthya<\/em> in it. However, the capacity to produce a sprout in it, is due to the presence of auxiliary causes and the contrary is due to the absence of them. Thus, as the two contrary features are due to the adjuncts, they can be present in the same seed, but at different times. There is no defect involved in this, at all.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might object as to how the two contrary features of proximity of auxiliaries <em>(sahak\u0101ri-sannidhi)<\/em> and their absence <em>(sahak\u0101ri-asannidhi)<\/em> can co-exist in a single seed, even according to the <em>siddh\u0101ntin<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this thus: when the <em>s\u0101magri<\/em>-s which are conducive to the proximity of the auxiliary causes are present, there will be the <em>sahak\u0101ri-sannidhi<\/em> and in the absence of those <em>s\u0101magri<\/em>-s, there will be the <em>sahak\u0101ri-asannidhi<\/em>. Thus the <em>sannidhi<\/em> and <em>asannidhi<\/em> are possible at different times, due to the presence and absence of the <em>samagri<\/em>-s which are produced at different times. These <em>s\u0101magri<\/em>-s too belong to different times depending upon their <em>s\u0101magri<\/em>-s. This series of <em>s\u0101magri<\/em>-s is beginningless (<em>an\u0101di<\/em>). So there is no possibility for the defect of <em>anavasth\u0101<\/em>. Thus, <em>sannidhi<\/em> and <em>asannidhi<\/em> of the <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em>-s which have the respective <em>s\u0101magri<\/em>-s as their <em>up\u0101dhi<\/em>-s can be present in the same seed at different times.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists might raise the following questions: how can there be the co-existence of the two contrary features of <em>s\u0101magri-sambandha<\/em> and <em>s\u0101magri-asambandha<\/em>, in the same entity?<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this by stating that this is unavoidable. As the <em>s\u0101magri<\/em> is produced at different times, there is <em>s\u0101magri-sambandha<\/em> and <em>s\u0101magri-asambandha<\/em> at different times.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, it can be contended that if contrary features can be present in an entity at different times, then even <em>gotva<\/em> and <em>a\u015bvatva<\/em> must be accepted to be present in an entity at different times. But this is not possible, because perception does not approve it. In the case of <em>s\u0101magri-sambandha<\/em> and <em>s\u0101magri asambandha<\/em>, however, there is the approval of perception. Hence there is no defect at all.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Further the Buddhisits too, are under obligation to accept the <em>s\u0101magri-sambandha<\/em> at a particular time. It is thus: the Buddhists, apart from maintaining the difference between the seed in the store-room and the one in the field, accept commonness between them. That is, say, both are <em>k\u0101lama<\/em> seeds (a particular variety of rice). So there is commonness (<em>s\u0101jatya<\/em>) between the seeds. This seed being momentary is also called a <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> or a moment (<em>k\u1e63a\u1e47yate-himsayate iti ksana\u1e25<\/em>). This <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> gives rise to another and so on and a series of like- <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> -s are produced. Among these seeds (i.e., <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> -s) belonging to a particular variety, only a particular seed give rise to a seed capable of producing sprout (<em>samartha- b\u012bja<\/em>) and the rest do not. When it is so, if it is doubted as to how a particular seed alone can produce the <em>samartha- b\u012bja<\/em> and not the rest, then the Buddhists must answer it only by accepting the <em>s\u0101magri-vi\u015be\u1e63a-sambandha<\/em> at a particular time. That is, their answer should then be that, that seed which has the <em>s\u0101magri-vi\u015be\u1e63a-sambandha<\/em> at a particular time alone can produce a <em>samartha- b\u012bja<\/em>. Therefore they cannot object the view of the <em>siddh\u0101ntin<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists might contend that they need not resort to the <em>s\u0101magri-samandha<\/em> at a particular time, but can account for the production of a <em>samartha- b\u012bja<\/em>, by admitting <em>svabh\u0101va-v\u0101da<\/em>. That is, only that <em>b\u012bja-k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>, which immediately precedes the <em>samartha- b\u012bja<\/em>, has the <em>svabh\u0101va<\/em> to produce it and not the rest.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> replies this by stating that, in that case, the <em>siddhantin<\/em> too, can account for the <em>s\u0101magri-sambandha<\/em> at a particular time, by accepting the <em>svabh\u0101va-v\u0101da<\/em> itself. That is, it is its <em>svabh\u0101va<\/em> that the <em>s\u0101magri-sambandha<\/em> occurs only at a particular time.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists may contend, in that case, just as <em>svabh\u0101va-v\u0101da<\/em> is accepted by the <em>siddh\u0101ntin<\/em>, so <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ika-v\u0101da<\/em> too, can be accepted by him. But, it is not possible because, there will be two defects if the <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ika-v\u0101da<\/em> is accepted. They are:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\r\n<li>In the Buddhists view, there is the production and destruction of entities at every moment. In this manner, innumerable moments are to be accepted. But it is not found. Hence, there will be the great defect of accepting innumerable moments, which are unseen (<em>anupalambham\u0101na-anata- b\u012bja -kalpanam<\/em>).<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>A <em>svabh\u0101va-visesa<\/em> must be inferred as existing in a particular <em>b\u012bja-k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>, by which it produces the succeeding <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> -s. In this manner, innumerable <em>svabh\u0101va-visesa<\/em>-s must be inferred in innumerable <em>ksana<\/em>-s. Therefore there is the defect of prolixity (<em>gaurava<\/em>). But in accepting the <em>sthiratva<\/em> of the entities, there would be no defect of prolixity. Hence it is better to accept the defect-less view of <em>sthiratva<\/em>.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might contend as follows. It has been stated by the <em>siddh\u0101ntin<\/em> that, only when there is the <em>sahak\u0101ri-sannidhi<\/em>, a <em>b\u012bja<\/em> can give rise to sprout and not in its absence. From, this it would be clear that they accept <em>sahak\u0101ri-k\u0101ra\u1e47a<\/em> as a cause for the production of a sprout. But in the Buddhistic view, <em>saha\u0101ari-k\u0101ra\u1e47a<\/em> is not accepted at all, as a <em>k\u0101ra\u1e47a<\/em>. When <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em> is not at all a cause, what is the need to accept it? Further if it be a cause, then it must produce effects forever. But it is not found to be so. This itself proves the <em>ak\u0101ranatva <\/em>of the <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em>. Further, it is the nature of the cause to produce the effect, in itself. For example, the <em>up\u0101d\u0101na<\/em> produces the effect in itself. But it is not so in the <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em>. Therefore <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em> cannot be the cause.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> replies this as follows: causality is decided by <em>anvaya-sahac\u0101ra<\/em> and <em>vyatireka-sahac\u0101ra<\/em>. <em>Anvaya-sahac\u0101ra<\/em> is of the form <em>yat sattve yat sattvam<\/em> and <em>vyatireka-sahac\u0101ra<\/em> is of the form \u2013 <em>yadabh\u0101ve yadabh\u0101vah<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em> is proved as a cause, as it is only in its presence (say, water etc.,) the effect (say, sprout), is produced and in its absence, there can be no effect. So it is but proper to accept <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em>, as a cause. If causality is denied to it, in spite of its having the <em>anvaya-sahac\u0101ra<\/em> and <em>vyatireka-sahac\u0101ra<\/em>, then even <em>up\u0101d\u0101na<\/em> cannot be the cause. It is because <em>anavaya-sahac\u0101ra<\/em> and <em>vyatireka-sahac\u0101ra<\/em> prove the causality of both <em>up\u0101d\u0101na<\/em> and <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em>. Further the Buddhistic view \u2013 \u0905\u0927\u093f\u092a\u0924\u093f\u0938\u0939\u0915\u093e\u0930\u094d\u092f\u093e\u0932\u092e\u094d\u092c\u0928-\u0938\u092e\u0928\u0928\u094d\u0924\u0930\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092f\u093e\u0936\u094d\u091a\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0930\u094b\u093d\u092a\u093f \u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e\u0928\u094b\u0924\u094d\u092a\u0924\u094d\u0924\u093f\u0939\u0947\u0924\u0935\u0903\u0964<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>(adhipati-sahak\u0101ry\u0101lambana-samanantarapratyay\u0101\u015bcatv\u0101ra\u1e25 j\u00f1\u0101notpatti-hetava\u1e25|)<\/em> <a id=\"_ednref3\" href=\"#_edn3\">[3]<\/a>too, cannot be accounted for. Therefore, just as <em>up\u0101d\u0101na<\/em> is accepted as a cause, so also <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em> must be accepted as a cause.<a id=\"_ednref4\" href=\"#_edn4\">[4]<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Further the Buddhists maintain that the <em>k\u0101ra\u1e47a<\/em> and the ak\u0101ra\u1e47a, and the sahak\u0101ri-sannidhi and <em>sahak\u0101ri-asannidhi<\/em> which belong to different times, differentiate the objects. They being contrary features cannot co-exist in one and the same object. Their contradiction cannot be resolved even by difference in time. Hence objects must be accepted as being differentiated by these contrary features.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> replies this as follows: if the said contention is accepted, then even the k\u0101ra\u1e47a and the <em>ak\u0101ra\u1e47a<\/em>, and the <em>sahak\u0101ri-sannidhi<\/em> and the <em>sahak\u0101ri-asannidhi<\/em>, which are present in different places, must be accepted as differentiating objects, on the said consideration. That is, a particular seed itself must be accepted as many, as it produces sprout only at a particular place, and at another it does not, and only at a particular place it gets associated with the <em>sahak\u0101ri<\/em> and at another it does not. In that case, as even a momentary seed becomes many, there would be the unwelcome position, even for the Buddhists, to accept countless differences. Therefore nothing can be proved as a single entity, and only the <em>s\u016bnya-v\u0101da<\/em> may have to be accepted by all. This however is undesirable even for those Buddhists who maintain the momentariness of objects. Hence the said contention is unsound.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might contend as follows: In order to avoid the said position, it is accepted that a seed produces sprout only in that place in which it exists and not in the rest.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> replies that it is not proper to state so. It is because there is the co-existence of two contrary features of &#8211; being present (in a place) and not being present (in another place), in a single seed. These contrary features naturally differentiate the object. Therefore, to avoid this unwelcome position, it must be admitted that the contradiction between the two features in a single object, is resolved by <em>de\u015ba-bheda<\/em>.\u00a0 Similarly, even <em>k\u0101la-bheda<\/em> must be accepted as resolving the contradiction. Consequently, the momentariness of objects stands refuted.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists seek to establish momentariness in another way. It is as follows: those who admit the enduring nature of substances state that every object exist both in the past and the present times. Since they exist in both the divisions of time, they are to be accepted as enduring. But this is not proper as, an object cannot be related to two different times, due to their mutual opposition. Therefore, only momentariness has to be accepted.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this as follows the <em>siddh\u0101ntin<\/em>-s do accept the association of two different times, the past and future, in an object. These past and future times are not with regard to that specific object, but with regard to the other objects. So these two times are only the <em>svak\u0101la<\/em>-s of the specific objects. Hence, there is no defect involved at all, in an object being related to the <em>p\u016brva<\/em> and <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em>, which form the <em>svak\u0101la<\/em> of it.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>The idea behind this is as follows: The time at which there is the prior non-existence of an object, is its <em>p\u016brvak\u0101la<\/em> and the time in which there is the posterior non-existence of an object is its <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em>. Now, this time, which becomes the <em>p\u016brvak\u0101la<\/em> and <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em> of some objects, can be the svak\u0101la of other objects, if they exist, at that time. So, the <em>siddh\u0101ntin<\/em>-s do not state that an object is associated with the time, which is the substratum, of its prior and posterior non-existence, but only state that, the object is associated with the time which is the substratum of the prior or posterior non-existence of other objects. Here the following illustration is to be kept in mind. A particular place, which is the <em>p\u016brvade\u015ba<\/em> as well as the <em>aparade\u015ba<\/em>, with regard to two different atoms, can well be the <em>svade\u015ba<\/em> of yet another atom. There is no contradiction involved in it at all. Similarly the <em>p\u016brvak\u0101la<\/em> and <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em> of different entities can be the <em>svak\u0101la<\/em> of a particular entity. If this is not accepted then the object itself must be accepted to be differentiated due to the contrary features. In that case, no single entity can be proved and as stated before only <em>\u015b\u016bnya-v\u0101da<\/em> will have to be accepted by all.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists state as follows: it is not objected that the association with the times conditioned by the prior and posterior non-existence of objects involves contradiction. But the objection is this: among those who advocate <em>sthiratva<\/em>, some accept the concept of time and some do not. In the case of the former, they state that a single object gets associated with <em>p\u016brvak\u0101la<\/em> and <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em>, and the latter state that the adjuncts of those two times get associated with that object. But both cannot hold well, as the two times or the adjuncts that cause them are mutually opposed to each other like light and darkness. Hence they cannot be associated to a single object. If they are not opposed to each other, then they must be associated to the object simultaneously.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this by stating that only if the <em>p\u016brva-aprak\u0101la-sambandha<\/em> or the <em>up\u0101dhi-sambandha<\/em> is simultaneously present in an object, there will be contradiction. But, if they are associated to the object at different times, then there is no contradiction. If this is not accepted or if it is maintained that an object can never be associated with two different times, then <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em> cannot arise at all. It is because even the Buddhists, who maintain <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101 <\/em>to be invalid, accept the association of <em>p\u016brvak\u0101la<\/em> and <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em> in it. Therefore to account for <em>pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101,<\/em> the association of the two different times must be accepted in a single entity.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might contend as follows the relation of time with the objects is only <em>t\u0101d\u0101tmya<\/em>. When it is so, there can be no possibility for the association of two different times in one object. Otherwise, the two times must be mutually identical. <em>(paraspara-t\u0101d\u0101tmya)<\/em>. This is because of the rule \u2013 \u0924\u0926\u092d\u093f\u0928\u094d\u0928\u093e\u092d\u093f\u0928\u094d\u0928\u0938\u094d\u092f \u0924\u0926\u092d\u093f\u0928\u094d\u0928\u0924\u094d\u0935\u0928\u093f\u092f\u092e\u0903\u0964 (<em>tadabhinn\u0101bhinnasya tad\u0101bhinnatva-niyama\u1e25). <\/em>Hence applying this maxim, the <em>p\u016brvak\u0101la<\/em> which is non-different from the object must be identical with <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em> too, as <em>aprak\u0101la<\/em> too, is identical with the object. But there can be no such identity between the different times.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this by stating that <em>t\u0101d\u0101tmya<\/em> is not the relation that relates time and object. If <em>t\u0101d\u0101tmya<\/em> be the relation, then, all the objects which were in the past and which are to be produced must have association with the same time as these must be the cognition \u2013 \u2018all objects which were and are to be produced are present in this particular time\u2019. But the association of all objects in a particular time is impossible. Therefore, instead of <em>t\u0101d\u0101tmya<\/em>, the <em>svar\u016bpa-sambandha<\/em> of the form \u2013 <em>k\u0101likavi\u015be\u1e63a\u1e47at\u0101<\/em> alone, is to be accepted as relating the objects and time. Thus, even without accepting the identity between two times, the associations of two different times in an object is possible without involving any contradiction. If identity is insisted upon then, <em>r\u016bpa, rasa<\/em> etc., which are present in a single object, cannot be accounted for. It is because they are not identical, in spite of being different and are related to a single object<a id=\"_ednref5\" href=\"#_edn5\">[5]<\/a>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists can object by stating that there can never be the association of many in one. But this is not possible because, even the Buddhists who admit attribute-less and momentary atoms accept that several atoms get associated and form an aggregate. In this case, a very close conjunction <em>(nairantarya)<\/em> of several atoms in one atom must be accepted.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now another section of Buddhists seek of establish momentariness as follows: Perception proves that objects like pot, etc., are existent <em>(gha\u1e6d\u0101dayo vartham\u0101na\u1e25|)<\/em>. This shows that pot, etc., are not <em>avartam\u0101na<\/em>. Only the two \u2013 the past and the future objects are accepted to be <em>avartam\u0101na<\/em>. From the said perceptual cognition of the pot as <em>\u2018gha\u1e6da\u1e25 vartham\u0101na\u1e25\u2019<\/em> it is clear that the pot is neither related to the past nor to future, but only to the present time. This proves pot, etc., to be momentary.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>But, <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha <\/em>states that this view is already refuted as it has been proved that an object can be related to two different times. Further, by the cognition <em>\u2018gha\u1e6da\u1e25 vartham\u0101na\u1e25\u2019<\/em> the absence of the relation with past and future times is neither comprehended, nor implied by <em>any\u0101th\u0101nupapatti<\/em>. \u2018This cognition only proves that pot etc., are not <em>avartam\u0101na<\/em> at that time<a id=\"_ednref6\" href=\"#_edn6\">[6]<\/a>. If there be the prior non-existence or the posterior non-existence of an object, then it can be accepted as <em>avartam\u0101na<\/em>. But as the object itself exists at that time, the <em>avartam\u0101natva<\/em> of it alone is negated by the <em>vartam\u0101natva-prat\u012bti<\/em>. It does not prevent the association of two different times in an object. Hence, the <em>sthiratva<\/em> of objects cannot be refuted.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>The perceptual cognition comprehends an object, which has the sense-contact, as associated with that particular time. The association of it with any other time is not comprehended by it. Hence there is no <em>pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> to prove the <em>sthiratva<\/em> of objects.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> replies this by stating that the recognition \u2018this verily is that\u2019 (<em>tadeva idam<\/em>) which comprehends an object as related to two different times and which is un-contradicted is the proof for the <em>sthiratva<\/em> of objects.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might object that \u2018recognition\u2019 is illusory and hence it cannot prove the <em>sthiratva<\/em> of objects. They prove the illusoriness of recognition by the following inference.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e \u092d\u094d\u0930\u093e\u0928\u094d\u0924\u093f\u0903 \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0926\u0940\u092a\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964<em>(<\/em><em>Pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101 bhr\u0101nti\u1e25, pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101tv\u0101t, d\u012bpa-pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101vat)<\/em>(Recognition is illusory, as it is recognition, like the recognition of lamp).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>With regard to the flame of a lamp, there arises the recognition \u2013 \u2018<em>seyam d\u012bpajv\u0101l\u0101<\/em>\u2019 (this flame of the lamp, is the same as that). But this recognition is contradicted by the inference \u2013 \u0926\u0940\u092a\u091c\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0932\u093e \u092d\u093f\u0928\u094d\u0928\u093e \u0924\u0948\u0932\u0935\u0930\u094d\u0924\u094d\u0924\u094d\u092f\u093e\u0916\u094d\u092f\u0938\u093e\u092e\u0917\u094d\u0930\u0940\u092d\u0947\u0926\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0964<em>(<\/em><em>D\u012bpajv\u0101l\u0101 bhinna tailavarty\u0101khya-s\u0101magr\u012bbhed\u0101t)<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>(The flames of the lamp are different, as their causal materials like wick, oil, etc., are different). Thus the recognition comprehending the oneness of the flame is illusory. On this analogy, all the recognitions become illusory, as they are recognitions. Hence recognition cannot be cited as a proof for the <em>sthiratva<\/em> of the objects.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this by stating that the inference of the Buddhists which proves the illusoriness of recognition is defective. There is the defect of <em>sop\u0101dhikatva<\/em> in it. <em>K\u0101ra\u1e47ado\u1e63a<\/em> and <em>b\u0101dhakapratyaya<\/em> are the <em>up\u0101dhi<\/em>-s. That knowledge, which is based on some defect or that which is contradicted alone, is illusory. In the case of the <em>d\u012bpapratyabhij\u00f1\u0101<\/em>, there is the defect of similarity (<em>s\u0101d\u1e5b\u015bya<\/em>). Hence it is defective. But in the case of the recognition of the pot etc., there is no such defect or contradiction. Therefore they are not illusory and are the <em>pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>-s that prove the <em>sthiratva<\/em> of objects.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might contend that the recognition of pot, etc., though, are not based on any defect are yet contradicted by the said inference, which proves the illusoriness of recognition. Hence they being illusions cannot be <em>pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>-s.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>\u201cBut it has already been shown\u201d, states <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em>, \u201cthat the inference is defective\u201d. Hence it cannot contradict the recognition. Nevertheless, admitting that the inference contradicts the recognition, he replies as follows: if recognition is admitted to be illusory merely because of it being contradicted by the said inference, then the <em>M\u0101dhyamika<\/em> view alone will have to be accepted by all. That is, the <em>M\u0101dhyamika<\/em>-s without bothering about its validity, seek to prove the illusoriness of all objects, through the inference.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>\u0938\u0930\u094d\u0935\u094b\u093d\u092a\u093f \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092f\u094b \u092d\u094d\u0930\u093e\u0928\u094d\u0924\u093f\u0903 \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0936\u0941\u0915\u094d\u0924\u093f-\u0930\u091c\u0924\u093e\u0926\u093f-\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092f\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964<em> (<\/em><em>Sarvo\u2019pi pratyayo bhr\u0101nti\u1e25 pratyayatv\u0101t sukti-rajat\u0101di pratyayavat<\/em>). (All cognitions are illusory, as they are cognitions, like the cognition of a shell-silver)<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Likewise, the particular section of Buddhists who are the <em>p\u016brvapak\u1e63in<\/em>-s too, not caring for the validity of their inference admit that it contradicts the recognition and thereby proves its invalidity. Therefore, it is almost similar to accepting the <em>M\u0101dhyamika<\/em> view. Further even an illusory recognition and remembrance cannot be accounted for, in the view of those who admit the momentariness of objects. This is because recognition and remembrance require an agent who is <em>sthira<\/em> (enduring). But in <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ika-v\u0101da<\/em>, even the self is momentary. Therefore neither recognition (which is illusory), nor remembrance can satisfactorily be explained.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Further, in the <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ika-v\u0101da<\/em>, <em>anum\u0101na<\/em> would be totally impossible. This is because there can be no remembrance of the <em>vy\u0101pti<\/em>, as <em>sm\u1e5bti<\/em> in general, is impossible. The result would be that <em>anum\u0101na<\/em> would be impossible, which would mean that momentariness cannot be proved by inference.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>In fact, even accepting that inference is possible, momentariness can still not be proved by it. It is because the inference through which the Buddhists seek to prove momentariness itself is flawed. Their inference is as follows:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>\u092f\u0924\u094d \u0938\u0924\u094d \u0924\u0924\u094d \u0915\u094d\u0937\u0923\u093f\u0915\u092e\u094d, \u092f\u0925\u093e \u0918\u091f\u0903 \u0938\u0928\u094d\u0924\u0936\u094d\u091a\u093e\u092e\u0940\u092d\u093e\u0935\u093e\u0903\u0964(Yat sat tat k\u1e63a\u1e47ikam, yath\u0101 gha\u1e6da\u1e25 santa\u015bca am\u012b bh\u0101vah)<a id=\"_ednref7\" href=\"#_edn7\">[7]<\/a> (That which is existent, is momentary, like a pot, and all the entities are existent).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>In effect, the above inference is obviously defective as follows: it may be asked as to whether the entire world is intended to be conveyed by the word \u2013 <em>bh\u0101va<\/em>. If yes, then there will be no difference of the <em>pak\u1e63a<\/em>, in the <em>hetu <\/em>and the <em>d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101nta<\/em>. If there is no <em>pak\u1e63abheda<\/em> in the <em>d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101nta<\/em>, then, it would mean that the <em>s\u0101dhya <\/em>is proved in the <em>d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101nta<\/em>, and hence there will be the defect of <em>siddhas\u0101dhana<\/em>. If there is no <em>pak\u1e63abheda<\/em> in the <em>hetu<\/em>, then, as the <em>hetu<\/em> does not exist in the <em>pak\u1e63a<\/em> through the <em>hetut\u0101vacchedaka-sambandha<\/em>, there will be the defect of <em>bhag\u0101siddhi<\/em>. That is, when there is non-difference between the <em>pak\u1e63a<\/em> and the <em>hetu<\/em>, there can be no <em>\u0101dhara-\u0101dheya-bh\u0101va<\/em> between the two.<a id=\"_ednref8\" href=\"#_edn8\">[8]<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>To overcome this defect, if <em>bh\u0101va<\/em> is taken to mean everything else other than pot, then pot cannot serve as the <em>d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101nta<\/em>. This is because, it is not accepted as momentary by the <em>siddh\u0101ntin<\/em>-s. And it has already been shown that the alleged contradiction involved in the co-existence of the contrary features of <em>s\u0101marthya<\/em> and <em>as\u0101marthya<\/em>, cannot show a pot to be momentary. This again is because the contradiction has been already resolved. Hence pot which is not proved to be momentary cannot be the <em>d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101nta<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists might contend that the flame of a lamp can serve as the illustration. But, this too is improper, as even that is accepted to exist for about some three or four <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>-s.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists might contend that <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47op\u0101dhi <\/em>which is accepted by the <em>Ny\u0101ya-Vai\u015be\u1e63ika<\/em>-s can serve as the example. That is, that <em>up\u0101dhi<\/em> which limits a small duration of time, namely, a <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> in the <em>mah\u0101k\u0101la<\/em>, is accepted as <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47opadhi<\/em> by the <em>Ny\u0101ya-Vai\u015be\u1e63ika<\/em>-s. This <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47opadhi<\/em> is not <em>sthira<\/em> (enduring), but is <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ika<\/em>. If it were <em>sthira<\/em>, then it cannot limit a <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>. Hence this <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikop\u0101dhi<\/em> can serve as the illustration.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>But this contention is not correct. It is because the origination of an object, as limited by the destruction of another or the destruction of an object as limited by the origination of some other object alone, is accepted as a <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47opadhi<\/em> by the <em>Ny\u0101ya-Vai\u015be\u1e63ika<\/em>-s. It is thus: The <em>Ny\u0101ya-Vai\u015be\u1e63ika<\/em>-s accepts a sequence in which the destruction of an object occurs. The sequence is \u2013 \u0915\u094d\u0930\u093f\u092f\u093e &#8211; \u0915\u094d\u0930\u093f\u092f\u093e\u0924\u094b \u0935\u093f\u092d\u093e\u0917\u0903 &#8211; \u0935\u093f\u092d\u093e\u0917\u093e\u0924\u094d \u092a\u0941\u0930\u094d\u0935\u0938\u0902\u092f\u094b\u0917\u0928\u093e\u0936\u0903 &#8211; \u092a\u0942\u0930\u094d\u0935\u0938\u0902\u092f\u094b\u0917\u0928\u093e\u0936\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0909\u0924\u094d\u0924\u0930\u0938\u0902\u092f\u094b\u0917\u0903 &#8211; \u0924\u0924\u0903 \u0915\u0930\u094d\u092e\u0928\u093e\u0936\u0903\u0964 (<em>Kriy\u0101, kriy\u0101to vibh\u0101ga\u1e25, vibh\u0101g\u0101t p\u016brvasamyogan\u0101sa\u1e25, p\u016brvasamyoga-n\u0101s\u0101t uttarasamoga\u1e25, tata\u1e25 karma-n\u0101s\u0101\u1e25)<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>In this sequence, first <em>karma<\/em> is produced. This moment is the <em>karmotpatti-k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>. Then, the <em>karma<\/em> remains in the second moment and gets destroyed in the third. In the second moment, <em>vibh\u0101ga-pr\u0101gabh\u0101va<\/em> is destroyed, so that in the third moment, <em>vibh\u0101ga<\/em> can be produced. Now, the <em>karmotpatti- k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> is the last moment or <em>avas\u0101na- k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em> for <em>vibh\u0101ga-pr\u0101gah\u0101va.<\/em> Hence it can be said that the karma is de-limited by <em>vibh\u0101ga-pr\u0101gah\u0101va<\/em>, or that the end of <em>vibh\u0101ga<\/em> is characterized or de-limited by the karma. Now the former is technically called <em>vibh\u0101ga-pr\u0101gabh\u0101v\u0101vacchinna-karma<\/em> and the latter, <em>karm\u0101vaccinna- vibh\u0101ga-avas\u0101na<\/em>. This <em>vibh\u0101ga-pr\u0101gabh\u0101va-avacchinna-karma<\/em> is accepted as the <em>up\u0101dhi<\/em> limiting that particular <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47a<\/em>. Therefore<em>, ekavastvar\u0101vavacchinna-avas\u0101naka-vastvantaram<\/em> or <em>ekavastu-avas\u0101na-avacchinna-\u0101rambhaka-vastvantaram<\/em> is the <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47op\u0101dhi<\/em>. Hence, since both the <em>vastu<\/em>-s involved are <em>sthira<\/em>, <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikop\u0101dhi <\/em>cannot be the illustration.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might contend that, there is no evidence (<em>pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>) for proving the <em>paraspar\u0101vaccheda<\/em> between two vastu-s. That is, two things de-limiting each other. <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> replies this by stating that as they become the objects of <em>vi\u015bi\u1e63\u1e6da-buddhi<\/em> (complex-cognition) simultaneously, there can be <em>paraspar\u0101vaccheda<\/em>. This is similar to two scales limiting a small place. That is, two scales which are kept in opposite directions and which are conjoined at a particular point by their parts are mutually conjoined. Thus, just as it is possible in the case of space, it is also possible in the case of time.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Thus Buddhists cannot prove momentariness by citing <em>anvayavy\u0101pti<\/em>, as it cannot be substantiated through an illustration.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, <em>the vyatireka-vy\u0101pti<\/em> of the form \u2013 \u092f\u0926\u0915\u094d\u0937\u0923\u093f\u0915\u0902 \u0924\u0926\u0938\u0924\u094d \u092f\u0925\u093e \u0936\u0936\u0935\u093f\u0937\u093e\u0923\u092e\u094d\u0964 <em>yadak\u1e63a\u1e47ikam tadasat, yatha \u015ba\u015bavi\u1e63\u0101\u1e47am<\/em> (that which is not momentary is non-existent as a hare\u2019s horn), might be stated as proving momentariness.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> rejects this by raising the question as to what is intended by <em>ak\u1e63a\u1e47ikatva<\/em>. If <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikatv\u0101bh\u0101va<\/em> is intended, then the <em>vy\u0101pti<\/em> cannot hold good. It is because, the <em>pratiyogi<\/em> of <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikatv\u0101bh\u0101va<\/em>, namely, <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikatva<\/em> itself is unproved. Therefore, without this <em>pratiyogi-jn\u0101na<\/em> there can be no <em>abh\u0101va- jn\u0101na<\/em>. Consequently, there can be no <em>vyatireka-vy\u0101pti<\/em> at all. To avoid this, it can be said that <em>cirak\u0101l\u0101-sth\u0101yitva<\/em> or remaining for some extended time is intended by <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikatva<\/em>. But this too is not proper, as it is not present in the hare\u2019s horn which is cited as the illustration.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>To overcome this, <em>\u015ba\u015bas\u1e5b\u1e45g\u0101bh\u0101va<\/em> might be stated as the illustration. But it is not proper, as it is an existent entity (<em>sat<\/em>). That is, <em>\u015ba\u015bas\u1e5b\u1e45g\u0101bh\u0101va<\/em> exists for ever. Thus, as it has <em>k\u0101lasambandha<\/em>, it becomes <em>pram\u0101\u1e47asiddha<\/em>. Hence it becomes <em>sat<\/em>. Being <em>sat<\/em>, it cannot become the illustration of the <em>vyatireka-vy\u0101pti<\/em> involving <em>asattva<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now the Buddhists might object that <em>k\u0101lasambandhitva<\/em> is not <em>sattva<\/em> but only <em>bh\u0101vatva<\/em> can be so. Hence the non-existence of hare\u2019s horn can be the illustration.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> answers this by pointing out that the <em>asattva<\/em> of the form of <em>bh\u0101vetaratva<\/em> (being different from <em>bh\u0101va<\/em>-a positive entity), is not present in the absence of hare\u2019s horn. That is, according to those who maintain non-existence as a positive entity (<em>bh\u0101v\u0101ntaro abh\u0101va\u1e25<\/em>), there can be no <em>bh\u0101vetaratva<\/em> in the non-existence of hare\u2019s horn, as that too will be of the form of some positive entity.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Further, in the view of those who maintain <em>abh\u0101va<\/em> as distinct from <em>bh\u0101va<\/em>, <em>k\u0101lasambandhitva <\/em>alone is unanimously accepted as <em>sattva<\/em>. Differing from this, if <em>bh\u0101vatva<\/em> is said to be <em>sattva<\/em>, by the Buddhists, then, even <em>abh\u0101vatva<\/em> can be stated to be so, by somebody else. Hence it is not proper to establish the <em>siddh\u0101nta<\/em> in the said manner.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>The Buddhists might now object that if <em>abh\u0101vatva<\/em> is stated as <em>sattva<\/em>, then even pot, etc., which are positive entities becomes <em>asat<\/em>. Hence the perception of them cannot be accounted for. Therefore <em>bh\u0101vatva<\/em> must be stated as <em>sattva<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> replies that the said defect remains even if <em>bh\u0101vatva<\/em> is maintained as <em>sattva<\/em>. That is, <em>ghat\u0101bh\u0101va<\/em>, etc., must be <em>asat<\/em>, being <em>abh\u0101va<\/em>. In that case, there can be no perception of them. But they are perceived. This perception can be accounted for only if they have got <em>k\u0101lasambandha<\/em>. Hence that alone must be accepted as <em>sattva<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Thus the objection and the reply are common when either <em>bh\u0101vatva<\/em> or <em>abh\u0101vatva<\/em> is accepted to be <em>sattva<\/em>. Therefore <em>k\u0101lasambandha<\/em> alone is <em>sattva<\/em>. Since it is present in the non-existence of hare\u2019s horn, it is <em>sat<\/em>. Consequently it cannot be the illustration of the <em>vyatireka-vy\u0101pti<\/em>. So this <em>vy\u0101pti <\/em>too cannot prove momentariness.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Then, a section of Buddhists contend as follows: it is not proper to prove momentariness by <em>sattva<\/em>. It is because there is the defect of <em>b\u0101dha<\/em> in the <em>hetu \u2013 sattva<\/em>. That is, <em>Buddha<\/em> has instructed that there is one <em>nitya-tattva<\/em>. In this <em>nityatattva<\/em> there is <em>sattva<\/em> but not <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikatva<\/em>. Hence there are the defects of <em>\u0101gama-b\u0101dha<\/em> and <em>vyabhic\u0101ra<\/em> in the <em>hetu (sattva)<\/em>. Hence momentariness of everything else apart from the said <em>nitya-tattva<\/em> is to be proved by the <em>hetu \u2013 dhruvabh\u0101vitva<\/em> (<em>dhruva-bh\u0101vi<\/em> is something whose happening cannot be prevented).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>That is, that which is <em>dhruva-bhavi<\/em>, is not dependent upon a cause &#8211; \u092f\u0926\u094d \u0927\u094d\u0930\u0941\u0935\u092d\u093e\u0935\u093f \u0928 \u0924\u0926\u094d\u0927\u0947\u0924\u0941-\u0938\u093e\u092a\u0947\u0915\u094d\u0937\u092e\u094d\u0964 (<em>yat dhruvabh\u0101vi na taddhetus\u0101peksam<\/em>). If <em>hetu-nirapeksatva<\/em> is not accepted, then it would be opposed to <em>dhruva-bh\u0101vitva<\/em>. Therefore, as the destruction of all the originated objects is <em>dhruva-bh\u0101vi<\/em>, it does not depend upon any <em>hetu<\/em>. And since it is not dependent upon any <em>hetu<\/em> an object is destroyed as soon as it gets originated. Thus, momentariness of objects is proved by <em>dhruva-bh\u0101vitva<\/em> through <em>ahetukatva<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> criticizes this view by raising the question as to what is intended by \u0927\u094d\u0930\u0941\u0935\u092d\u093e\u0935\u093f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u092e\u094d (<em>dhruva-bh\u0101vitva)<\/em>. It can mean only one among the following. They are:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\r\n<li>\u0924\u0926\u094d-\u0938\u092e\u0915\u093e\u0932-\u092d\u093e\u0935\u093f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u092e\u094d &#8211; <em>Tad-samak\u0101la-bh\u0101vitvam<\/em><\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>\u0924\u0926\u094d-\u0905\u0928\u0928\u094d\u0924\u0930-\u092d\u093e\u0935\u093f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u092e\u094d &#8211; <em>Tad-anantara-bh\u0101vitvam<\/em><\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>\u0924\u0928\u094d\u092e\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0930-\u091c\u0928\u094d\u092f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u092e\u094d &#8211; <em>Tanm\u0101tra-janyatvam<\/em><\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>\u0924\u0926\u0947\u0915\u0938\u093e\u092e\u0917\u094d\u0930\u0940-\u091c\u0928\u094d\u092f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u092e\u094d &#8211; <em>Tad-ekas\u0101magr\u012b-janyatvam<\/em> and<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>\u0905\u0939\u0947\u0924\u0941\u0915\u0924\u094d\u0935\u092e\u094d &#8211; <em>Ahetukatvam<\/em><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, <em>dhruvabhavitva<\/em> cannot mean either <em>Tad-samak\u0101la-bh\u0101vitva<\/em> or <em>Tad-anantara- k\u0101la bh\u0101vitva<\/em>, as there will be the defect of <em>asiddhi<\/em>. It thus: the destruction of an originated object, which is stated to be <em>dhruvabh\u0101vi<\/em>, does not exist at the time at which the effect exists or at the time following the production of the effect. Therefore, if <em>dhruvabh\u0101vi<\/em> is taken to mean the two said senses, then there will be the defect of <em>asiddhi<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>It cannot also mean either <em>Tanm\u0101tra-janyatva<\/em> or <em>Tad-ekas\u0101magr\u012b-janyatva<\/em>, as there will be the defects of <em>vy\u0101gh\u0101ta<\/em> and <em>virodha<\/em>. It is thus: if the destruction of effects which is stated to be <em>dhruvabh\u0101vi<\/em>, be caused by the effect alone (<em>tanm\u0101trajanya<\/em>) or be caused by the same auxiliaries which produce the effect (<em>tadekas\u0101magr\u012bjanya<\/em>), then it becomes <em>sahetuka<\/em>. Hence, if <em>dhruvabh\u0101vitva<\/em> which means <em>sahetukatva<\/em> be stated as the <em>hetu<\/em>, which proves the <em>s\u0101dhya \u2013 ahetukatva<\/em>, then there will be the defects of <em>vy\u0101gh\u0101ta<\/em> and <em>virodha<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Similarly if <em>ahetukatva<\/em> is intended by <em>dhruvabh\u0101vitva<\/em>, then there will be the defect of <em>s\u0101dhy\u0101vi\u015be\u1e63a<\/em>. This is because <em>ahetukatva<\/em> itself becomes both the <em>hetu<\/em> and the <em>s\u0101dhya<\/em>. In that case, even the <em>hetu<\/em> (which is not different from the <em>s\u0101dhya<\/em>), becomes doubtful like the <em>s\u0101dhya<\/em>. Thus, <em>dhruva-bh\u0101vitva<\/em> cannot mean any of the said five senses<a id=\"_ednref9\" href=\"#_edn9\">[9]<\/a>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists might contend that <em>dhruvabh\u0101vitva<\/em> means <em>e\u1e63yatva-niyama<\/em> or the rule that something will invariably occur. But, <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> points out that this too is improper, as there is the defect of <em>vyabhic\u0101ra<\/em><a id=\"_ednref10\" href=\"#_edn10\">[10]<\/a>. It is thus: the Buddhists who uphold momentariness of objects admit that there is a series of momentary objects. This series can either be a series of like-objects (<em>sad\u1e5b\u015ba-sant\u0101na<\/em>), or a series of unlike-objects (<em>visad\u1e5b\u015ba-santana<\/em>). When there is a series of momentary pots, then there is the <em>sad\u1e5b\u015ba-sant\u0101na<\/em> involving <em>apratisankhy\u0101-nirodha<\/em>. That is, there is the non-intentional or natural destruction of the preceding momentary pots in the series.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Similarly, when a pot is broken by a stick, then there is a series of pot-shreds, which are also momentary. This series which got initiated by a pot has pot-shreds which are dissimilar to it. Therefore this is a <em>visad\u1e5b\u015ba-sant\u0101na<\/em>. This dissimilar series involves <em>pratisa\u1e45khy\u0101-nirodha<\/em><a id=\"_ednref11\" href=\"#_edn11\">[11]<\/a>. That is there is the destruction of the pot due to the will to destroy it. The Buddhists accept that when a pot is broken with a stick, both the initial momentary pot-shred in the dissimilar series and the <em>pratisa\u1e45khy\u0101 -nirodha<\/em> occur simultaneously. In this, <em>pratisa\u1e45khy\u0101-nirodha<\/em>, there is the <em>e\u1e63yatva-niyama<\/em> which is the <em>hetu<\/em>, but there is no <em>ahetukatva<\/em>, which is the <em>s\u0101dhya<\/em>. Hence there is the defect of <em>vyabhic\u0101ra<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Thus <em>dhruva-bh\u0101vitva<\/em> taken in any sense remains defective.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Further if <em>ahetukatva<\/em> is accepted merely because of <em>e\u1e63yatva-niyama<\/em>, then all the objects of the world, which are supposed to be momentary, must come into being in the first moment itself and get destroyed in the very second moment. But such a position is not found in experience. Therefore, <em>dhruva-bh\u0101vitva<\/em> cannot prove <em>ahetukatva<\/em> and consequently <em>k\u1e63a\u1e47ikatva<\/em> cannot be proved.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Now, the Buddhists might contend that there is need for instructing momentariness, for the purpose of preventing attachment to worldly existence. But <em>Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha<\/em> points out that the Buddhists who consider themselves to be <em>dh\u0101rmika<\/em>-s will incur the great sin due to uttering falsehood. A person of sharp intellect who listens to the instruction of momentariness will easily understand its <em>apramaikata<\/em> and so the attachment to the world in his case will not be prevented. Further, this attachment can be prevented even by instructing the <em>anityatva<\/em> of <em>sams\u0101ra<\/em>. If not, only <em>s\u016bnya<\/em> or void is to be instructed for the purpose of developing detachment. But it is not acceptable even to the <em>Vaibh\u0101\u1e63ika<\/em>-s. Therefore momentariness need not be instructed for the said purpose.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Then, Ve\u1e45ka\u1e6dan\u0101tha proceeds to give the counter-inferences for refuting momentariness and establishing the enduring nature of objects. They are as follows:<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\r\n<li>\u0935\u093f\u0917\u0940\u0924\u093e \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e \u0938\u094d\u0935\u0935\u093f\u0937\u092f\u0947 \u092a\u094d\u0930\u092e\u093e \u0905\u092c\u093e\u0927\u093f\u0924-\u092c\u0941\u0926\u094d\u0927\u093f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0938\u094d\u0935\u0932\u0915\u094d\u0937\u0923\u092c\u0941\u0926\u094d\u0927\u093f\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964 (<em>Vig\u012bt\u0101 pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101, svavi\u1e63aye pram\u0101, ab\u0101dhitabuddhitv\u0101t svalaksa\u1e47a-buddhiv\u0101t<\/em>) (Recognition, which is under discussion, is valid in regard to its object, as it is an un-contradicted knowledge, like the knowledge of the <em>svalaksa\u1e47a<\/em> -s). [In the Buddhist terminology, <em>svalaksa\u1e47a<\/em> -s means <em>r\u016bpa, rasa, gandha and spar\u015ba<\/em>. The knowledge of these is accepted to be un-contradicted and hence valid even by the Buddhists. The <em>Ved\u0101ntin<\/em>-s too accept the knowledge of the four, though not termed <em>svalaksa\u1e47a<\/em>-s, as valid. Similar to this, recognition too must be valid, being un-contradicted. The inference of the Buddhists, \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e \u092d\u094d\u0930\u092e\u0903 \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0926\u0940\u092a\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u094d\u092f\u092d\u093f\u091c\u094d\u091e\u093e\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964<em> (pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101, bhrama\u1e25, pratyabhij\u00f1\u0101tvat, d\u012bpapratyabhij\u00f1\u0101vat)<\/em> (recognition is invalid, being recognition, like the recognition of the flame of the lamp), is contradicted by the said inference].<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>\u0918\u091f\u093e\u0926\u092f\u0903 \u0905\u0915\u094d\u0937\u0923\u093f\u0915\u093e\u0903 \u0938\u0924\u094d\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0938\u0902\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u093f\u092a\u0928\u094d\u0928 \u0928\u093f\u0924\u094d\u092f\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964 (<em>Gha\u1e6d\u0101daya\u1e25 ak\u1e63a\u1e47ik\u0101\u1e25 sattv\u0101t, sampratipanna-nityavat<\/em>) (Pot etc. are not momentary, being existent, like the eternal object accepted by both). [The Buddhists accept a <em>nitya-tattva<\/em> instructed by Buddha. The <em>Ved\u0101ntin<\/em>-s too accept <em>Brahman<\/em> and other objects as <em>nitya<\/em>. These are accepted to be <em>nitya<\/em> due to <em>sattva<\/em> (i.e., since they are existent). Similarly, pot etc., too are not momentary being existent. The inference of the Buddhists &#8211; \u0915\u094d\u0937\u0923\u093f\u0915\u0902 \u0938\u0924\u094d\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0918\u091f\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964 (ksanikam sattvat gha\u1e6d\u0101vat) is contradicted by the said inference].<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>\u0918\u091f\u093e\u0926\u092f\u0903 \u0905\u0915\u094d\u0937\u0923\u093f\u0915\u093e\u0903 \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0924\u0940\u0924\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0936\u0936\u0936\u0943\u0919\u094d\u0917\u093e\u0926\u093f\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964 (<em>Gha\u1e6d\u0101daya\u1e25 ak\u1e63a\u1e47ik\u0101\u1e25 prat\u012btatv\u0101t, \u015ba\u015ba\u015b\u1e5b\u1e45g-\u0101divat<\/em>) (Pot etc. are not momentary, as they are objects of knowledge, like the hare\u2019s horn). [The hare\u2019s horn is cognized by the word \u2013 <em>\u015ba\u015ba\u015b\u1e5b\u1e45ga<\/em>. It is also not momentary as it is <em>tuccha<\/em>. Likewise, pot etc., too being cognized cannot be momentary. This inference too contradicts the inference of the Buddhists &#8211; \u0915\u094d\u0937\u0923\u093f\u0915\u0902 \u0938\u0924\u094d\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u0918\u091f\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964<em>(k\u1e63a\u1e47ikam sattv\u0101t, gha\u1e6davat<\/em>)].<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>\u092a\u094d\u0930\u0927\u094d\u0935\u0902\u0938\u0903 \u0938\u0939\u0947\u0924\u0941\u0915\u0903 \u092a\u0942\u0930\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0935\u0927\u093f\u092e\u0924\u094d\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d \u092a\u091f\u0935\u0924\u094d\u0964(<em>Pradhva\u1e41sa\u1e25 sahetuka\u1e25 p\u016brva-avadhimatv\u0101t, pa\u1e6davat<\/em>). (Destruction is possessed of cause, as it has a beginning like a cloth). [This inference contradicts the inference of the Buddhists &#8211; \u092a\u094d\u0930\u0927\u094d\u0935\u0902\u0938\u0903 \u0905\u0939\u0947\u0924\u0941\u0915\u0903 \u0927\u094d\u0930\u0941\u0935\u092d\u093e\u0935\u093f\u0924\u094d\u0935\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0964 (<em>Pradhva\u1e41sa\u1e25 ahetuka\u1e25 dhruva-bhavitv\u0101t<\/em>)].<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Thus, the enduring nature of substances is proved, by refuting momentariness upheld by the M\u0101dhyamikabauddhas.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><strong>____<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><strong>References<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\r\n<li>Nyayasiddhanjana of Vedantadesika with Nyaya-siddhanjana-tika and Ratna-petika, ed., Uttamur Veeraraghavacharya, Ubhayavedanta-grantmala, T.Nagar, Madras \u2013 17, 1978<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>Nyayasiddhanjana of Vedantadesika, with Nyaya-siddhanjana-tika, ed. Kapisthalam Desikacarya, SrivaisnavaSiddhanta Pracara Sabha Ltd., Madras, 1934<\/li>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<li>Tattva-muktakalapa and Sarvarthasiddhi and two commentaries, ed. Uttamur Veeraraghavacharya, Ubhayavedantagrantamala, Madras 1973<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n\r\n\r\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\" \/>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div class=\"wp-block-group is-vertical is-layout-flex wp-container-core-group-is-layout-8cf370e7 wp-block-group-is-layout-flex\">\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn1\" href=\"#_ednref1\">[1]<\/a> \u0926\u094d\u0930\u0935\u094d\u092f\u0938\u094d\u0925\u093f\u0930\u0924\u094d\u0935\u0928\u093f\u0930\u0942\u092a\u0923\u092e\u094d pp. 16-37<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn2\" href=\"#_ednref2\">[2]<\/a> <em>Ratnape\u1e6dik\u0101<\/em> Com. on <em>Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<\/em> pp. 16 -17<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn3\" href=\"#_ednref3\">[3]<\/a> Quoted in <em>Ny\u0101ya-siddh\u0101\u00f1ajana-\u1e6d\u012bk\u0101<\/em> p. 20 &amp;\u00a0 <em>Ratnape\u1e6dik\u0101<\/em> Com. on <em>Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<\/em> p. 20<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn4\" href=\"#_ednref4\">[4]<\/a> <em>Ratnape\u1e6dik\u0101<\/em> Com. on <em>Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<\/em> p. 21<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn5\" href=\"#_ednref5\">[5]<\/a> <em>Ratnape\u1e6dik\u0101 <\/em>Com. on <em>Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<\/em> p. 24<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn6\" href=\"#_ednref6\">[6]<\/a> <em>Tattvamukt\u0101kal\u0101pa\u1e25<\/em> 1-27<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn7\" href=\"#_ednref7\">[7]<\/a> This belongs to <em>par\u0101rth\u0101num\u0101na<\/em> type. The Buddhists accept only the two <em>avayava<\/em>-s of <em>par\u0101rth\u0101num\u0101na &#8211; d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6d\u0101nta <\/em>and <em>upanaya<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn8\" href=\"#_ednref8\">[8]<\/a> <em>Ratnape\u1e6dik\u0101<\/em> Com. on <em>Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<\/em> p.27<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn9\" href=\"#_ednref9\">[9]<\/a> <em>Ny\u0101ya-siddh\u0101\u00f1ajana-\u1e6d\u012bk\u0101<\/em>\u00a0 p.20 &amp;\u00a0 <em>Ratnape\u1e6dik\u0101<\/em> Com. on <em>Ny\u0101yasiddh\u0101\u00f1janam<\/em> p. 32<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn10\" href=\"#_ednref10\">[10]<\/a> <em>Tattvamukt\u0101kal\u0101pa\u1e25<\/em> 1-28<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p><a id=\"_edn11\" href=\"#_ednref11\">[11]<\/a> <em>Pratisa\u1e45khy\u0101-nirodha<\/em> is explained in two ways. One is that <em>sa\u1e45khy\u0101 <\/em>means knowledge, <em>prati<\/em> means <em>pratik\u016bla<\/em> and <em>nirodha<\/em> means destruction. Hence, <em>pratisa\u1e45khy\u0101-nirodha<\/em> means destruction due to non-conducive knowledge or intentional destruction. See <em>Ratnape\u1e6dik\u0101<\/em>. P.33. But, the Hindi translator explains it in a different way, as the destruction, which is opposed to the previous cognition. That is, it prevents the previous knowledge. For instance, when a pot is destroyed by a stick, then it prevents the knowledge \u2013 \u2018this is a pot\u2019. See Hindi translation of NS. P.30. Also see <em>Alabhyal\u0101bha<\/em>. C. on TMK p.127<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center has-text-color has-background has-link-color has-medium-font-size wp-elements-e352afcea19db27d1e4b0af22d9c293e\" style=\"color: #00246b; background-color: #cadcfc;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/S.-Usha.pdf\"><strong>Download PDF<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Dr.S.Usha Abstract Dravya or substance is a basic, fundamental and foundational entity that constitutes reality. Hence it is essential to acquire a good understanding of this concept. But it is not an&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-190","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-parispanda-2025"],"gutentor_comment":4,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/190","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=190"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/190\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":811,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/190\/revisions\/811"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=190"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=190"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=190"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}