{"id":188,"date":"2025-08-04T13:48:05","date_gmt":"2025-08-04T13:48:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/?p=188"},"modified":"2026-03-19T02:00:17","modified_gmt":"2026-03-19T02:00:17","slug":"nagarjunas-arguments-for-relativism-in-cognitive-matters","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/parispanda.ssus.ac.in\/index.php\/2025\/08\/04\/nagarjunas-arguments-for-relativism-in-cognitive-matters\/","title":{"rendered":"Nagarjuna\u2019s Arguments for Relativism in Cognitive Matters"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n

Dr.Saroj Kanta Kar<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

\u00adKey Words:<\/strong> Pram\u0101\u1e47a, prameya, vaita\u1e47dika, prasa\u1e45g\u0101p\u0101d\u0101na, svabh\u0101va, ni\u1e25svabh\u0101vat\u0101 chakraka, itaretara\u015braya, an\u0101vastha. Prat\u012btyasamutp\u0101da<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Abstract<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

In place of the ascription of \u2018cognitive skepticism on Nagarjuna\u2019, as sometimes argued by many, a humble attempt is made here to argue for \u2018relativism of cognitive matters\u2019 in his philosophy.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Nagarjuna argues against the supposition of independent entity-hood or substantivity as sattva<\/em> or sva-svabh\u0101va, <\/em>while preaching for relativity.<\/em> This is well exhibited in understanding of beings, things, actions as well as processes of cognition (pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>). This contention was taken as aimed at the realists who suppose the independent reality of things and beings. The realists, presumably Ny\u0101ya, is supposed to be p\u016brvapak\u015b<\/em>a to establish the reality of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> and prameya<\/em> in such a way that the same would establish independent stance and substantivity of things and actions. The same go against the Buddhist notion of inter-dependence and non-substantiality, which was upheld by Nagarjuna. Hence, it was a necessity to expose the non-substantiality and relativity of the pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> and the prameya<\/em> by disproving the independent and substantial status of the things. This was demonstrated in M\u016blamadhyamakak\u0101rik\u0101<\/em> and subsequently in Vigrahavy\u0101vartani<\/em>, and it earned for him the title of (a cognitive) skeptic by some scholars.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

He argued to show that any of the prama\u1e47as<\/em> and prameya<\/em>s<\/em> is not self-established as any of them requires proof by the other, which is not yet established. He disproved the realist position by citing logical oddities with employing a special type of destructive arguments (prasa\u1e45gap\u0101d\u0101na\u1e41<\/em>).<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

What he proved is the relativity and lack of any substantivity of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> and prameya<\/em>. This position is not understood by many, and Nagarjuna was wrongly taken as the cognitive skeptic. This wrong ascription is proposed to be contested and refuted in the paper by establishing his position as relativist in the matter of cognition as in every other cases.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

The discourse has a suggestion for the practical life of a common man when it will be understood that the value of anything is relative to the other. The otherness will be cared for replacing the self-centeredness of things and beings.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Nagarjuna\u2019s philosophical enterprise often is abstruse as well as seminal in many respects. This character of his philosophy leads to very many interpretations, among which a skeptical coloring of his philosophy floats at the surface. The same is ascribed on his dealings with matters of cognition, when he is engaged in refuting the essentialist picture of them, supposed to be led by Ny\u0101ya-Vai\u015be\u1e63ika. The context has been taken up by the scholars, some of which argue that it is a case of Cognitive Skepticism,[1]<\/a> Nagarjuna\u2019s arguments in this context, of course, lead in this direction. But, is the skeptical interpretation appropriate with Nagarjuna\u2019s Philosophy. If his philosophy is rescued from the ascription of Skepticism in another context, \u2018why not the same can happen in this context? With this objective it is humbly attempted to argue here that from the point of view of his overall philosophy this context can also safely by considered as relativism, the present context can alternatively be considered as relativism in cognitive or epistemic matters in Nagarjuna.\u00a0 Relativism makes the ground of his philosophy. From the point of view of his spiritual lineage also his philosophical enterprise only preaches non-essentialism of empirical realities and it is achieved through relativistic and prasangap\u0101d\u0101na<\/em> arguments. The same has been done in the context of his disprove of pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Nagarjunian Relativism<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Relativism, of any variety, vouchsafes relative value or judgment of certain contexts. According to it relating to some conditions or parameters something is meaningful, true or good. For example, cultural relativism holds certain things as meaningful or good relating to a certain culture, and the same may not be equally and absolutely be good. The truth value of a sentence is relative to its comprising factors and the contexts; moral values of anything is relative to the culture, context, etc. Relativism draws a relative finality. This sort of relativism, according to which values are essentially relative, raises in opposition to absolutism that advances unique value of things universally and objectively.\u00a0 Nagarjuniana relativism, if one is permitted to say so, is of different genre in the sense that while other relativism makes a relation between something in relation to some other thing, Nagarjuna\u2019s relativism is based upon the relation of the things with causes and conditions or qualifiers. It is derived from the phenomenal principle of prat\u012btyasamutp\u0101da<\/em>. It means everything arises or comes into existence by depending upon something other. Everything phenomenal is relative to its causes and conditions, but in its existential form, it cannot be traced back to the causes and conditions. There cannot be any immutable thing-hood or intrinsic nature (svabh\u0101va<\/em>) of the arising or existing thing, as it is not found in the individual causes and conditions or in them taken together; it is also not found in the something else. Hence, things are devoid of immutable intrinsic nature (svabhava\u015b\u016bnya<\/em>). Things are ni\u1e25svabh\u0101va<\/em> or svabh\u0101va s\u016bnya<\/em> or simply \u015b\u016bnya<\/em>. This analysis and contemplation on this may lead to insight (praj\u00f1\u0101<\/em>) and spiritual gains, but the dependence or para\u1e63paraprek\u1e63\u0101<\/em> is the matter of empirical realm (vy\u0101vah\u0101rika<\/em>) as it plays within the boundary of phenomenal or empirical (vy\u0101vah\u0101rika<\/em>) level. This relativism in Nagarjuna, However, is not applicable to the perennial moral or spiritual values and actions, because they play great roles within and beyond the vy\u0101vah\u0101rika<\/em> realm.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

There is a consistent reason for thinking of such relativism in Nagarjuna in relation to his philosophical enterprise. His philosophy, arguably, has certain primordial aims of discarding essentialist intrinsic nature (svabh\u0101va-v\u0101da<\/em>) in empirical; and demolishing the tendency of metaphysical speculative viewing (sarvad\u1e5b\u015b\u1e6di prara\u1e47a<\/em>), in order to pave the path for the tattva<\/em> to be realized intuitively. Along with this type of discarding and demolition of metaphysical in empirical, he verily honors the status of empirical for itself. For example, while declaring that everything empirical is lacking its intrinsic nature (svabh\u0101va\u015b\u016bnya<\/em>), he accepts the respective empirical value and efficacy of the empirical things, like, pot, cloths, etc. Similarly, when he argues against the Naiyayikas that the pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> are not established (to be discussed in the forthcoming section), he doesn\u2019t deny their respective empirical functions. The relativism here is a methodological discourse, because it is not the end of thesis, rather a useful apparatus for making the point clear that the pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> are relative, so also, are their prameya<\/em>s, and thinking of each of them as a separate category in essentialist picturization amounts to their non-establishment.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Reason for his Argument against the Essentialist <\/strong>Pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em><\/strong> of Ny\u0101ya<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

The Arguments that Nagarjuna advances against the essentialist epistemology of Ny\u0101ya is called prasa\u1e45ga p\u0101d\u0101n\u0101m<\/em> or reductio ad absurdum<\/em> argument. It is a special type of argument that only takes up the opponents\u2019 thesis and demolishes it by showing absurdity in it. Often, there may not be any antithesis or alternative to be established in replacing the opponents\u2019 thesis in order to prove exactly whatever the opponent was viewing. Nagarjuna says, \u2018I have no thesis or pratij\u00f1\u0101<\/em> (n\u0101sti mama pratij\u00f1\u0101<\/em>). This specific standpoint of Nagarjuna\u2019 shows his consistency of supposing no essentialist view or destroying the essentialist views (sarvad\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6di prahara\u1e47a<\/em>) in the context of the argument. It should not be extended beyond the context to says that Nagarjuna has no philosophical position and nothing to say at all. There is a difference between saying \u2018someone has no alternative or counter thesis against or in place of the rejected thesis\u2019 and \u2018someone has no purpose in the argument or no business at all\u2019. A person or a strong wind sweeps away all dry leaves, not for putting other alternative dry leaves, but maybe, only to sweep away and clean. Why is there sweeping clean? The person may have some purpose, or the wind has some cause. Similar is the case of Nagarjuna declaring that he has no thesis or antithesis (pratij\u00f1\u0101<\/em>) against the refuted ones, but still he might have some purpose. Thus, looking internally within the debate he has no counter-thesis, but looking externally on the purpose of the debate he can be assigned with a position, and this position is characterized as cognitive relativism in the sense of relativism in cognitive matters, in consistence with his relativistic position throughout and that in the context of cognition.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

To assume relativism in Nagarjuna means to denounce Skepticism for him. There is a little difference between relativism and Skepticism for which a relativist may look like skeptic. Skepticism generally (a) raises the reasons for something impossible, (b) it does not advance the solution or alternative about the issue. Relativism has neither \u2018a\u2019 nor \u2018b\u2019. However, both \u2018a\u2019 and \u2018b\u2019 are seen in Nagarjuna\u2019s case, which other M\u0101dhyamikas have accepted as it is their vaita\u1e47dika<\/em> method,[2]<\/a> and for this reason, he is judged as skeptic at this level, and no relativism can be advanced at this level. Now, ask any skeptic, \u2018what is his purpose of advancing the skeptical arguments?\u2019 \u2018No purpose except exposing the issue\u2019 would be the answer from the skeptic. For Nagarjuna, however, there is a purpose, that is, to point out non-establishment of knowledge by which he exposes that there cannot be any essential immutable intrinsic nature in the phenomena. For this reason, Nagarjuna cannot be a skeptic in all levels, through a vaita\u1e47dika<\/em>. He is a vaita\u1e47dika<\/em> at the level of the arguments \u2013 level 1, but has philosophical and spiritual purpose at a meta-level \u2013 level 2, which is relativity and ni\u1e25svabh\u0101vat\u0101<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Now, if anybody can suppose for a relativist position for cognitivism, one can happen to assume a cognitive relativism. This can be assumed for Nagarjuna. The only difficulty here is that Nagarjuna has dismissed the establishment of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> by relating to the other or mutual establishment.\u00a0 One may fairly refer to this for rejecting any assumption of cognitive relativism. In this respect, it can be understood that the actions of level -1 may not be applicable to the ascription of a level 2. A soldier kills the attackers and plunders moved by benevolence and his duty towards saving people. Here, the soldier is a killer in one level, and at the same time, in another level, is a kind and dutiful savior. Similarly, Nagarjuna\u2019s exhibition of destructive dialectic arguments that lead to the action of cognitive Skepticism in one level may still not conflict with the ascription of cognitive relativism upon him in another level.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Consider the purpose of Nagarjuna that can make a room for the possibility of cognitive relativism in the context. While advancing the destructive dialectic against the Ny\u0101ya essentialist realist epistemology, Nagarjuna mentions why is going to criticize the pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em>. He says, ‘If you [i.e., essentialists and realists] think that things as prameya<\/em> are established through the pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>, then how is the pram\u0101\u1e47as <\/em>(i.e., perception, inference, verbal testimony, and comparison) are established?[3]<\/a> Thus, criticism of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> was conditional for the context of eradication of essentialist conception or svabh\u0101va<\/em> of prameya<\/em>. Such conditionality may not be taken for ascribing septicism. Rather the purpose of Nagarjuna behind the necessity of criticism of pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> may be taken, and that is the exposition of ni\u1e25svabh\u0101vat\u0101<\/em> and relativity.\u00a0 Thus, the ascription of cognitive relativism of Nagarjuna in the context of debates on pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> is well supported by his M\u0101dhyamika position. A Madhyamika always takes the middle paths avoiding the extremes. It may be understood here that Nagarjuna\u2019s philosophical enterprise aims at sarva d\u1e5b\u1e63\u1e6di prahara\u1e47a<\/em>, and for this reason, any \u2018ism\u2019 is not proper as a final characterization for his philosophy. The \u2018ism\u2019 is a provisional use as required for us accustomed with such languages in order to understand, and therefore his position as well.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Nagarjuna\u2019s Arguments against Essentialist <\/strong>Pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em><\/strong> of Ny\u0101ya<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Nagarjuna intends to expose the relative status of existing things and therefore their ni\u1e25svabh\u0101vat\u0101<\/em>, i.e., inter-dependent, non-essentialist status of prameya<\/em>s.\u00a0 For this, it is required for him to argue against the supposition of the independent and unique essentialist status of things, which the Naiyayikas claimed based on pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em>. If prameyas<\/em> are established as independent and essentialist conception by pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em>, whether pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em> are so established? Hence, he must examine the independent and essentialist status of pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em>.\u00a0 Nayayikas have both concepts of paratha pram\u0101\u1e47a<\/em> and svatah pram\u0101na<\/em> for cognition. in their pr\u0101m\u0101\u1e47yav\u0101da<\/em>. Nagarjuna\u2019s refutation starts using them for the pram\u0101\u1e47as<\/em>.\u00a0<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

Argument- 1. Examination of pram\u0101\u1e47a\u1e25 <\/em>on Parata\u1e25 Pr\u0101m\u0101\u1e47ya<\/em>:\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n